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Preamble
 
In August of 1998 the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center (CADRC) of the California 
Polytechnic State University in San Luis Obispo (Cal Poly), approached the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR) with the proposal for an annual workshop focusing on emerging concepts in 
decision-support systems for military applications. The proposal was considered timely by the 
ONR Logistics Program Office for at least two reasons. First, rapid advances in information 
systems technology over the past decade had produced distributed, collaborative computer-
assistance capabilities with profound potential for providing meaningful support to military decision 
makers. Indeed, some systems based on these new capabilities such as the Integrated Marine Multi-
Agent Command and Control System (IMMACCS) and the Integrated Computerized Deployment 
System (ICODES) had already reached the field testing and final product stages, respectively. 
Second, over the past two decades the US Navy and Marine Corps have been increasingly 
challenged by missions demanding the rapid deployment of forces into hostile or devastated 
territories with minimum or non-existent indigenous support capabilities. Under these conditions 
Marine Corps forces have to rely mostly, if not entirely, on sea-based support and sustainment 
operations. Operational strategies such as Operational Maneuver From The Sea (OMFTS) and 
Ship To Objective Maneuver (STOM) are very much in need of intelligent, real-time and adaptive 
decision-support tools to assist military commanders and their staff under conditions of rapid 
change and overwhelming data loads. 
In the light of these developments, Dr. Phillip Abraham of the Logistics Program Office of ONR 
considered it timely to provide an annual forum for the interchange of ideas, needs and concepts 
that would address the decision-support requirements and opportunities in combined Navy and 
Marine Corps sea-based warfare and humanitarian relief operations. The first ONR Workshop 
(Collaborative Decision Making Tools) was held April 20-22, 1999 and focused on advances in 
technology with particular emphasis on an emerging family of powerful computer-based tools. The 
workshop concluded that the most able members of this family of tools appear to be computer-
based agents that are capable of communicating within a virtual environment of objects and 
relationships representing the real world of sea-based operations.  Keynote speakers included: 
VAdm Jerry Tuttle (USN Ret.); LtGen Paul Van Riper (USMC Ret.); RAdm Leland Kollmorgen 
(USN Ret.); and, Dr. Gary Klein (Chairman, Klein Assoc.). 
The second Workshop (The Human-Computer Partnership in Decision-Support) held May 2­
4, 2000, was structured in two parts: a relatively small number of selected formal presentations (i.e., 
technical papers) followed each afternoon by four concurrent open forum discussion seminars. 
Keynote speakers included: Dr. Ronald DeMarco (Assoc. Technical Director, ONR); RAdm 
Charles Munns (USN); Col Robert Schmidle (USMC); and, Col Ray Cole (USMC Ret., Program 
Manager ELB ACTD, ONR). 
The third Workshop (Continuing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)) held June 5-7, 
2001, is the subject of these Proceedings.  Copies of the proceedings of past Workshops are 
available free of charge from: 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center (CADRC)
 
Cal Poly (Bdg. 117T)
 
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
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Opening Remarks
 
as a Foreword to the 3rd Annual Office of Naval Research Workshop
 
Good Morning! I would like to welcome you all to this third annual Collaborative Decision 
Support Workshop sponsored by the Logistics Program Office of the Office of Naval Research.  
am Jens Pohl, Executive Director of the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center at Cal Poly 
University in San Luis Obispo, California. Our Center, and Cal Poly, has had the honor of hosting 
this Workshop since 1999, and I am very gratified to see such a large attendance this year. 
One might well ask: Why should we have a Workshop on Collaborative Decision Support?; and: 
Why chose this year’s topic Continuing the Revolution in Military Affairs?  The answers to 
both of these questions are in fact quite logical. Certainly, nobody would argue that the Information 
Age has brought far reaching changes. 
•	 Technology is advancing at an unprecedented rate. 
•	 We appear to be inundated by the shear volume of information. However, we 
need to examine our words carefully here, are we really talking about 
information or is it just data? 
•	 Global connectivity has not only increased accessibility, but it has also 
greatly increased the complexity of most of our undertakings. 
•	 Our expectations of what we believe that we, as individuals, are capable of 
achieving have greatly increased. 
•	 And, it has become quite apparent that the value of each individual person 
has appreciated enormously in recent years. 
It is to be expected that these changes will also have a profound impact on the way the military will 
conduct its business over the next decade. Not only will these changes be reflected in the weapons 
that will be used and the warfighting strategies that will be employed, but also, the kind of 
capabilities the military will require from its decision-support systems. It is therefore by no means 
an overstatement to say that we are in the middle of a Revolution in Military Affairs. 
When we established our Center at Cal Poly more than 15 years ago we had a vision: We thought 
that it should be possible to utilize computers for more than just data-processing and 
visualization; - as an intelligent, collaborative assistant. Today, after much work by many 
centers and groups around the world, this vision is rapidly becoming a practical reality.  In this 
regard I would, in particular, like to recognize Dr. Phillip Abraham of the Office of Naval Research 
(ONR), who also shared this vision and saw the need to establish an Annual ONR Workshop 
Series on Collaborative Decision Support in 1999.  He saw a compelling need to explore several 
questions that could have profound impact on military affairs: 
•	 Could computers be more than dumb data-processors? 
•	 Should the difference between data and information be re-examined? 
•	 Could computers be intelligent tools collaborating with human users? 
•	 Were new concepts, notions, and approaches required? 
•	 Should existing entrenched schools of thought be challenged? 
He established this Workshop Series as a means of accelerating the transition from a data-centric 
to an information-centric decision-support systems environment.  Thank you Phil, for your 
foresight and support. 
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I believe that we can look forward to a most exciting and inspiring three days. The presentations 
and discussions will explore several important topics: 
•	 The essential need for, and purpose of, experimentation. 
•	 Practical innovations by some of our active and retired military commanders. 
•	 Technical innovations leading to information-centric interoperability. In this 
regard, during the last session this afternoon, we will be presenting a live 
demonstration of interoperability in which seven multi-agent systems will 
collaborate in a typical expeditionary warfare scenario. 
•	 And, what we need to do to clear some of the obstacles on the road ahead. 
Now I would like to ask my colleague and friend, Col Tony Wood (USMC Ret.), to introduce our 
distinguished keynote speaker, Mr. Andrew Marshall, Head of the Office of Net Assessment, US 
Department of Defense. 
Jens Pohl 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center, Cal Poly (San Luis Obispo) 
Quantico, June 5, 2001 
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Third Annual ONR / CADRC Decision Support Workshop
 
June 5-7, 2001, Quantico, Virginia
 The Office of Naval Research
&

 The Collaborative Agent Design Research Center,
 
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo
 
"Continuing the Revolution in Military Affairs (RMA)"

   Theme  A:  The Changing Role of the Military 
   Theme B: The Future of Decision Support 
   Theme C: The Transitional Period 
Tuesday, June 5: The Changing Role of the Military (Theme A) 

OFFICE OF 
NAVAL RESEARC
H 
USN 
 Time Activity 
7:30 	 Check-in and Registration Begins 
Registration Desk open from 7:30 AM to 4:30 PM 
8:30 - 8:45 	 Opening Remarks and Welcome by Dr. Jens Pohl, Executive Director,  
   Collaborative Agent Design Research Center, California Polytechnic State  
   University (Cal Poly), San Luis Obispo, CA. 
8:45 - 9:45 	 Keynote Address by Mr. Andrew W. Marshall, Head, The Office of Net  
   Assessment, The Pentagon. 
9:45 - 10:00 	 Break 
10:00 - 10:45 	 "Military Experimentation: Considerations and Applications"
Col. Anthony Wood (USMC Ret.), Director of Applied Research, Collaborative  
Agent Design Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. 
10:45 - 11:30 	 "Applying the Lessons of Hunter Warrior during Recent Operations in the  
   Persian Gulf" 
CDR Christopher Noble, US Navy.
11:30 - 1:00 	 Lunch 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center
 
California Polytechnic State University
 
San Luis Obispo, CA 93407
 
www.cadrc.calpoly.edu 
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Tuesday, June 5  ~ continued
 
 Time Activity
1:00 - 1:30 "Experimentation as a Compass for the Future" 
Col. James Lasswell (USMC Ret.), Senior Advisor, Marine Corps Warfighting  
Laboratory. 
1:30 - 2:00 "Experimentation: Staying Ahead of Today's Threats" 
Col. Ray Cole (USMC Ret.), Demonstration/Program Manager, Extending the  
Littoral Battlespace ACTD. 
2:00 - 2:30 "Insights into Optimum TTPs/SOPs for Battalion, Regimental, and Brigade 
Command and Control" 
Jim Murphy, Dynamics Research Corporation. 
2:30 - 2:45 Break
 Concurrent Sessions (by rotation)
   Session A Session B 
2:45 - 3:30 	 Demonstration (CADRC):      Dr. Jens Pohl (CADRC):
 and "Interoperability at the "Information-Centric 
3:30 - 4:15 Information Level" 	 Decision-Support Systems" 
4:15 	 End of Day 1 
Wednesday, June 6: The Future of Decision Support (Theme B) 
 Time Activity 
8:15 - 8:45 Introductory Remarks by Dr. Phillip Abraham, Logistics Program Office, 
   Office of Naval Research (ONR). 
8:45 - 9:45 Keynote Address by  RAdm. Jay M. Cohen, Chief of Naval Research, Office of  
   Naval Research (ONR). 
9:45 - 10:00 Break 
10:00 - 10:45 "Transformation and Joint Experimentation"
   Dr.  Theodore  S.  Gold, Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program. 
10.45 - 11:30 "Situation Awareness (SA) in a Knowledge-Centric C2 Application  
   Environment"
   Lt  Col. Robert Morris, Col.Sel., US Army.
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Wednesday, June 6  ~ continued
 
 Time Activity
11:30 - 1:00 	 Lunch 
1:00 - 1:30 	 "Perspective Filters as a Means for Interoperability Among Information- 
Centric Decision-Support Systems" 
Kym Jason Pohl, Senior Software Engineer, Collaborative Agent Design  
Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. 
1:30 - 2:00 	 "The Architecture of a Case-Based Reasoning Application" 
Michael Zang, Senior Software Engineer, Collaborative Agent Design Research  
Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo. 
2:00 - 2:30 	 "A Clustering Approach for Analyzing Complex Knowledge Bases" 
Mala Mehrotra, President, Pragati Synergetic Research Inc.
2:30 - 2:45 	 Break 
2:45 - 3:30 	 "SEAWAY Supply Mission Scheduling Using Computational Intelligence" 
Dr. Russell Eberhart , Associate Dean for Research, Purdue School of  
Engineering and Technology, Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis  
(IUPUI). 
3:30 - 4:15 	 "Project Albert + Rolf 2010 = RED ORM: A US-Sweden Decision-Support  
Collaboration" 
Dr. Alfred Brandstein, Chief Scientist, USMC MCCDC. 
4:15 	 End of Day 2 
Thursday, June 7: The Transitional Period  (Theme C) 
 Time Activity 
8:30 - 9:15 	 "Designing Communications Software for Tactical Wireless Networks"
   Dr.  Thomas McVittie, Principal Software Engineer, Mission Software Systems, 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory, California Institute of Technology. 
9:15 - 10:00 	 "Will We Ever Get to a Network-Centric Navy? DoD Aquisition System 
   Adjustments and Reforms Necessary to Bring About the Successful  
Migration"
   Capt.  Scot  Miller, US Navy, Naval War College.
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Thursday, June 7  ~ continued

 Time Activity 
10:00 - 10:45 	 "The Value of Decision-Support Tools in the Aquisition Process" 
Christopher Neff, CINCPACFLT Logistics Office. 
10:45 - 11:00 	 Closing Remarks by Dr. Phillip Abraham, Logistics Program Office,  
   Office of Naval Research (ONR). 
11:00 	 End of Day 3 
Address: POC: 
The Clubs at Quantico 
Quantico Marine Base 
3017 Russell Road 
Quantico, VA 22134 
Mrs. Phyllis Whitlock 
CDM Technologies, Inc. 
Tel:  (805)541-3750 Ext.235 
Fax: (805)541-1221 
E-Mail: Phyllis@cdmtech.com 
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About the Speakers
 
Dr. Phillip Abraham 
Logistics Program Office 
Office of Naval Research 
Dr. Abraham is a Scientific Officer at the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR). For the past seven years he has 
managed the ONR S&T Logistics Program. During the 
previous five years he was in charge of the ONR 6.1 
Structural Acoustics Program, the goal of which was 
minimizing emission/scattering of sound by submarines. 
From 1982 until 1989 he was a member of the Naval 
Research Laboratory where he did research on fluid-
structure interactions, and on wave propagation 
phenomena. He studied the propagation of acoustic 
waves in inhomogeneous and random media, and 
showed how to obtain results, to all orders, for both weak 
and strong perturbations. This work and work on 
reflection tomography were motivated by the need to 
detect passively or actively targets in the ocean. 
Dr. Abraham started working for the Navy in 1974 at the 
Underwater Sound Laboratory in New London, 
Connecticut. There his research dealt with underwater 
acoustics, focusing on detection and localization of 
underwater targets. Among other topics he determined 
the influence of size on magnetic anomaly detection 
(MAD) of ferromagnetic targets. In addition, he and Dr. 
H. Moses used inverse scattering theory to generate 
new families of potentials for which the Schrodinger 
equation has exact solutions. These were useful later 
on in determining acoustic wave propagation in the arctic 
ice cap. 
From 1970 until 1974, Dr. Abraham was an Assistant 
Professor of Physics at the University of Connecticut, 
where he taught and worked on Nonlinear Dynamics 
problems related to solitons. 
During 1968-1970, Dr. Abraham was employed by 
Raytheon Company in New London, Connecticut. There 
he worked on acoustic imaging in fluid media using an 
exact analytic approach. A concurrent laboratory 
experiment yielded a visual image, on a TV screen, of 
an insonified submerged object. At that time, it was the 
first such image generated with acoustic waves. 
From 1966 until 1968, Dr. Abraham was granted a 
Postdoctoral Research Associateship by the National 
Research Council. Located at NASA’s Goddard Space 
Flight Center, he worked on propagation of charged 
particles, originating from solar flares, through the 
interplanetary magnetic field. The results of the 
theoretical work matched quite well with experimental 
results obtained from high-altitude balloon flights. 
Dr. Abraham was awarded the Ph.D. in Physics by the 
University of Maryland in 1966. His thesis topic was in 
Solid State Physics, and it dealt with generating exactly 
solvable models of crystal lattices, which were used 
subsequently to check perturbation methods employed 
in the treatment of actual crystals. 
Dr. Alfred Brandstein 
Chief Scientist (SES-IV) 
USMC MCCDC 
Dr. Alfred George Brandstein holds a Bachelor of 
Science degree from Brooklyn College, with majors in 
Physics, Mathematics, and Astronomy, and a Ph.D. in 
Mathematics from Brown University. The topic of his 
doctoral dissertation was Function Spaces Related to 
hypo-Dirichlet Algebras. 
Dr. Brandstein joined the U.S. Army’s Harry Diamond 
Laboratories in 1972 after serving as a professor at 
the University of Conneticut. At Harry Diamond Labs, 
he engaged in research in the simulation of military 
communication systems and nuclear weapons effects. 
He transferred to the Analysis Support Branch of the 
Marine Corps Development Center in 1980 and served 
as Chief of that branch and as Deputy of the Plans 
Division. With the formation of the MAGTF Warfighting 
Center, Dr. Brandstein became Head of the Assesment 
Branch. During Desert Shield/Dessert Storm, he was 
Director of the Marine Corps Operations Analysis and 
Assessment Group (MCOAAG). 
Currently, he is Scientific Advisor/Senior Analyst, a 
Senior Level (SES-4 equivalent) position for the Marine 
Corps Combat Development Command. While at the 
Development Center, he completed the Command and 
Staff College Non-Resident Program. Dr. Brandstein, 
who has authored several hundred professional 
papers, is the recipient of the Darcom Systems Analysis 
Award, the Marine Corps Meritorious Civilian Service 
Award, and the Superior Civilian Service Award. He is 
a former director of the Military Operations Research 
Society and a recipient of the Clayton Thomas Award 
for technical achievement. He has served on numerous 
national and international panels and boards in such 
diverse areas as directed energy, acoustics, 
seismology, lasers, and mathematics. 
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RADM Jay M. Cohen 
Chief of Naval Research 
Rear Admiral Jay M. Cohen became the 20th Chief of 
Naval Research, commanding the Office of Naval 
Research (ONR), on June 7, 2000. As the Chief of Naval 
Research, RADM Cohen manages the science and 
technology programs of the Navy and Marine Corps 
from basic research through manufacturing 
technologies. 
In addition to his position as Chief of Naval Research, 
RADM Cohen also assumed the duties of Director, Test 
and Evaluation and Technology Requirements in the 
office of the Chief of Naval Operations, and Assistant 
Deputy Commandant (Science and Technology), 
Headquarters, US Marine Corps. 
Rear Admiral Jay M. Cohen received his commission 
as an Ensign upon graduation from the United States 
Naval Academy in 1968, where he was a Trident 
Scholar. After graduation, he qualified as a Navy diver 
with the SEALAB Group in San Diego, CA. Following 
training at Submarine School, New London, CT, he 
reported to USS DIODON (SS 349) in San Diego for 
duty as Supply and Weapons Officer during an extended 
WESTPAC deployment. He next studied at the 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology and Woods Hole 
Oceanographic Institution under the Navy’s Burke 
Scholarship Program. He received a joint Ocean 
Engineering degree and Master of Science in Marine 
Engineering and Naval Architecture from MIT. Following 
Nuclear Power Training, he was assigned to the 
Engineering Department aboard USS NATHANAEL 
GREENE (SSBN 636) (BLUE) in New London. He was 
next ordered to duty as Engineer Officer aboard USS 
NATHAN HALE (SSBN 623) (BLUE) in overhaul at 
Bremerton, WA, subsequently changing homeport to 
Charleston, SC. Upon completion of that tour, he served 
on the staff of the Commander Submarine Force, US 
Atlantic Fleet, from which he reported to USS GEORGE 
WASHINGTON CARVER (SSBN 656) (GOLD) in New 
London as Executive Officer. 
Rear Admiral Cohen commanded USS HYMAN G. 
RICKOVER (SSN 709) from January 1985 to January 
1988. Under his command, RICKOVER completed a 
Post New Construction Shakedown availability in New 
London, changed homeport to Norfolk, VA, and 
completed three deployments. RICKOVER was 
awarded a Navy Unit Commendation, a Meritorious 
Unit Commendation, the SIXTHFLT “Hook’em” Award 
for ASW excellence, CINCLANTFLT Golden Anchor 
Award for retention excellence, the COMSUBRON 8 
Battle Efficiency “E” Award, and was designated the 
best Atlantic Fleet Attack Submarine for the 
BATTENBURG CUP. 
Following command, Rear Admiral Cohen served on the 
staff of Commander in Chief, US Atlantic Fleet, as senior 
member of the Nuclear Propulsion Examining Board, 
and the staff of the Director of Naval Intelligence at the 
Pentagon as Director of Operational Support. 
Rear Admiral Cohen commanded USS L.Y. SPEAR (AS 
36) and her crew of 800 men and 400 women from March 
1991 to April 1993. During his tour, SPEAR was awarded 
the Submarine Force Atlantic Fleet Battle Efficiency “E” 
Award and conducted an unscheduled five-month 
deployment to the Persian Gulf in support of Operation 
DESERT STORM that included repairs to over 48 US 
and allied ships, recovery of an F/A-18 Hornet sitting in 
190 feet of water off the coast of Iran, and humanitarian 
projects in Kuwait City. SPEAR received a Meritorious 
Unit Commendation for the deployment, which was the 
ship’s first in eleven years. Additionally, SPEAR was the 
CINCLANTFLT 1991 Secretary of Defense Maintenance 
Award nominee and the only Atlantic Fleet tender 
recognized in two consecutive Golden Anchor 
competitions. 
In April 1993, Rear Admiral Cohen reported to SECNAV 
staff for duty as Deputy Chief of Navy Legislative Affairs. 
In October 1997, he was promoted to the rank of Rear 
Admiral and reported to the Joint Staff for duty as Deputy 
Director for Operations. In June 1999, he assumed 
duties as Director Navy Y2K Project Office. In May 2000, 
he was ordered to duty as Chief of Naval Research. 
Rear Admiral Cohen is authorized to wear the Defense 
Superior Service Medal and multiple awards of the 
Legion of Merit and Meritorious Service Medal. He is 
submarine and surface warfare qualified. 
Col. Raymond Cole 
USMC Ret. 
Demonstration/Program Manager 
Extending the Littoral Battlespace ACTD 
Raymond Cole was born in Philadelphia, Pennsylvania. 
He enlisted in the Marine Corps and was commissioned 
in November 1971 after graduating with a Bachelor of 
Arts Degree in Economics from Virginia Polytechnic 
Institute and State University in Blacksburg, Virginia. 
Mr. Cole served in a variety of command and staff 
positions with the 1st and 2nd Marine Divisions for almost 
eleven years. Subsequent tours included: Executive 
Officer, Marine Detachment, USS Saratoga, Instructor 
Amphibious Warfare School, and Executive Officer of 
Basic School Classes 5-79 and 3-80. 
From July 1980 to July 1983, Mr. Cole served with the 
2nd Marine Division, initially with 2nd Battalion, 8th 
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Marines as a Rifle Company Commander and Battalion 
Operations Officer, and then, as the Regimental 
Operations Officer, 8th Marines. He twice deployed to 
the Mediterranean and participated in operations to 
evacuate the Palestine Liberation Organization from 
Lebanon and in the subsequent peacekeeping mission. 
Mr. Cole served as a Ground Combat Analyst at 
Headquarters Marine Corps from July 1984 to July 1987. 
He transferred to the Basic school in July 1987 and 
served as the Tactics Group Chief until July 1989. 
In August 1990, Mr. Cole began his second tour with the 
1st Marine Division, serving as the Division Operations 
Officer during Operations Desert Shield and Storm. After 
the war, he commanded the 1st Light Armored Infantry 
Battalion and served as a Battalion Commander in Los 
Angeles during the 1992 Riots. He assumed duties as 
the Division G-3 in 1992 and deployed to Somalia in 
December 1992 in support of Operation Restore Hope. 
Then, Colonel Cole commanded 1st Marine Regiment 
from July 1993 until January 1995 when he assumed 
interim duties as the Chief of Staff, I Marine Expeditionary 
Force. 
Mr. Cole returned to Washington DC in June of 1995 
and served as the Chief, Land and Littoral Warfare Joint 
Warfighting Capabilities Assessment Division, J-8, the 
Joint Staff. During this tour, Mr. Cole served as the Co-
Executive Secretary for the 1996 Defense Science Board 
and the Modernization Panel Chief for the 1996 
Quadrennial Defense Review. 
During his active service, Mr. Cole attended the Marine 
Corps’ Amphibious Warfare School and Command and 
Staff College and the National War College at Fort 
McNair during the academic year 1989-1990. Mr. Cole 
received personal decorations that include the Defense 
Superior Service Award, Legion of Merit with Gold Star 
and Combat Distinguishing Device, Meritorious Service 
Medal with Gold Star, Navy Commendation Medal, Navy 
Achievement Medal, and Combat Action Ribbon. In 
1991, Mr. Cole was awarded the Navy League’s “Holland 
M. Smith Award” for Operational Competence. 
Mr. Cole retired from the Marine Corps in 1997 and joined 
Booz Allen & Hamilton where he worked as a Consultant 
to both the ELB ACTD and the Urban Warrior AWE.  In 
June 1999, Mr. Cole assumed his present responsibilities 
as the Program/Demonstration Manager for the ELB 
ACTD. Mr. Cole serves in his present position as an 
IPA from the Potomac Institute for Policy Studies. 
Mr. Cole is married to the former Dianne Casteel of 
Virginia Beach, Virginia. They have one daughter, 
Adrian, and three sons: Brian, Adam, and Mark. 
Dr. Russell C. Eberhart 
Associate Dean for Research, Purdue School of 
Engineering and Technology, Indiana University 
Purdue University Indianapolis (IUPUI) 
Russell C. Eberhart is the Associate Dean for Research 
at the Purdue School of Engineering and Technology, 
Indiana University Purdue University Indianapolis 
(IUPUI). He is also Director of the Biomedical Research 
and Development Center and Professor of Electrical and 
Computer Engineering. He received his Ph.D. from 
Kansas State University in electrical engineering. In 
addition, he is co-editor of a book on neural networks, 
now in its fifth printing and co-author of Computational 
Intelligence PC Tools, published in 1996 by Academic 
Press. His recent book with Jim Kennedy and Yuhui 
Shi entitled, Swarm Intelligence, was published by 
Morgan Kaufmann/Academic Press in October 2000. 
Furthermore, he is Associate Editor of the IEEE 
Transactions on Evolutionary Computation and was 
recently awarded the IEEE Third Millenium Medal. 
Dr. Theodore S. Gold 
Director, Joint Advanced Warfighting Program, 
Institute for Defense Analyses 
Dr. Gold’s career has concentrated on the applications of 
technology to national security. He has conducted and 
managed R&D at a National Laboratory, served in 
government in the Department of Defense, provided 
technical services and strategic planning advice to 
government and industry clients, and led many end-to­
end systems and architectural efforts. 
Dr. Gold is currently Director of the Joint Advanced 
Warfighting Programs at the Institute for Defense 
Analyses, IDA. This new activity was established by the 
DoD to help develop and experiment with new joint 
operational concepts and capabilities. 
Dr. Gold is a member of DoD’s Threat Reduction Advisory 
Committee, the Defense Science Board, and for a four-
year term, was Chairman of DoD’s Ballistic Missile 
Defense Advisory Committee. His recent Defense 
Science Board activities include chairing studies of 
coalition warfare, rapid force projection, modeling & 
simulation, the transnational chemical and biological 
warfare threat, and cruise and ballistic missile defenses. 
Prior to moving to his current position at IDA in March 
1998, Dr. Gold had been President of Hicks & Associates, 
Inc. (H&AI). Before joining H&AI in 1987, Dr. Gold had 
established and managed a National Security Studies 
Group at Booz-Allen and Hamilton. 
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In the early 1980s, Dr. Gold served as Deputy Assistant 
to the Secretary of Defense responsible for chemical 
warfare deterrence and biological warfare defense 
programs. He was the first occupant of this position 
and worked closely with the military to improve the 
posture of our forces, while guiding DoD’s research, 
development, and procurement activities in these areas. 
He was also a major participant in the nation’s chemical 
arms control initiatives. 
Before his government service, Dr. Gold held a variety 
of technical and management positions during a twenty-
year career at Sandia National Laboratories. Much of 
his efforts at Sandia were directed toward helping ensure 
the safety, security, reliability, and control of nuclear 
weapons. He also designed weapon survivability, safing, 
and fuzing systems; led many system analysis efforts; 
conducted research in weapon effects; managed a large 
scale computing and programming center; and, 
developed energy technologies. 
Dr. Gold received a BSEE degree from Renssalaer 
Polytechnic Institute, an M.S. degree in Electrical 
Engineering from the University of New Mexico, and a 
Ph.D. in Engineering from the University of California, 
Davis. 
He is married to Dr. Sydell Gold. The Golds reside in 
McLean, VA and have three grown children: a daughter 
and two sons. 
Col. James Lasswell 
USMC Ret. 
Senior Advisor 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 
James A. Lasswell has been the senior analyst for GAMA 
Corporation since June 1998. In this capacity, he has 
been responsible for a series of advanced concept 
wargaming as well as supporting the development of 
the Collin’s Combat Decision Range under contract for 
the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory (MCWL). 
A retired US Marine Corps Colonel, he was the Head 
of Experimental Operations at MCWL and served as 
Experiment Control for the seminal Hunter Warrior 
Advanced Warfighting Experiment during March 1997. 
In addition, he has over 10 years military experience 
in political, military, and strategic plans positions 
including serving as the Head of the Commandant’s 
Staff Group, as well as additional duties that included 
serving as Co-chairman of two Office of the Secretary 
of Defense sponsored Revolution in Military Affairs Task 
Forces. Mr. Lasswell was the Marine Corps author for 
the Naval Services’ strategic concept document titled, 
Forward... From the Sea, and is a frequent contributor 
to professional journals on future technology and 
conceptual issues. 
Andrew W. Marshall 
Head, The Office of Net Assessment 
The Pentagon 
Andrew W. Marshall is the Advisor to the Secretary of 
Defense for Net Assessment. Mr. Marshall founded 
the Office of Net Assessment, which provides 
Secretaries of Defense, other managers, and military 
commanders with assessments of military balancing, 
major geographic theatres, and mission areas. These 
assessments are designed to highlight existing or 
emerging problem areas or important opportunities that 
deserve top-level management’s attention to improve 
the future US position in the continuing military­
economic-political competition. Major asymmetries in 
the capabilities, organizations, operational concepts, 
and strategies of the US and all major actors relevant 
to the continuing competition in specific balance areas 
are addressed.                                                           
While working in the Office of the Secretary of Defense, 
Mr. Marshall has conducted discussions with groups 
in other countries performing similar or related 
assessments, including major, continuing interchanges 
with the governments of Australia, France, Germany, 
Israel, Japan, and Sweden. Mr. Marshall has 
encouraged and participated in the development of 
strategic planning, in particular, the competitive 
strategies initiative. From 1986-1988, he was the co­
chairman of the Future Security Environment Working 
Group on the President’s Commission on Integrated 
Long-Term Strategy.  In addition, he was Chairman of 
the Nuclear Strategy Development Group from 1984­
1985. 
Between April 1972 and October 1973, Mr. Marshall 
was a member of the National Security Council Staff 
where he established and directed the NSC Net 
Assessment Group. This group provided staff support 
of the National Security Council Intelligence Committee. 
During this period, he monitored the implementation 
of the November 1971 reorganization of the Intelligence 
Community ordered by President Nixon. 
Mr. Marshall was at RAND Corp. from 1949 until 1972. 
While at RAND, his major areas of research included: 
nuclear targeting; strategic warning; Monte Carlo 
simulation methods; analysis of Soviet military 
programs; application of organizational behavior theory 
to military analysis; and, the development of strategic 
planning concepts, including strategy for long-term US-
Soviet political-military competition. 
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Mr. Marshall holds an A.M. in Economics from the 
University of Chicago (1949) and attended the 
University of Detroit (1940-41) and Wayne University 
(1943-1945). 
Dr. Thomas McVittie 
Principal Software Engineer 
Mission Software Systems 
Jet Propulsion Laboratory 
California Institute of Technology 
Thomas McVittie is a principal software engineer at 
NASA’s Jet Propulsion Laboratory. His research interests 
include highly reliable object-based distributed systems 
and fault tolerant system architectures. 
McVittie has a Ph.D. in Electrical and Computer 
Engineering from the University of California at Santa 
Barbara. He is the systems architect for the Defense 
Information Infrastructure (DII) Common Operating 
Environment (COE) Kernel and the principal designer 
of the Shared Net, which is an object-based information 
sharing system designed for the USMC.                 
Mala Mehrotra 
President
 
Pragati Synergetic Research Inc.
 
Mala Mehrotra is the founder and President of Pragati 
Synergetic Research, Inc, a small business located in 
Cupertino, CA. The company has recently relocated from 
VA to the Silicon Valley. Since its inception eight years 
ago in VA, Pragati Inc. has been performing high-end 
artificial intelligence research for mainly government 
contracts. Its clients have been DARPA, Air Force, Navy, 
NSF, DOT (Department of Transportation), and several 
others. 
Mala Mehrotra has an M.S. degree with a concentration 
in artificial intelligence and parallel computing from the 
College of William and Mary in VA. In addition, she has 
an M.S. in Nuclear Physics from Delhi University, India. 
Her B.S. degree was in Physics (Hons) from Calcutta 
University, India. 
As an on-site contractor at Systems Validation and 
Methodology Branch (SVMB), NASA Langley Research 
Center in Hampton, VA from 1989-93, Ms. Mehrotra 
developed various methodologies for software 
engineering of knowledge-based systems. She has 
been the principal architect of the prototype Multi-
ViewPoint Clustering Analysis Tool (MVP-CA), that 
partitions large and complex knowledge-based systems 
into meaningful units for the purpose of software 
engineering them. She has been the recipient of several 
SBIR awards from NASA, NSF, and AF, relating to the 
development and application of the MVP-CA tool. Her 
presentation will describe salient aspects of her 
technology as well as her experiences in analyzing 
IMMACCS, a multi-agent system for command and 
control developed by the CADRC. 
Capt. Scot A. Miller 
United States Navy 
Naval War College 
Ensign Miller entered the Navy from the US Naval 
Academy in 1978 and was designated a Naval Aviator in 
December 1979. His first operational unit was Patrol 
Squadron FORTY at NAS Moffett Field, CA, flying the 
P-3C Orion. He deployed three times to Misawa, Japan, 
with detachments to Cubi Point, RP, and Diego Garcia, 
BIOT. 
From 1983-1986, LT Miller served as a flight instructor 
at Training Squadron THREE, flying the T-34C. In 1985, 
he was named squadron Instructor of the Year. In 1986, 
LT Miller reported aboard the USS CARL VINSON (CVN­
70) in Alameda, CA as an aircraft launch and recovery 
officer. He also qualified and stood regular watches as 
a Tactical Action Officer. LT Miller deployed twice to the 
Indian Ocean and North Arabian Sea. From 1988-1989, 
LCDR Miller served as Aide and Flag Lieutenant to the 
Commander, Operational Test and Evaluation Force in 
Norfolk, VA. 
After training at the Fleet Replacement Squadron, LCDR 
Miller returned to Patrol Squadron FORTY at Moffett 
Field, CA. He served as the Administrative, Tactics, and 
Maintenance Officer and deployed to Misawa, Japan, 
with a detachment to Diego Garcia, BIOT. In 1994, CDR 
Miller was assigned as the Modeling and Simulation 
Officer at CINCPACFLT in Pearl Harbor, HI. He tested 
modeling and simulation capabilities on board naval 
ships. 
CDR Miller reported aboard the staff of Commander, 
THIRD Fleet on the USS CORONADO, home ported in 
San Diego, CA in 1997. He was the first permanently 
assigned Director of the Sea Based Battle Laboratory 
and coordinated numerous limited objective experiments, 
Fleet Battle Experiment ECHO, and a Marine Corps 
advanced warfighting experiment. In 1999, CDR Miller 
became the first Director of the COMTHIRDFLT Network 
Centric Innovation Center. In this role, he worked to 
improve fleet use of existing IT infrastructure. 
Besides a B.S. in Operations Analysis from the United 
States Naval Academy (1978), CAPT Miller holds an 
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MBA from the University of West Florida (1986) and an 
M.S. in Operations Analysis from the Naval Postgraduate 
School (1994). He is married to the former Wendy Barry 
of Albemarle, NC.  They have one son, Jeffrey. 
CAPT Scot Miller is currently a student at the Naval War 
College in Newport, RI. Recently, CAPT Miller served as 
the first Director of the Network Centric Innovation Center 
for COMTHIRDFLT, where his team assisted deploying 
battle groups and amphibious ready groups to improve 
employment of their new IT infrastructure. Previously, 
he was the first director of COMTHIRDFLT’s Sea Based 
Battle Laboratory from 1997-1999. His experience as 
the Modeling and Simulation Officer at CINCPACFLT from 
1994-1997 led to his billets at COMTHIRDFLT. CAPT 
Miller coordinated a variety of technology and process 
innovations and experiments during this time frame. He 
supported several Decision-Support design proposals for 
operational commanders and worked closely with several 
future information management initiatives. During several 
Joint Task Force exercises and Fleet Battle Experiment 
ALFA, he introduced operational level modeling and 
simulation support to the decision maker at sea. CAPT 
Miller is an enthusiast and novice facilitator for Group 
Support Systems. CAPT Miller just completed an 
Advanced Research Project at Naval War College which 
focused on modifications and reforms necessary to 
migrate the Navy to a more capable network-centric force. 
Upon graduation, CAPT Miller has been ordered to the 
Naval Warfare and Space Systems Command in San 
Diego. 
LTC Robert C. Morris Jr. 
Col. Sel.                                                                         
US Army                                                                
Lieutenant Colonel Morris graduated from the Virginia 
Military Institute receiving his commission in Infantry in 
1979. His initial assignment was with the 1st Battalion, 
31st Infantry in Korea where he served as a Rifle Platoon 
Leader, Company Executive Officer, and Scout Platoon 
Leader. LTC Morris was next assigned to the 2d Battalion 
(Ranger), 75th Infantry in Fort Lewis where he served as a 
Rifle Platoon Leader, then as Battalion Support Platoon 
Leader supporting Operation Urgent Fury. Following the 
Infantry Officer Advance Course, LTC Morris was assigned 
to the 4th Battalion, 325th Infantry (Airborne) Battalion 
Combat Team as the Battalion S-4. He returned with the 
unit to the 82d Airborne Division and Fort Bragg as a 
Company Commander and later served as the Battalion 
S-3. LTC Morris served three years with the Joint Special 
Operations Command at Pope Air Force Base, North 
Carolina as the Logistics Plans and Procurement Officer 
supporting special operations combat missions that 
include Just Cause (to include the capture of Manuel 
Noriega), Desert Shield/Desert Storm, and several 
classified operations.                                         
After the Command and General Staff College, LTC Morris 
was assigned to Alaska where he served as the 6th Infantry 
Division EDRE/Force Modernization officer responsible 
for re-organizing the 6th Infantry Division to the Separate 
Infantry Brigade. He also served in Alaska as the 6th 
Infantry Division Operations Officer, Battalion Executive 
Officer for the 4th Battalion, 9th Infantry (Manchus), and 
the 1st Brigade, 6th Infantry Division (Light) Executive 
Officer. Following his assignment in Alaska, LTC Morris 
completed an assignment as Special Project Officer to 
the Assistant Secretary of Defense for Special Operations 
and Low Intensity Conflict, where he supported numerous 
international humanitarian organizations, programs, and 
operations that include the International War Crimes 
Tribunal for Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia. In 
addition, he was an author of the United Nations 
contingency support package concept. LTC Morris was 
selected as the battalion commander for 1st Battalion, 11th 
Infantry at Fort Benning, Georgia, and subsequently, 
served as the Chief of the Forced Entry Lab, Dismounted 
Battle Space Battle Lab, and Fort Benning, Georgia, where 
he refined the concept and configuration for Enroute 
Mission Planning. Most recently, because of his expertise 
in Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal, LTC Morris 
was personally selected by the Army Vice Chief of Staff 
to serve as an Army MEL-1 Fellow with the specific charter 
to study the requirements and develop a long-range plan 
for a Joint Enroute Mission Planning and Rehearsal 
System. In this capacity and in support of this Enroute 
Mission Planning research, LTC Morris conducted the first 
ever detailed Work Style and Work Style Under Stress 
study of Army Rapid deployment forces. LTC Morris also 
serves as a Subject Matter Expert for NGO/PVO civil-
military interoperability for the Army Command and 
General Staff College. As a volunteer, he authored and 
facilitated the World Food Programs first-ever deliberate 
planning course and program.                                 
In 1994, LTC Morris founded the non-profit organization, 
Partners International Foundation, a 501(C)(3) Public 
charity for which he currently serves as president. Partners 
International Foundation has no paid employees and 
current projects include raising funds to establish a Women 
and Children’s wellness center in Rwanda for victims of 
the genocide, operating an eye clinic in Zimbabwe, and 
providing medical supplies to a women and children’s 
hospital in Grenada. Programs in the United States 
include Human Rights training for international military 
officers and support to homeless shelters, battered 
women’s shelters, Native American programs, and the 
disabled. The foundation also supports The World Peace 
Club, an Internet project run by children to promote 
understanding between nationalities. Partners 
International has close ties to the Columbus community 
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through the Muscogee Rotary, where it supports several 
of the club’s overseas programs and is seeking funding 
to support its Minds Without Boarders program to train 
teachers in special skills to increase the learning level of 
poor learners in disadvantaged communities. 
(www.partners-international.org) 
LTC Morris’ decorations include the Legion of Merit, the 
Bronze Star, the Defense Meritorious Service Medal, five 
awards of the Meritorious Service Medal, the Joint Service 
Commendation Medal with two bronze oak leaf clusters, 
the Army Commendation Medal, the Joint Service 
Achievement Medal, the Joint Meritorious Unit Award, the 
Army Achievement Medal with five oak leaf clusters, the 
Superior Volunteer Service Medal, Southwest Asia Service 
Medal with two bronze stars, the Armed Forces 
Expeditionary Medal, the Army Service Ribbon, the 
Overseas Service Ribbon with two bronze oak leaf 
clusters, the Southeast Asia Kuwait Liberation Medal, the 
Government of Kuwait Liberation Medal, the National 
Defense Service Medal, the Expert Infantryman’s Badge, 
Master Parachutist Badge, and Ranger Tab. 
Lieutenant Colonel Morris is married to the former Kim E. 
Etzler and they have two children: Katie, 14, and Robert 
John, 14 months. 
Col. Jim Murphy 
USMC Ret. 
Analyst 
Dynamics Research Corporation 
Jim Murphy is a retired Marine colonel who has specialized 
in tactical command and control studies since leaving 
active duty in 1992. He worked initially as an after-action 
review (AAR) exercise analyst in the Eighth Army Battle 
Simulation Center in Korea. Subsequently, he assisted 
in the exercise design and execution portions of the first 
two Army STOW (Strategic Theater of War) experiment: 
STOW-Europe in 1994 and Prairie Warrior 95. In 1997, 
he became one of a number of persons who can claim to 
have written one of the drafts of Marine Corps Warfighting 
Publication (MCWP) 5-1, Operational Planning. 
Joining DRC in October 1997, he served as the military 
functional member of an Army Research Laboratory (ARL) 
cognitive engineering team developing both process and 
cognitive models of the commander’s decision-making 
process. In a related project, he was the lead analyst in 
developing prototype behaviorally anchored rating scales 
(BARS) for 17 commander-staff team proficiencies. He 
continues to support the Human Factors analysis team at 
ARL. He participates as a field data collector and post-
experiment analyst in the continuing series of advanced 
warfighting experiments (AWE) supporting the development 
of the Army Battle Command System (ABCS). 
He had a balanced mix of command and staff experience 
while on active duty and was a Joint Specialty Officer. He 
is a graduate of the US Military Academy and the US Army 
Command and General Staff College. He has a Master 
of Military Art and Science (MMAS) degree from CGSC 
and an MBA from Hofstra University. 
Christopher K. Neff                             
Logistics Program Analyst                                  
CINCPACFLT Logistics Office                             
US Pacific Fleet                                                       
Chris Neff has been serving as the principal logistics 
program analyst for the US Pacific Fleet since May 1999. 
Prior to this post, he was the principal Base Operating 
Support (BOS) program analyst for facilities and base 
support services throughout the Pacific Fleet Area of 
Responsibility from Nevada to the Indian Ocean. 
Mr. Neff enlisted in the US Navy in 1969 and was 
subsequently selected for the Navy’s Enlisted Scientific 
Education Program (NESEP), where he earned a Bachelor 
of Engineering Degree in Computer Science prior to 
assuming jobs as an Electronic Material Officer,and Supply 
Officer on USS Davidson and USS O’Callahan 
respectively. His 21 year career included assignments 
as Accounting Officer, Financial Management Officer, a 
financial systems project director, Fleet Budget Officer, 
and comptroller, on the staffs of the US Surface Force 
commander Pacific Fleet, Chief of Naval Operations, Navy 
Comptroller, Pacific Fleet Commander, and Commander 
Naval Logistics Command, Pacific. 
He has been a regular lecturer at the Navy’s Postgraduate 
school in the area of financial management and has taught 
graduate and undergraduate courses in financial and 
managerial accounting, as well as strategic management. 
He has a Masters Degree in Business Administration. 
CDR Christopher D. Noble 
Surface Warfare Analyst 
US Navy 
Commander Noble is the son of Dr. Charles and Anna 
Mary Noble. A native of Northeastern Oklahoma, he 
received his commission from the Officer Candidate 
School, Newport, Rhode Island, in the summer of 1980. 
Commander Noble has completed six sea and two 
shore tours. He first served as a division officer on USS 
BARBEY FF-1088 and USS CHANDLER DDG-996. 
Then as a department head, he served tours as 
Engineer Officer on USS MCCLUSKY FFG-41 and as 
Damage Control Assistant on USS RANGER CV-61. 
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Additionally, he was the first Commanding Officer of USS 
GLADIATOR MCM-11. He commanded USS 
FLETCHER DD-992 from June of 99 until December of 
00 completing an Arabian Gulf CVBG deployment. 
While at sea, he completed five major deployments that 
include Operations Earnest Will, Desert Shield, Desert 
Storm, MCM Euro 95, and Operation Southern Watch. 
Ashore, Commander Noble has served in Washington 
as a deputy resources and requirements sponsor on 
the OPNAV staff in the Expeditionary Warfare 
Directorate. He also served as Special Assistant to the 
Director of the Commandants Warfighting Laboratory 
for the Hunter Warrior Battle experiment. Commander 
Noble is now the Surface Warfare Analyst in the 
Secretary of the Navy’s Office of Program Appraisal. 
Commander Noble’s education includes both traditional 
and joint curricula. He holds a B.S. in Biology from the 
University of the State of New York and a M.S. in 
Weapons Systems from the Naval Postgraduate School 
in Monterey. He has completed joint professional 
education by attending the US Army’s Senior War 
College in Carlisle and the Joint and Combined 
Warfighting course at the Armed Forces Staff College 
in Norfolk. 
Among Commander Noble’s awards are: Meritorious 
Service Medal (three awards), Navy Commendation 
Medal (two awards), Navy Achievement Medal, Navy 
Unit Citation, Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal, 
National Defense Medal, and Kuwait Liberation Medal. 
Commander Noble is married to Dianne, daughter of 
Norman and Lene Piper of Sun City, California. They 
have three sons, Clint, Barret, and Travis. 
Dr. Jens G. Pohl 
Executive Director 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center 
Professor of Architecture 
California Polytechnic State University 
Dr. Jens Pohl holds the positions of Professor of 
Architecture, Executive Director of the Collaborative 
Agent Design Research Center (CADRC), and Post-
Graduate Studies Coordinator in the College of 
Architecture and Environmental Design, California 
Polytechnic State University (Cal Poly), San Luis Obispo, 
California, US.                                                   
Professor Pohl received his formal education in Australia 
with degrees in Architecture and Architectural Science: 
B.Arch. (University of Melbourne, 1965) M.Bdg.Sc. and 
Ph.D. (University of Sydney 1967 and 1970). He taught 
in the School of Building at the University of New South 
Wales in Sydney, Australia, until the end of 1972 and 
then left for the US where he was appointed to the position 
of Professor of Architecture at Cal Poly. Following several 
years of research and consulting activities in the areas 
of building-support services and information systems, Dr. 
Pohl’s research focus today lies in the application of 
distributed artificial intelligence methodologies to decision-
support systems in engineering design, logistical 
planning, and military command and control. 
Under his direction, the CADRC at Cal Poly has over the 
past decade developed and implemented a number of 
distributed computing applications in which multiple 
computer-based and human agents collaborate in the 
solution of complex problems. Foremost among these 
are the ICDM (Integrated Cooperative Decision Model) 
and TIRAC (Toolkit for Information Representation and 
Agent Collaboration) frameworks which have been 
applied to engineering design (industry sponsorship: 
ICADS - 1986 to 1991), energy conservation (US Dept. 
of Energy sponsorship: AEDOT - 1992 to 1993), logistical 
planning (US Army (MTMC) sponsorship: ICODES - 1993 
to present), military mission planning (US Marine Corps 
(MCWL) sponsorship: FEAT, FEAT4, and IMMACCS ­
1994 to present), and facility management (US Navy 
(ONR) sponsorship: CIAT and SEAWAY- 1996 to present). 
The Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and 
Control System (IMMACCS) was successfully field-
tested as the command and control system of record 
during the Urban Warrior Advanced Warfighting Exercise 
(AWE) conducted by the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory (MCWL) in Central California (Monterey and 
Oakland) during the period March 11 to 18, 1999, and 
during a live fire Limited Objectives Exercise (LOE) held 
at Twentynine Palms, California, in March 2000. The 
Integrated Computerized Deployment System (ICODES) 
was designated by the US Department of Defense as 
the ‘migration system’ for ship loading in July 1995. 
ICODES 3 was released to the US Army in 1997, and 
ICODES 5 was released to the US Marine Corps and 
US Navy this year (2001). 
Dr. Pohl is the author of two patents (US), several books, 
and more than 80 research papers. He is a Fellow of the 
International Institute for Advanced Studies in Systems 
Research and Cybernetics and was awarded an 
honorary doctorate by the Institute in August, 1998, 
during the InterSymp-98 conference held in Baden-
Baden, Germany. Professor Pohl is a Fellow of the Royal 
Australian Institute of Architects, a Fellow of the Australian 
Institute of Building, a Member of the American Institute 
of Constructors, and a member of IEEE. He is a licensed 
architect in the states of New South Wales and Victoria, 
Australia. 
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Kym J. Pohl 
Senior Software Engineer 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center 
California Polytechnic State University 
Kym Pohl is a Senior Software Engineer at the Cal Poly 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center. In addition 
to providing technical consultation on a number of 
projects, Kym currently provides technical leadership for 
the SEAWAY and LOGGY maritime logistics project, the 
FCADS Command and Control System, and the ICDM 
project. Kym holds Bachelor of Science and Master of 
Science degrees in Computer Science and a Master of 
Science degree in Architecture. His research interests 
are in the application of agent-based decision-support 
theory. 
Col. Anthony A. Wood 
USMC (Ret.) 
Director of Applied Research 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center 
California Polytechnic State University 
Colonel Anthony A. Wood joined the Collaborative Agent 
Design (CAD) Research Center at California Polytechnic 
State University in 1998 as Director of Applied Research. 
A Marine for over 30 years, including more than two years 
of combat duty, Colonel Wood joined the CAD Research 
Center following a distinguished career during which he 
was twice decorated with the Distinguished Service 
Medal, the nation’s second highest, as well as the Legion 
of Merit, Bronze Star, and others. In the course of his 
service, he has been responsible for a number of unique 
conceptual and practical contributions to joint warfare, 
naval expeditionary warfare, and our military posture in 
the Pacific. 
In 1968, he served his first tour in Vietnam as a platoon 
commander and then advisor to the Korean Marine Corps 
Blue Dragon Brigade. In his second tour in Vietnam in 
1974-75, Captain Wood commanded a joint-contingent 
executing clandestine mission in Laos, Cambodia, and 
Vietnam. In January 1975, Maj General Homer Smith, 
USA, the Defense Attache in Saigon, had him transferred 
to the Defense Attache Office, where has was directed 
to secretly develop a plan for the evacuation of Saigon. 
Capt. Wood then executed that plan in April of 1975. 
Col. Wood has since served in a succession of infantry 
and reconnaisance command billets and several staff 
assignments. 
As the principal author of the US Navy and Marine Corps 
“Maritime Prepositioning Concept”, he developed a 
detailed concept and then supervised the implementation 
of a national strategic response capability based on 
forward positioning three squadrons of specially 
configured climate controlled ships. Each of these 
squadrons contained prepackaged supplies and 
equipment sufficient to support a force of 15,000 Marines 
for thirty days. 
While serving as Chief of Staff Marine Forces Pacific, 
Colonel Wood was dispatched to Russia in 1993. There, 
over a two-week period of negotiations, he successfully 
concluded a major tension reduction agreement and multi­
year exercise program with the Russian General Staff, 
the Commander Russian Pacific Fleet in Vladivostok, and 
the Commander Russian Far East Military District in 
Kharbovsk. Designed to relax tensions and reduce the 
risk of nuclear incidents in the Pacific Theater, the 
agreement has since been extended. 
Colonel Wood’s last billet was as founding Director and 
Commanding Officer of the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory from 1995-1998. Unique in its concept-based 
approach as well as its projection of a very different and 
non-traditional post cold war future, the laboratory spear 
headed Marine experiments to recast military capabilities 
in a mold appropriate to emerging future requirements. 
Col. Wood’s decorations include the Distinguished Service 
Medal (multiple awards), the Legion of Merit, the Bronze 
Star with Combat V, the Meritorious Service Medal, the 
Joint Commendation Medal (multiple awards), and the 
Combat Action Ribbon (multiple awards). At the time of 
his retirement in June 1998, Colonel Wood was the only 
Colonel or Captain on active duty in any service to have 
been twice awarded the Distinguished Service Medal. 
Michael Zang 
Senior Software Engineer 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center 
California Polytechnic State University 
Mike Zang is a Senior Software Engineer at the Cal Poly 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center. Mike 
currently provides technical leadership for the OTIS and 
SILS maritime logistics projects, the CIAT port 
management project, and the COACH project for 
providing repair assistance, as well as technical 
consultation on a number of other projects. Mike holds a 
dual Bachelor of Science degree in Electronic Engineering 
and Physics. He was a ROTC scholarship recipient and 
worked as an officer in the Army Reserves for 8 years. 
His research interests are in software system architecture 
and applied artificial intelligence. 
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Keynote Address 
Mr. Andrew W. Marshall
 
Head, The Office of Net Assessment
 
US Department of Defense
 
Thank you very much for the overly generous introduction. What I wanted to talk with you 
about this morning is first, the importance of field experimentation, and second, to say a few 
words about the history of past military innovations and what made such efforts successful. I 
myself am not an expert in actually running field experiments. A number of you know much 
more than I do about actually running such events. So what I have to say is based primarily on 
history. 
Over the years I have become interested in the history of periods of major change. Over a decade 
or so ago, when we first began to examine the possibility that we were living in a period where 
major change in warfare is likely or plausible, one of the things I did was to initiate a number of 
historical studies to gain some understanding of what actually happens during such periods. 
How does the change process occur, how long does it take, and particularly I wanted to gain 
some insight into past periods during which there were competing military organizations that 
more or less had the same technology and the same opportunities. In short, I wanted to 
understand why one organization did better than another. 
Let me talk briefly about the period that we are in now. I think that there is a growing belief, 
certainly not everyone actually believes it, but a large portion of people do sense that we are 
living in a period of really major change. A period in which we are not just dealing with normal 
steady progress, but a period in which really disruptive change could take place. In the military 
area, we owe our current attention to the idea of revolution in military affairs to the military 
theorists in the Soviet Union. They began writing about this idea of periods of military 
revolution which the historians of more than forty years ago first raised. Periods, in the broad 
sweep of history, where really significant change in warfare takes place. Periods of perhaps a 
couple of decades or fifty years. While historians argue about the number of such periods, 
ranging from six to twelve since the 15th Century, they appear to be coming closer together, 
perhaps because many of these periods (although not all of them) are driven by technological 
change. In any case, that we have become self-aware that we may be in such a period of major 
change, we owe to the Russian military theatres too. 
What is interesting about those periods and particularly some of the more recent ones, like the 
1920s and 1930s, is that the more successful military organizations in these periods tend to be 
those that find the right operational concepts and create the right military units for experimenting 
with the use of the technologies that are available. It would therefore appear to follow that if you 
believe that you are in one of these periods of major change, then you are under an obligation to 
try to identify the most promising operational concepts and to establish what you think are the 
right new units to use in field experiments. 
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Because of this, I have come to believe that field experiments are tremendously important. People 
can go only so far with war games and conceptual analyses. In the first place the models of 
combat that we have are just not good enough. They do not capture the entire nature of the issues 
that are being investigated. The most poorly treated aspects of warfare happen to be those where 
the technology is currently changing most rapidly, i.e., the information related to technology, etc. 
In many cases the issues that need to be explored are very complex. Some of the most successful 
cases of major changes that have been looked at in detail (the US Navy’s development of carrier 
air operations and the German development of the Panzer Division and armored warfare in the 
1920s and 1930s) involved field experiments. Moreover, in the best of these cases the field 
experiments fed back important data to related war gaming efforts. They provided better notions 
of what the exchange rates will be in combat operations and served as a basis for calibration of the 
parameters in the models used in the wargames. In other words, while ideas and concepts come 
from the war games, the field experiments allowed the war games to improve. The result is a very 
important cycle of concept evaluation and testing that leads to success. 
The other aspect that I believe is particularly interesting and important about field experiments is 
that they present opportunities for the people involved to learn the special skills that may be 
required to operate under new conditions. During periods of major change in the past, the new 
military specialists acquired the kind of knowledge that can only be obtained through active 
practice and hands-on experience. Furthermore, this knowledge can be passed onto other people 
only through working alongside the people who already have mastered those particular skills. 
Also, field experiments often generate hardware/or operational inventions that make the concept 
possible. 
One of the cases that we and others have looked at most thoroughly is the development of naval 
air capabilities in the United States in the inter-war years. What we see is an initial emphasis on 
war gaming. Out of these came ideas that led to fleet exercises utilizing some ships as surrogates 
for aircraft carriers. Then the Langley came into service in December 1924, which allowed 
experiments in conducting flight operations. They wanted to change the way flight operations 
were being conducted. The British had carriers before the US Navy did and had adopted a 
process for operations that was too slow to allow the formation of large strike formations, which 
the war games had shown were the key to success. The US Navy changed the take off and 
landing process, invented the crash barrier and other things that were necessary to speed up these 
operations. 
As with most human knowledge, people learn a great deal by doing things, testing new ideas, and 
so on. Another possibility for learning, which is not really a field experiment, is learning from 
real operations that allow people to try out things they have a requirement for. We would not be 
nearly as far along in areas such as communication systems and data systems, without the 
lessons learned during real operations. I believe that a specific case in point is the Unmanned 
Airborne Vehicle (UAV). We would not be nearly as far along in the use of UAVs if it had not 
been for the Bosnia and Kosovo operations which allowed the development of ways of using 
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these devices and linking them together with other sea forces. I think that we often, however, do 
not fully use these opportunities for learning and do not capture all of the lessons that people 
have in fact learned. 
Now let me go back and look at some of these examples to draw lessons as to what history 
suggests makes for success. I am talking of success being something like the development of 
aircraft carrier operations or the development of the Panzer Division, and all of the operational 
skills and everything that went with them. Full success requires not only the adaptation of 
devices supplied by available or feasible technology, but also the formulation of new concepts of 
operation and a new set of skills that go with the new way of operating. In this arena, the officer 
corps is the central player. In both of the previously mentioned examples of successful change 
there was a subsection of the officer corps who became convinced that change was necessary and 
feasible. They were people who saw some new way of operating, or some new kind of unit, as 
being particularly valuable. And they were able to form new units, to conduct experiments and 
to coeval equipment, operational practices, organizations and skills. 
This process goes far beyond isolated experiments. I do not believe that successful change can 
come from isolated experiments, in the way that we have to some extent operated recently. 
Historically, it has been far more promising to allow a group of officers to go off and create a new 
unit that stays in existence and continuously evolves over a period of three or four years. This 
can influence the design of future equipment, the evolution of new concepts of operation, small 
incremental inventions like the crash barrier net, and over time potentially still greater changes. 
The German case is very instructive in that, in the first design of the Panzer Division they had 
about 600 tanks. The final design had only about 225 tanks, because they found in their field 
experiments that they could not do what they wanted to do with the larger number of tanks. The 
basic goal and concept was one of punching through enemy lines and operating deep in his rear 
areas.. They found that to achieve this goal they had to have a lot more infantry, a lot more 
transporting fuel and other things in order to achieve this decisive punch into the rear area. The 
original design was far too tank heavy, and over the course of the three or four years that they 
had before the war, the design evolved very quickly and was greatly improved. 
Something similar happened in the aircraft carrier case. This suggests to me that if at all possible 
you want to have some small units that continually evolve. Some of them will be failures. In the 
German case, when they began to re-arm the army had seven new kinds of units, only four of 
which survived. So in some way, and I am not sure what the right word for this is, we should use 
a prototype unit that evolves and develops rather than a single experiment. However, in order to 
be able to implement this approach to experimentation there needs to emerge within the officer 
corps at least a small cluster of people who believe in some idea, some new way of fighting or 
some new operational concepts that they wish to pursue. It concerns me that we seldom provide 
the opportunity and enough support for such prototypes. Our tendency is to conduct 
experiments and then disband the unit. I suppose ideally, the younger officers in all of the 
services ought to be allowed to form some prototype units that further the accomplishment of 
the key tools of their services. These groups would formulate some competing ideas about new 
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kinds of units or new operational approaches, and then some more senior group would select 
what they judge to be the two or three best ideas and allow them to proceed. 
One of our current problems obviously is that we have a high operational tempo. People are very 
busy. One of the wonderful things about the 1920s and 1930s was that none of the military 
services had any money, but they had plenty of time. US Navy ships went out to sea a couple 
of days a week and there was one large fleet exercise a year, so there was time to experiment and 
think. Today we have a military that has almost no leisure time for those kinds of activities. 
Another ingredient that I believe makes for success is the existence of some original concept that 
underlies the new design and what we do with it. It was certainly true in the case of the Panzer 
Division. What made the German efforts more successful was that they had this concept of 
punching a hole and getting deep into the rear of the enemy lines. This led to the design of tanks 
that were lighter, faster, and had a longer range than had been previously contemplated. Both we 
and the French initially went down the line to design the tank to support the infantry. In fact, the 
US Congress passed a law at one point that imposed a speed limit on the tank so that it could not 
outrun the infantry. In other words, having the right concept is very, very important. In the case 
of the aircraft carriers the war games had suggested that what you wanted to do was to get as 
many aircraft in the air as you could, at one time. The important American invention in some 
sense was to take that notion seriously and to dramatically change the whole way of staging flight 
operations so that this objective could be realized. This was one of the features that appealed to 
me about the Hunter Warrior experiment undertaken by the Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory a few years ago. It was concept-based, and not just an experiment to see whether we 
liked some new devices or what computers can do for us. Rather it was a concept where they 
improvised some new devices, and the experiment was designed to determine the feasibility of 
the concept and the best way of implementing the required operational support. 
I do not have very much more to say than that. In summary, I believe that field experiments are 
tremendously important. I do not believe that human beings solve problems or effectively 
question existing solutions without experimentation. To acquire new skills you have to go out 
and do it. History suggests that the best way of doing this is either through some systematic 
series of experiments, field experiments, or the establishment of a unit with a concept-based 
notion about some new way of operating that stays in existence and evolves over the course of at 
least three to five years. The best thing that could happen in our military would be somehow to 
move in the direction of more field experimentation, more prototype units evolving over time. 
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Good morning! I'm going to follow Mr. Andy Marshall with personal observations collected 
over more than 20 years of military experimentation. My view is a composite one: that of a 
young officer involved in experimentation; that of a staff officer involved in developing 
Maritime Prepositioning through a process of practical experimentation; as the Officer In Charge 
of —Hunter Warrior“, the Marine Corps‘ Advanced Warfighting Experiment (AWE) during the 
early Sea Dragon series; and, finally, as the founder and first Commanding Officer of the 
Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory. As I discuss experimentation as a road to the future, I'll 
try to offer frank observations so that others might avoid some of the difficulties we faced. 
We have well-developed processes in the United States military for everything except identifying 
and dealing with major change. Allow me to relate a short tale of success at implementing 
change, and the —rewards“ that followed. In 1982, a group of staff NCOs and officers, 
composing the staff of the Sixth Marine Amphibious Brigade, boarded a very rusty old 
amphibious assault ship for a three day voyage to Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. During the course of 
that sail, staff and officers were organized into four syndicates. Each syndicate was responsible 
for developing, briefing, and then defending an approach to part of an experimental concept 
called Maritime Prepositioning which was then under development by the Navy and Marine 
Corps. On reaching the base at Gitmo the combined results of the syndicates would provide the 
basis for four days and nights of trial and error leading to a written SOP. 
When we docked at Gitmo we had a 30 page paper. It proposed a series of measures and 
organizational changes for dramatically cutting the strategic response time for a powerful 
brigade. Essentially it laid out a proposal for forward afloat positioning of brigade supplies and 
equipment on specially designed ships that would be complemented by a fly echelon and link-up 
for combat. Sound like a concept to act as the experimental basis? We had an amphibious ship 
and one example of each piece of major equipment in the Marine Corps. Sound like the use of 
surrogates for experimentation? We had designed a scenario and command post exercise to be 
executed in Cuba. Sound like an experimentation plan? And, we had several TRS-80 Radio 
Shack computers sets side-by-side with three men behind them to move the disks and track 
equipment and timing in transit after offload evolution at the docks. This of course was an early 
primitive effort at documentation and analysis. 
The outcome less than three months later was the Maritime Prepositioning Progam SOP, a 
document that has undergone remarkably few changes since first drafted. Subsequently, other 
findings from the early experiments found their way into special capabilities that would be 
reflected in the design of the Prepositioning ships. And a whole set of further —findings“ 
(—experiments“ today) shaped what has now become a polished Marine Corps capability: the 
formation and execution of a task organized fly-in echelon (FIE) which would link up with the 
prepositioned supplies and equipment. 
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In my opening I stated that I would tell this tale and then mention the —rewards“ that followed. 
Shortly after the Secretary of Defense arrived at our base to complement the Brigade on two 
years of effort, the Brigade‘s Commanding General, then BGen Robert F. Milligan and his 
planner then LtCol Anthony A. Wood were relieved and transferred. Maritime Prepositioning 
was regarded as a strategic gem by DoD (US Department of Defense), but the pace of change 
was far too fast for digestion by some within the Corps. That would only come with time. The 
thought I would leave with you is the importance of carefully preparing the ground for 
introducing innovation. If innovations are to be accepted, evolution is preferable to revolution. 
My second observation is to deal with reality rather than tilt at windmills. Build a successful 
experimentation program that compliments, not competes with the acquisition and program 
goliaths that are already in place. Now I‘ll admit this has not always been my attitude, but it has 
become my attitude (after a certain amount of soul searching), because I think it is very 
important that experimentation proceed. If it is to proceed, we must preserve dreams and observe 
practicalities. 
With those as introductory framing remarks, my remaining comments address the key 
components of the experimental process, the guiding vision, how the vision is used, the men and 
women who do experimentation, leading them, the leader‘s responsibilities, and closing 
comments on the experimental process itself. 
The vision should be a formal document. Regard it as a living document that will change as you 
go along. I am certain that I won't say it as well as Andy Marshall did, but the vision must be 
derived from an initial analysis of the world that lies ahead. It must reflect the social, political, 
economic, and technological frame within which military force will be employed. In a real sense, 
the military capabilities that will be required are derivative from this larger frame. I would 
suggest to you that the vision document always begins with this careful analysis of what lies 
ahead, then looks at the nation, mixes in likely service roles and missions, and then current 
service concepts and responsibilities. If we have done a good job, the vision document will 
suggest a set of military concepts and capabilities necessary to support the nation‘s future 
interests. 
With that said, just what roles does the vision play? First of all, it is the compass for 
experimentation. It sets the course. Critically, it gives you the basis from which to extract, first 
concepts, and then capabilities for experimenting. At once it acts as a —backboard“ against which 
to bounce proposals and ideas as well as a —scoreboard“ for assessment. Ideas will flood you in 
this business. The question is, do they support and are they consistent with the vision? Resources 
are finite. Good ideas also need to be ideas that are appropriate to the experimental mission of 
the service. 
Vision also gives you one other very important capability. When you go before Congress or go 
before other audiences, the vision statement gives you the clear structure with which to trace the 
logic and potential contribution of everything you're doing from the experiments in the field to 
future war fighting capabilities. In other words, it gives you the logic that is critical to defending 
your position and securing further funding. 
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This isn't about bumper stickers. Everybody has a vision statement in industry today, and they're 
rarely useful as a guide for anyone in the trenches. The vision statement needs to be very 
carefully wrought, and it should be uniquely the responsibility of the commander. While he may 
draw in other smart people as contributors, the final product is his responsibility. Further, the 
drafting isn't a democratic process. While committees are terrific at providing consensus, a good 
vision statement almost never will gain consensus. By its very nature it is projecting a set of 
capabilities that don't exist but are needed. It's projecting a sense of strategy that may need to be 
adopted but has not yet been tested. Consensus is not the goal of the vision document. The 
vision document is a guide to experimentation and the future, not a justification for the current 
force. 
Approving a service vision as a basis for experimenting introduces the first of several frictions 
that characterize military experimentation. . There is no pat answer to gaining approval of the 
vision. However, I will say that after watching labs in the Army, the Navy, the Air Force, and 
the Marine Corps, and talking to many men and women involved in the process, we all could 
agree on one thing: —The higher the top cover, the better“. Said differently, the more 
controversial the program, the more important it is that you have top level approval of the vision 
document that guides it. 
Mr. Marshall suggested that it would be desirable to have a strong group of younger officers 
working as sort of full time "red team". I agree that this could be invaluable. Implementing this 
—red team“ proposal requires that the institution itself, or at least a large portion of its top 
leadership, provide approval and shield them from the inevitable pressures to conform which will 
emerge. Unless this cover is extended, experimentation may become little more than 
demonstration or justification of existing capabilities. 
Experimental organizations need to combine the ability to generate good ideas with the need for 
experience and judgement. Any experimental organization must provide a channel for surfacing 
good ideas. The channel must be a clear one because good ideas rarely survive a long journey 
through hierarchy (very rarely.) The young guys are unencumbered with tradition or with 
position, they often have terrific ideas, and given a conducive atmosphere, they will voice them. 
The more senior members of an experimental organization have two things that are also 
invaluable: experience; and, judgement. These are important qualities for reviewing and then 
selecting good ideas for experimentation. In any case, if at all possible, build the organization by 
identifying and recruiting individual talent whether junior or senior. Experimental organizations 
are not cast from a standard mold; it is a great mistake to establish a staff and a plant before the 
vision and mission are defined. 
I have a theory that the size of experimental bureaucracies and the size of their budgets is 
inversely proportional to output. The danger, of course, is that we will manage the large and 
demanding hierarchy at the expense of momentum and experimental substance. Suddenly, 
personnel management and the management of the organization supplant what we're really here 
to do. Experiments don't do well in a bureaucratic climate. Rather, they thrive on a sense of 
commitment and purpose, a great deal of talent, and a lot of energy. This doesn't mean that 
large bureaucracies can't put on experiments. But, to gain the quality that comes as a result of 
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 the courage to question established views, I believe that you must build teams within a large 
bureaucracy and give them the independence to proceed. That word —independence“ is critical œ 
and also the top cover that preserves it and allows the teams to exercise it. 
Nothing, absolutely nothing, is as important as the selection of the men and women who will 
staff the experimental organization. And nothing is more important after their selection than 
treating them with the respect which their contributions and their energies deserve. The 
acquisition community is not the model. The reason is simple: contracted talent will rarely 
suggest the unconventional or the disruptive. Instead we need to draw on the talent of retired 
military officers by making far greater use of the IPA route and give them the authority and 
independence that will garner results. They are the critical piece that provides discipline and 
judgement and a certain independent sense of good ideas. If they are treated with respect and 
given a challenge, then we can recruit men and women of excellence who are retiring and move 
them into our experimental organizations. There, along side of Marshall‘s young —red teamers“ 
we can take advantage of the full range of talent at our disposal. 
Balance. This is the age old question of enough but not too much. If good ideas are to rise 
through the hierarchy, you need to carefully balance creating enough internal freedom to let 
them rise and just enough process to inject appropriate resources and discipline. This balance is 
critical and it often leads to criticism of the experimental organization. Why? Because freedom 
to speak out may foster the notion that the organization is —messy“. Another phrase which is 
sometimes used to describe labs is "not very military" and the label you may hear with regard to 
outspoken staff officers is "loose cannons." In the military we are a fairly conservative group of 
men and women and the label "loose cannon" is a very negative one. Once entered into a fitness 
report it is death. The responsibility to strike a balance between a free flow of ideas (perhaps 
including some from —loose cannons“) while injecting necessary process rests with the 
commander. It is a balance that he will have to continuously adjust œ and doing it well may 
involve acceptance of criticism from his peers and his seniors. 
I'm going to spend a little while on the functional role of the vision document because, if 
carefully crafted, it can lead us from broad concepts to the identification of key enabling 
capabilities. These key capabilities can then be further refined to provide the supporting 
functions that make up each capability. Once functions have been identified, experiments can be 
designed in which functions are grouped to evaluate the potential war fighting contribution of 
one or more of the key capabilities. The bad news here is that in my experience one man in five 
or six is able to read even a well-crafted vision document and extract from that document the 
capabilities that are necessary to make a proposed operational concept reality. This process is 
the heart of experimentation. A well-written prescient vision document presents a coherent 
description of the future environment and the concepts with which we expect to fight. 
Extracting key capabilities from it is the next critical step in order to build the experiments. 
Performing this extraction demands a group of men with imagination and a great deal of 
experience. This is one of several times senior retired officers make a major contribution. Their 
experience enables them to assess the required underpinnings behind the broad concepts, and 
imagination and breadth allow them to define these into key capabilities. In my experience, 
perhaps three or four out of a staff of 40 or 50 have this unique and vital insight. 
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So let's have a quick look at the logic of how we get from concepts in the vision document to 
capabilities and finally supporting functions suitable for experiments. I‘m going to post a 
statement on the screen that may well appear in a vision document today in any of the services. 
—A force that can combine its information superiority with an adaptive command and control 
capability will be able to dynamically adjust its decision-to-action loop to stay well ahead of its 
opponent‘s.“  My guess is we probably could extract a minimum of six or eight or even 10 key 
capabilities from this visionary goal. I have extracted one that you might consider an important 
derived capability: —The capability for an adaptive command and control system to continuously 
monitor the situation and assist in dynamically re-allocating reconnaissance, surveillance, and 
target acquisition assets.“  There‘s a whole bunch of subordinate functions tied up in this broad 
capability statement that support achieving useful information superiority (information 
superiority means nothing if it isn't useful.) The trick is, further breaking the capability functions 
that men and women can examine and incorporate into the design for an experiment. 
We've examined a concept in the vision. We have seen how we might derive the 10 or 12 key 
capabilities that make up the broad concept, and how each of these can be broken down into 
functions. Now the commander and his staff can review the proposed experimental program, 
identify a place for the new proposed experiment and move to questions of priority for resources 
and implementation. What I've tried to do in this short example is to present the notion of the 
key role that the vision document plays in providing a basis for presenting concepts, deriving 
capabilities, and identifying the supporting functions composing each capability. Once those 
functions have been identified experiments can be designed. 
I didn't know Mr. Marshall was going to mention the use of surrogates in experiments, but I‘m 
delighted that he did. Surrogates play an important role. Remember my little tale at the start of 
the talk concerning the development of Maritime Prepositioning? We certainly didn't call them 
surrogates just as we didn't call the research and test period an experiment, but that old 
amphibious ship was the —surrogate“ for later development of the TAK maritime prepositioning 
ships. History has many examples of the use of surrogates. Prior to WWII, the Germans used old 
cars and trucks as surrogates for tanks during early development of Blitzkrieg tactics. They 
didn't need actual tanks to explore the concepts (nor did they have them). Instead, to determine 
effective formations and tactics, they experimented with the Blitzkrieg concept through use of 
surrogates -- cars and trucks in formation running around, linked by primitive communication 
means. 
Using surrogates has several advantages in contemporary experimentation. First, surrogates can 
speed the process of experimentation (don't wait for the real item). Second, they can drastically 
reduce the cost. Finally, surrogates can keep you from adopting a particular technology at the 
outset. Committing prematurely to a particular technological approach locks experiments into a 
single direction. You have to be very, very sensitive to this danger. Many technologies are self-
fulfilling prophecies. If you select a particular technology at the outset for the experiment, you 
may well be dictating the result a priori. 
A well-planned and well-executed analysis and data gathering plan is one of the 
commander's principal responsibilities. Let me say that again. A well-planned and well-executed 
analysis and data gathering plan is one of the commander's principal responsibilities. Why? Isn‘t 
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this a technical area best left to —green eye shade“ types? No! In the end, all the effort that his 
gone into the experiment comes down to results. Those all-important results are going to be 
viewed through the lens of the analysis and data gathering plan. That plan must support the 
experimental mission. It must be specifically tailored to identify and evaluate the capabilities 
extracted from the vision. It must directly link means and ends in a clear fashion that employs 
credible MOE(s). When all is said and done, nothing receives more attention than the analysis. 
In my view you cannot be too careful. Demand the best in terms of analysts and establish a long 
term relationship that will ensure more analytical talent when it is needed. But, the adequacy of 
this plan is one of the commander‘s primary responsibilities. 
If the analyst is important, the design of the experiment is equally so. Men who can design 
experiments are difficult to find. If you were a division commander, you would be incredibly 
careful concerning who was selected as your operations officer. And, if in fact that operations 
officer wasn't your pick, you'd make damn sure his assistant was the finest you could find. In 
experimentation, the head of experimental design is just that important. The recipe? One very, 
very talented guy who can clearly see the purpose of the experiment, relate goals to resources, 
understand the concept, evaluate the analysis and data gathering plan (and integrate it in the 
design), and then pull it all together with an experimental support and preparation plan. Sound 
like a tall order? It is. And then, of course, after you've picked a good guy and after you have 
placed your trust in him, check, check, check. 
A word on presentation. More often than not experiments can be boring for the outside observer. 
I‘ve heard it said that experiments are about as exciting as watching crab grass grow. For this 
reason, as well as the fact that they may occur at different sites over an extended period, 
experiments have to be presented. Not only are they often boring, an experiment may not even 
be understandable without a presentation plan. The presentation plan enables the experimental 
staff to explain what is actually going on and why you're doing it. The presentation plan also 
contributes to visibility and credibility and thus to securing future resources and support. As an 
example, there were nine general officers assigned by the Commandant of the Marine Corps to 
observe Hunter Warrior (Am I correct on that one?) -- nine general officers assigned as observers 
and evaluators for one experiment. But it was an important experiment. We had to do a very 
careful presentation plan. The experiment covered five different sites over a 3300 square mile 
battlefield and at sea. The presentation plan included a helicopter transport scheme to move 
guests and observers. It required a very carefully constructed information flow just so they 
would understand what the experiment was, what was going on, what the concepts under 
evaluation were, and how we were proceeding? And, it helped manage the crowd. In short, I 
would suggest that credibility requires that you be able to show and explain what you're doing 
and, at the same time, keep those who are observing from affecting the experiment. The tool is 
the presentation plan. 
No one will be more sensitive to the publication of the final experimental results than your own 
staff. No one. How you as a commander present these results will surely have a major impact 
on every experiment that follows. If, under outside pressure, you tell a victorious experimental 
team that the game didn't count, that it‘s been called, you will only have to do it once. You only 
have to politically filter the results of an experiment once to convince your staff that it's not 
worth it to go out on a limb œ and good experimentation requires that they go out on a limb. I‘m 
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aware of the conflicting pressures which tug at the experimental commander when final results 
call into question some important aspect of the status quo. However, there is a heavy 
responsibility to the parent service, to the experimental mission, and to your staff to accurately 
portray your findings. As Mr. Marshall implied earlier, in this business courage really does 
count. 
At this point I‘d like to briefly comment on exercises and experiments. These two activities are 
very different. Resource pressures are pushing us to include experimentation within exercises. 
And there may be no way to avoid that entirely. However, we owe it to ourselves to proceed with 
a clear understanding of the differences between experiments and exercises. 
Critically, the experiment must be structured and conducted in such a fashion that failure is one 
possibility. The hypothesis can turn out not to be provable, otherwise why experiment? If this is 
not the case, if so-called experiments do not admit of the possibility of failure, then you're 
demonstrating or you're justifying, or you're camouflaging, but you're not experimenting. 
The second major difference between experiments and exercises is the end purpose of each. The 
operating forces go to the field to polish current capabilities and ensure war fighting readiness. 
Their responsibility is to defend today. Nothing can get in the way of that, and nothing should. 
Furthermore, as Mr. Marshall alluded to earlier, the operating forces are practicing team work 
and improvisation. Exercises strengthen and polish the ability to improvise and interoperate. 
However this powerful commitment, to accomplish the mission and improvise as necessary to 
do it, can convert an experiment into a demonstration with positive results a foregone 
conclusions. 
So there are several good reasons to be very careful about how we combine exercises and 
experiments. I've given up saying you can't do it (which I used to say), because the fact of the 
matter is, that resources today probably aren't going to allow us the luxury of separate venues. 
Further, there are many small experiments that in spite of their small scale are enormously useful 
and can be included under a larger exercise umbrella. 
There are other practical considerations that arise when mixing experiments with exercises. 
Chief among these are the differing time horizons of each. A few years ago, I was briefing one 
of the CINCs and I was watching his face redden and temper rise as we tried to persuade him 
that he should support a major experiment. About halfway through the discussion, I suddenly 
realized that I was proposing an experiment whose outcomes would impact a time horizon which 
was five, six or seven years out. At the same time he was concerned with the capabilities which 
would be available to his forces across a huge theater for the next 24 months. The lesson is clear 
œ keep a close eye on time horizons. Be careful when asking men whose responsibility is now 
to combine experiments whose impacts may be seven years out. Or if you are going to have to 
do it, tie it back to their responsibilities today. 
The horizon issue also applies to mixing experiments and exercises within our divisions, wings, 
and fleets. As stated the responsibility of these commanders is the employment of the operating 
forces now. If we're going to ask them to host experimentation, then we should ask them to host 
experimentation that is appropriate, that fits into their exercises, and that in fact is likely to 
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complement their capabilities in the fairly short term. And there will be periods during which 
experimentation will be focused on very short term enhancements. It's like a pendulum. 
Sometimes experimentation will have aggressive periods where we'll tackle very controversial 
future concepts and capabilities, and those will frequently be followed by more conservative 
periods during which we will focus on much more near term enhancements. It differs, service by 
service. But the fact is, both periods can contribute to identifying and refining war fighting 
capabilities. 
At any rate, when we talk about experimenting within an exercise we are going to have to be 
careful that we don't drink our own bath water. It's very easy to do. Clearly, if well planned, 
experiments can be carried out within a large exercise without being negatively influenced. 
However, while our commitment to accomplishing the mission and improvising as necessary is a 
huge plus in maintaining current readiness, it can be just as big a detractor and unduly bend the 
results of experiments. Finally, remember that experiments fail. When was the last time you 
heard a senior commander announce failure? 
Leading experimental organizations is tough. On one hand there is a responsibility to support 
and protect your staff and shield them from the pressures of acquisition, from service 
controversy, and from the knee-jerk reactions of those blindly committed to preserving the status 
quo. Equally, the experimental commander must retain the trust and support of the senior 
leadership or the program will be terminated. It's the commander‘s job to achieve balance, and it 
may not always be career enhancing. Coming to grips with this issue and having the services 
accept this will depend on very high level recognition of the importance of military 
experimentation. It will also depend on establishing a tradition that the general officers placed in 
charge of experimentation are in fact —between two worlds“ and that their primary responsibility 
is to explore the capabilities we may need for the future. We should also strive to establish a 
widespread understanding that these experimental leaders are reasonable and very wise men as 
they direct this exploration. Believe me, they're going to have to be very wise men because as 
Mr. Marshall remarked, innovators have not traditionally been rewarded. 
I'll close these personal remarks on experimentation, experimenters, and their processes with the 
comment that they are just that œ personal remarks based on experience stretching back over 
more than 20 years of military experimentation. I hope my thoughts have complemented what 
Andy Marshall had to say, and I hope that they will prove useful to those engaged in military 
experimentation today. 
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EXPERIMENTATION AS A COMPASS FOR THE FUTURE 
By Colonel James A. Lasswell, USMC (Ret.) 
Divining the future is hard. There are no reliable crystal balls in the Pentagon any more than 
there are on Wall Street. The military attempts to chart its future course through the use of such 
vehicles as White Paper vision statements and future concepts of how they perceived the military 
should respond to the future threat in order to carry out the National Security Strategy. In some 
cases, these future concepts are simply product improvements of current military objectives. 
However, at other times, the vision of the future requires a major change of direction œ a 
transformation œ that require a major departure from current legacy capabilities in order to either 
meet new challenges or to take advantage of new technological opportunities. 
Experimenting with future systems present a major challenge because future technologies are by 
definition beyond the current state-of-the-art for current equipment. The situation is made harder 
if the new technologies offer the opportunity to implement new organizations, tactics, techniques 
and procedures œ or even the development of personnel with different skill sets to operate œ than 
current operational forces. In these cases, the only option may be to first wargame the concept 
and then when the capabilities are adequately defined attempt to conduct concept-based 
experimentation using surrogate technologies that approximate the future technologies 
sufficiently to permit operational assessment of the new concept. 
This process has been used for over a century in the U.S. Naval Service. Wargaming at the 
Naval War College predates the turn of the century and was particularly influential during the 
interwar years in the development of fleet tactics for carrier and amphibious operations. 
Wargames can lead to experiments with surrogate technologies such as the landings on the Island 
of Culebra during the 1920s using small boats to simulate more advanced landing craft as an 
example. By the first World War II 
amphibious assault against Tarawa in 
1943, the launches had given way to 
the Higgins boat, tracked assault 
amphibian vehicles, and a Fleet 
Marine Force organized and equipped 
to conduct amphibious assaults. 
In the case of the amphibious assault, 
the capability took over 20 years from 
initial wargaming through initial 
experimentation in fleet exercises 
using surrogate systems, to the 
refinement of the concept into an 
actual warfighting capability. Arguably, one of the most difficult stages in this development is 
the transition of a concept into viable and meaningful concept-based experimentation using first 
surrogates and then candidate prototype technologies. 
Wargaming/ 
Capability 
Identification 
Early 
Concept 
Fleet 
Experiment 
Warfighting 
Capability
From Concept to Capability 
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Even thought the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory is only about five years old, there have 
already been three examples of how a revolutionary concept has progressed from idea, to a 
wargamed capability, to a concept-based experiment with a surrogate, to more comprehensive 
experimentation with a prototype until they are now sufficiently defined that it can be evaluated 
for acquisition. Each in its own way provides an example of a different use of a surrogate 
technology in concept-based experimentation to establish the direction for future warfighting 
capabilities. 
Concept Exploration œ Defining the Potential of a Digital Battlefield 
The initial experiment of the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory was the Hunter Warrior 
Experiment conducted during March 1997. This seminal Marine Corps experiment into the 
potential impact of technology generally associated with Joint Vision 2010 when applied to the 
capabilities of a typical naval task force comprised of a future Carrier Battle Group and 
Amphibious Ready Group with embarked Marine Expeditionary Unit. 
The centerpiece of the experiment was the use of a surrogate communications architecture that 
approximated the kind of digital network envisioned in the future supporting a form of Common 
Tactical Picture available in near real time at any location on the battlefield. The hub of the 
architecture was the Experimental Command 
and Control Center (ECOC).
 The concept was based on a vision of the 
future battlefield in which information is 
digitally shared throughout the battlespace. 
Commanders at all levels could draw 
information from shared information data 
bases œ similar in concept to the Joint Forces 
Command concept of a Common Relevant 
Operational Picture -- as required to provide 
situational awareness and to support their 
command and coordination requirements. 
Information would neither funnel up nor down 
a chain of command focused on filtering and interpreting information. 
Instead, information would be available near simultaneously to all 
echelons of command both on and off the battlefield. 
The Hunter Warrior ECOC was intended to explore the implications 
of such a system on both staff organization and the types of decision-
making systems that would permit distributing command and control 
functions within the battlespace. Most notably, the ECOC was 
intended to integrate the functions of the Landing Force Operations 
Center (LFOC) and the Tactical Logistics Group (TacLog) with Navy 
command and control functions such as the Supporting Arms 
Coordination Center (SACC) and Tactical Air Operations Center 
(TACC). Located at Camp Pendleton œ as a surrogate for an 
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amphibious command ship œ the ECOC was connected by landlines and tower relays to tactical 
units on the ground at 29 Palms California over 150 miles away. 
The landlines and towers were a key part of a surrogate communications architecture 
approximating future envisioned over-the-horizon, wide band wireless communications. At the 
other end of the architecture were Marine squads equipped with Apple Newton palm-top 
computers with embedded Trimble GPS cards that automatically established the location of the 
sending unit whenever it transmitted.The Hunter Warrior ECOC was originally intended to be a 
shipboard node of a network centric approach to organizing the future littoral battlefield around 
digital information. It was to be one of multiple nodes œ not the hub œ for decision making 
within the naval task force during littoral operations. In the concept, similar ECOCs would be 
located on the various ships of the Amphibious Ready Group and the supporting Carrier Battle 
Group, and ashore in mobile operations centers of the landing force 
The Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory developed a concept for a cellular staff organization 
to use the ECOC. The Staff was organized around functions. Fighting the current battle was the 
Engagement Coordination Cell (or section) that inherently combined all aspects of engagement œ 
lethal fires, non-lethal fires, maneuver, psychological operations, etc. œ into a single staff 
function. 
The concept  of  the  
Engagement Coordination Cell 
was not dissimilar to that of 
the Effects Based Operations 
Cell currently under review by 
Joint Forces Command. 
Supporting the Engagement 
Coordination Cell was a 
Planning and Shaping Cell œ 
similar to a Future Operations 
and Future Plans organization 
in function œ and a Combat 
Information Cel l  that  
performed an information 
managemen t  func t ion .  
Notably, there was no 
intelligence fusion function. 
The experimental concept assumed that information technology would permit distribution of 
operationally critical intelligence information throughout the staff simultaneously to those 
individuals who needed it. A nascent intelligence fusion function was performed within the 
combat information cell and by a red team that provided an independent interpretation of the 
battle to the battle captain based on the perceived effects of events upon the enemy. 
However, time and resources limited the development of the Hunter Warrior C2 architecture to a 
single ECOC and the concept for experimentation during the AWE to that of funneling all 
available information to a single centralized decision making node within the ECOC. Although 
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 spectacularly successful in some aspects, centralization during the experiment led to a focus in 
subsequent ECOC development into improving the decision-making capability of the ECOC 
rather than the exploration of the impact of shared information within a network centric 
approach. 
The Hunter Warrior ECOC demonstrated the value of electronic displays of information within 
an ECOC. However, the Hunter Warrior ECOC did not have an integrated C2 system. Instead, 
it was a collection of stand-alone legacy systems that were used in the Advanced Warfighting 
Experiment with various prototype systems such as xBAIT and the 3-Dimensional Workbench 
(for visually displaying information) and FEAT4 (for intelligent agent manipulation of data 
bases) that were on display but not actually used in the conduct of the experiment. 
The Hunter Warrior ECOC demonstrated how dramatically more capable a future command 
element might be able to command and coordinate forces on a widely dispersed future battlefield 
provided it developed the ability to automate the dissemination and display of the data pouring 
into the ECOC through the use of computer assisted decision support systems. In the Hunter 
Warrior ECOC all information was essentially distributed in near real time to every station 
within the staff due as text messages. Only the electronic map was updated automatically to 
show new position reports of both friendly units and enemy sightings. In spite of these 
limitations, the amount of information 
available within the staff and the lack of a 
vertical chain of command for the 
dissemination of information, led to 
significant reassessments as to the 
significance of automated decision support 
systems to help manage the information that 
an all- digital communications architecture 
can potentially provide. 
The Urban Warrior ECOC developed for the 
Urban Warrior experiment in March of 1999, 
was a dramatic product improvement over that of the Hunter Warrior ECOC. 
Warrior ECOC was a dramatic change from that of the previous experiment in that it 
incorporated intelligent computer agent driven decision support systems. It was built around a 
prototype Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and Control System that was designed to 
employ computer agents in a variety of roles to aid in near-real time decision making. Agent 
functionality provided similar racking and stacking of information capabilities that currently 
requires a host Marines with pen and paper œ and grease pencils on overlays -- to accomplish. 
The approach was to use intelligent agents to make information more usable by decision makers 
rather than as a substitute for a Marine in the decision making loop. Agents provided limited 
support to distribution of information throughout the network œ down to the squad level in some 
cases using a computer end user terminal œ but fundamentally remained focused on providing 
decision support to the ECOC staff. 
During the June 2001 Kernal Blitz (Experimental), the Marine Corps Warfighting Laboratory 
and the Extended Littoral Battlespace Advanced Concepts Technology Demonstration Program 
The Urban 
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 Office conducted the third major experiment involving the ECOC. For this experiment, the 
ECOC is a state-of-the-shelf, high technology command center built from the bottom-up within 
an old magazine of the USS Coronado. Instead of surrogate terrestrial communications 
architecture, the ELB ACTD employed prototype systems that could eventually be employed in 
UAVs to serve as airborne relays for wideband secure wireless communications. 
This new ECOC is several technical generations and a considerable conceptual departure 
from the original idea of an ECOC that was developed prior to the Hunter Warrior Advanced 
Warfighting Experiment Often lost in the focus on the information technology of the ECOC is 
its original operational concept. 
The Capable Warrior ECOC used 
during Kernal Blitz (Experimental) 
is a product improved Urban 
Warrior ECOC that progressed 
primarily in its ability to 
incorporate legacy C2 systems 
with a wide band communications 
system. However, there was 
significant improvement within its 
ability to support distributed 
decision making and collaborative 
planning through the use of 
intelligent agents and shared 
i n f o r m a t i o n  p r o t o c o l s .  
Experiments were conducted with 
distributed C2. For example, during one live fire experiment at 29 Palms fires were coordinated 
and then controlled using a network centric approach by individual company Fire Support Teams 
using the same agent functionality available within the ECOC.
 With the completion of Capable Warrior , the ECOC had progressed from a crude, surrogate 
command and control system that was so fragile that it could not be located at sea, through a 
more advanced stage in Urban Warrior that not only was capable of emplacement within the 
secure network of a Navy combatant but also employed intelligent agent decision support 
systems within the Marine Corps, to a mature prototype demonstrated by the ELB ACTD and the 
Lab during Capable Warrior. Through this experimentation process the potential feasibility of 
future wide band wireless over-the-horizon communications were demonstrated while the 
Marine Corps acquired its first real test of tactical computers to share situational awareness and 
the use of intelligent agents to support decision support systems. 
Breaking Paradigms œ Ubiquitous Tactical Unmanned Air Vehicles flown by Non-Aviators 
Whereas the surrogate information systems of Hunter Warrior were used to explore the 
ramifications of a new concept empowered by emerging technologies, the use of the Dragon 
Drone during Hunter Warrior was intended to change the way Marines perceived unmanned 
aircraft œ UAVs œ in the future. Historically, things-that-fly œ and systems that are intended to 
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shoot down things-that-fly -- are controlled by the aviation units. Current Marine Pioneer UAVs 
are flown and controlled by the VMU squadrons of the Marine 
Aircraft Wings. 
The Dragon Drone was flown by the 
Marine Corps Warfighting 
Laboratory as an all-purpose UAV 
testbed for any possible future use of 
a UAV. In fact one of the first 
limited objective experiments 
conducted by the Lab was the use of 
the Dragon Drone to drop pepper 
spray non-lethal agents from the air 
as a means of dispersing crowds and 
riots before they massed within the 
immediate proximity of Marines. 
Other uses included tests at 
Dugway, Utah, proving grounds of 
the drone‘s ability to deliver special 
sensors in an effort to detect and 
identify the existence of small traces 
aerosol of either chemical or 
biological agents within the 
atmosphere and the delivery of 
scatter able micro sensors. 
However, the drone became a true paradigm breaker when it was used during Hunter Warrior as 
a surrogate small unit level tactical UAV to conduct reconnaissance beyond the next hill or to 
track fleeting targets beyond visual range. Although the drone was launched and recovered from 
rear areas, it was capable of having its camera controlled and the video feed drawn down directly 
to a tactical ground unit. The ground unit could also control it. Once that ground unit was done 
with the UAV, it could be released to continue on its GPS controlled track until it returned to its 
designated recovery zone. 
By Urban Warrior, the drone had progressed even further such that it was considerably easier to
 
control, had been given a new heavy fuel engine so that it could be deployed aboard Navy ships
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 with Marine Expeditionary Units as a semi-disposable tactical UAV asset, and had been operated 
by artillery units, light armored reconnaissance units, combat service support units, and by 
infantry units down to the platoon and squad level. Just as significant, experience with the 
drone was leading to an easing of air space management concerns involving simultaneous 
employment of manned aircraft. 
As a result of the success of the Dragon Drone, the Lab has developed the Dragon Eye tactical 
UAV that is reduced in size from the 80 pounds of Dragon Drone to less than 8 pounds in the 
composite winged Dragon Eye. Also GPS guided, the Dragon Eye is intended to be an 
inexpensive, almost disposable tactical UAV that can be operated by a wide range of ground 
combat units. With its small weight and a GPS-controlled top ceiling of 500 feet it is exempt 
from formal air space management and truly a ground element item of equipment that can be 
employed in support of the squad, platoon, and company reconnaissance, surveillance, and target 
acquisition requirements. 
During FY02, over 40 of these UAVs will be fielded by the Lab for operational testing by the 
ground operating forces as a prototype tactical UAV. 
Alternative Concept Demonstrators œ The Expeditionary Fire Support System 
As the Hunter Warrior experimental concept was under development, it became clear there was a 
need for a highly mobile fire support system that could be readily deployed internally within 
helicopters œ or the MV-22 œ and employed upon arrival either automatically or with a minimum 
crew to provide immediately responsive fire support to small units in contact. Long range 
precision naval gunfire was projected to have a time of flight of up to eight minutes from launch. 
Aircraft were sometimes unavailable due to weather or interruptions in flight schedules. 
Accordingly, small units on the future battlefield needed an alternative system. 
Almost as an afterthought for Hunter Warrior, a 
conceptual expeditionary fire support system 
modeled on a state-of-the-art French 120mm 
rifled mortar was included in the force list for the 
experiment. Since no such system then existed, 
three wooden boxes filled with sand were used 
as representational surrogate systems during the 
experiment and the ECOC computers were used 
to adjudicate its usage. 
Within 17 months of the development of the 
concept of such a system, the Lab had acquired a 
French rifled 120mm Mortar and built a portable 
chassis through Pickatinny Arsenal. Named the 
Dragon Fire, this operational prototype firing 
system was used as a concept demonstrator against the current program of towed artillery 
systems. In effect, it provided a visible and functional alternative to howitzers or rockets for the 
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 expeditionary fire support role requiring a firing system with an identical mobility profile of the 
ground combat element that it is supporting. 
During Urban Warrior gaming and modeling, the mortar demonstrated its superior potential for 
use in the urban canyons of the city, providing plunging fire to isolate building objectives, 
breakup counter offensives in dead space behind building complexes, and even as a direct fire 
system if altered to be breach loading vice muzzle loading. In addition, the Lab‘s Dragon Fire 
was joined in several experiments by a French, LAV-mounted rifled 120mm Mortar. 
Subsequently, the concept for the Dragon Fire‘s employment was expanded to include a potential 
third deployment means, loaded internally within the cargo bay of a LAV25 or a LAV logistics 
variant. Potentially, the Dragon Fire could be deployed in either of three ways œ towed by a 
HUMMWV or LAV, internally within a CH-53E or MV-22 tilt rotor aircraft, or internally within 
a LAV. Significantly, if internally loaded in a LAV, the capability could be developed to 
potentially fire the mortar on the move. 
As an alternative concept prototype, the 
Dragon Fire has been a huge success. It has 
been embraced by three consecutive 
commanders at the Lab and is currently 
under consideration both as a future 
alternative to the Light Weight 155mm 
Howitzer as a direct support artillery system 
for the infantry under some operational 
concepts as well as a potential replacement 
or augmenting infantry mortar system to the 
81mm Mortar. Its existence has forced the 
Marine Corps to consider alternatives to 
current firing systems and operational 
concepts. 
In each of the three cases described above, surrogates were the means that the Marine Corps 
Warfighting Laboratory used to explore, demonstrate, or challenge future concepts before state-
of-the-art technology was available to provide the capability in a fully useable prototype system. 
As Yogi Berra put it, —the future ain‘t what it used to be.“ Using surrogates as the compass to 
chart the correct direction into the future has already proven its worth. 
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Raymond Cole (Col. USMC Ret.)
 
Demonstration/Program Manager
 
Extending the Littoral Battlespace ACTD
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Demonstration: Interoperability at the Information Level 
Anthony Wood (Col. USMC Ret.) 
Director of Applied Research
 
Collaborative Agent Design Research Center, Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo (CA)
 
The decided advantages of an information-centric computer environment, presented at the third 
annual Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored Workshop on Collaborative Decision-Sup­
port (Quantico, VA, June 5, 2001), are highlighted herein. Of particular significance is the ability 
of software agents to reason about events, collaborate intelligently with each other and users, and 
transmit alerts across multiple application domains. 
For the past 20 years the military services have suffered under the limitations of stove-piped com­
puter software applications that function as discrete entities within a fragmented data-processing 
environment. Lack of interoperability has been identified by numerous think tanks, advisory boards, 
and studies, as the primary information systems problem (e.g., Army Science Board 2000, Air Force 
SAB 2000 Command and Control Study, and NSB Network-Centric Naval Forces 2000). Yet, de­
spite this level of attention, all attempts to achieve interoperability within the current data-centric 
information systems environment have proven to be expensive, unreliable, and generally unsuccess­
ful. 
Why is this so? The expectations of true interoperability are threefold. First, interoperable appli­
cations should be able to integrate related functional sequences in a seamless and user transparent 
manner. Second, this level of integration assumes the sharing of information from one applica­
tion to another, so that the results of the functional sequence are automatically available and simi­
larly interpreted by the other application. And third, any of the applications should be able to enter 
or exit the integrated interoperable environment without jeopardizing the continued operation of 
the other applications. These conditions simply cannot be achieved by computer software that 
processes numbers and meaningless text with predetermined algorithmic solutions through hard-
coded dumb data links. 
Past approaches to interoperability have basically fallen into three categories. Attempts to create 
common architectures have largely failed because this approach essentially requires existing sys­
tems to be re-implemented in the common (i.e., new) architecture. Attempts to create bridges 
between applications within a confederation of linked systems have been faced with three major 
obstacles. First, the large number of bridges required (i.e., the square of the number of applica­
tions). Second, the fragility associated with hard-coded inter-system data linkages. Third, the cost 
of maintaining such linkages in a continuously evolving information systems environment. The 
third category of approaches has focused on achieving interoperability at the interface boundary. 
For anything other than limited presentation and visualization capabilities, this approach cannot 
accommodate dynamic data flows, let alone constant changes at the more useful information level. 
(Editor’s note: This is the text of a brochure that was provided to Workshop participants as back­
ground information for the live demonstration, which was narrated by Col. Wood.) 
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These obstacles to interoperability and integration are largely overcome in an information-centric 
software systems environment by embedding in the software some understanding of the informa­
tion being processed. How is this possible? Surely computers cannot be expected to understand 
anything. Aren’t they just dumb electronic machines that simply execute programmed instruc­
tions without any regard to what either the instructions, or the information to which the instruc­
tions apply, mean? The answer is no, it is all a matter of representation (i.e., how the information 
is structured in the computer). 
As shown in the centerfold diagram, the integration and interoperability capabilities of an infor­
mation-centric software system allow agents in one application to notify agents in other appli­
cations of events occurring in multiple domains. For example, the Engagement Agent in the 
tactical Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and Control System (IMMACCS) is able to 
advise appropriate agents in the logistical SEAWAY application whenever a Supply Point ashore 
is threatened by enemy activity. This may result in the timely rescheduling or redirection of a 
planned re-supply mission. The agents are able to communicate across multiple applications at 
the information level through the common language of the ontological framework. Similarly, 
the SEAWAY application is able to rely on the Integrated Computerized Deployment System 
(ICODES) to maintain in-transit cargo visibility, down to the location of a supply item in a con­
tainer on-board a MTMC (Military Traffic Management Command, USTRANSCOM) ship en-
route to an Intermediate Staging and Embarkation Port (ISEP). This kind of interoperability can­
not be achieved in a data-centric systems environment, where computer-based reasoning cannot 
take place and linkages between applications are limited to the transmission of data messages that 
depend entirely on human interpretation. 
The term information-centric refers to the representation of information in the computer, not to 
the way it is actually stored in a digital machine. This distinction between representation and 
storage is important, and relevant far beyond the realm of computers. When we write a note with 
a pencil on a sheet of paper, the content (i.e., meaning) of the note is unrelated to the storage 
device. A sheet of paper is designed to be a very efficient storage medium that can be easily 
stacked in sets of hundreds, filed in folders, folded, bound into volumes, and so on. However, all 
of this is unrelated to the content of the written note on the paper. This content represents the 
meaning of the sheet of paper. It constitutes the purpose of the paper and governs what we do with 
the sheet of paper (i.e., its use). In other words, the nature and efficiency of the storage medium is 
more often than not unrelated to the content or representation that is stored in the medium. 
In the same sense the way in which we store bits (i.e., 0s and 1s) in a digital computer is unrelated to 
the meaning of what we have stored. When computers first became available they were exploited for 
their fast, repetitive computational capabilities and their enormous storage capacity. Application 
software development progressed rapidly in a data-centric environment. Content was stored as data 
that were fed into algorithms to produce solutions to predefined problems in a static problem solving 
context. It is surprising that such a simplistic and artificially contrived problem solving environment 
was found to be acceptable for several decades of intensive computer technology development. 
When we established the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center at Cal Poly in 1986, we had 
a vision. We envisioned  that users should be able to sit down at a computer terminal and solve 
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problems collaboratively with the computer. The computer should be able to continuously assist 
and advise the user during the decision making process. Moreover, we postulated that one should 
be able to develop software modules that could spontaneously react in near real-time to changing 
events in the problem situation, analyze the impact of the events, propose alternative courses of 
action, and evaluate the merits of such proposals. What we soon discovered, as we naively set out 
to develop an intelligent decision-support system, is that we could not make much headway with 
data in a dynamically changing problem environment. 
Initially focusing on engineering design, we had no difficulties at all developing a software module 
that could calculate the daylight available inside a room, as long as we specified to the computer the 
precise location and dimensions of the window, the geometry of the room, and made some assump­
tions about external conditions. However, it did not seem possible for the computer to determine on 
its own that there was a need for a window and where that window might be best located. The 
ability of the computer to make these determinations was paramount to us. We wanted the com­
puter to be a useful assistant that we could collaborate with as we explored alternative design 
solutions. In short, we wanted the computer to function intelligently in a dynamic environment, 
continuously looking for opportunities to assist, suggest, evaluate, and alert us whenever we pur­
sued solution alternatives that were essentially not feasible. 
We soon realized that to function in this role our software modules had to be able to reason. To be 
able to reason the computer needs to have something akin to understanding of the context within 
which it is supposed to reason. The human cognitive system builds context from knowledge and 
experience using information (i.e., data with attributes and relationships) as its basic building block. 
Interestingly enough the storage medium of the information, knowledge and context held by the 
human brain is billions of neurons and trillions of connections (i.e., synapses) among these neurons 
that are as unrelated to each other as a pencilled note and the sheet of paper on which it is stored. 
What gives meaning to the written note is its representation within the framework of a language 
(e.g., English) that can be understood by the reader.  Similarly, in a computer we can establish the 
notion of meaning if the stored data are represented in an ontological framework of objects, their 
characteristics, and their interrelationships. How these objects, characteristics and relationships 
are actually stored at the lowest level of bits (i.e., 0s and 1s) in the computer is immaterial to the 
ability of the computer to undertake reasoning tasks. The conversion of these bits into data and the 
transformation of data into information, knowledge and context takes place at higher levels, and is 
ultimately made possible by the skillful construction of a network of richly described objects and 
their relationships that represent those physical and conceptual aspects of the real world that the 
computer is required to reason about. 
This is what is meant by an information-centric computer-based decision-support environment. One 
can further argue that to refer to the ability of computers to understand and reason about information 
is no more or less of a trick of our imagination than to refer to the ability of human beings to under­
stand and reason about information. In other words, the countless minuscule charges that are stored in 
the neurons of the human nervous system are no closer to the representation of information than the 
bits (i.e., 0s and 1s)  that are stored in a  digital computer. However,  whereas the human cognitive 
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system automatically converts this collection of charges into information and knowledge, in the com­
puter we have to construct the framework and mechanism for this conversion. Such a framework of 
objects, attributes and relationships provides a system of integrated software applications with a com­
mon language that allows software modules (call them agents if you like) to reason about events, 
monitor changes in the problem situation, and collaborate with each other as they actively assist the 
user(s) during the decision making process. One can say that this ontological framework is a virtual 
representation of the real world problem domain, and that the agents are dynamic tools capable of 
pursuing objectives, extracting and applying knowledge, communicating, and collaboratively assist­
ing the user(s) in the solution of current and future real world problems. 
An increasing number of commercial companies are starting to take advantage of the higher level 
collaborative assistance capabilities of computers to improve their competitive edge and overcome 
potential customer service difficulties. A good example is the timely detection of the fraudulent use 
of telephone credit card numbers. Telephone companies deal with several million calls each day, 
far too many for monitoring by human detectives. Instead, they have implemented intelligent 
computer software modules that monitor certain information relating to telephone calls and relate 
that information to the historical records of individual telephone users. The key to this capability is 
that telephone call data such as time-of-day, length of call, origin of call, and destination are stored 
in the computer as an information structure containing data objects, relationships, and some at­
tributes for each data object. For example, the data “Colombia” may have the attributes interna­
tional, South America, uncommon telephone call destination, attached to it. In addition, relation­
ships are established dynamically between “Colombia” the telephone number of the caller, the 
telephone number being called, the time-of-day of the call, and so on. The result is a network of 
objects with attributes and relationships that is very different from the data stored in a typical 
commercial data-mart. This network constitutes information (rather than data) and allows hun­
dreds of software agents to monitor telephone connections and detect apparent anomalies. What is 
particularly attractive about this fairly straightforward application of information-centric technol­
ogy, is that the software agents do not have to listen in on the actual telephone conversations to 
detect possibly fraudulent activities. However, from the telephone company’s point of view this use 
of expert agents saves millions of dollars each year in lost revenues. 
The ability to achieve interoperability at the information level eliminates the many obstacles that 
plague data-centric confederations of software systems. In particular, it obviates the need for hard 
coded data bridges between discrete applications and allows the data-centric requirement for pre­
defined solutions to be replaced by a tool kit of powerful agents that can provide useful assistance 
in a dynamically changing collaborative decision making environment. 
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For the past 20 years the US military services have suffered under the limitations of stove-piped 
computer software applications that function as discrete entities within a fragmented data-
processing environment. Lack of interoperability has been identified by numerous think tanks, 
advisory boards, and studies, as the primary information systems problem (e.g., Army Science 
Board 2000, Air Force SAB 2000 Command and Control Study, and NSB Network-Centric 
Naval Forces 2000). Yet, despite this level of attention, all attempts to achieve interoperability 
within the current data-centric information systems environment have proven to be expensive, 
unreliable, and generally unsuccessful. 
The Apparently Elusive Goal of ”Interoperability‘ 
The expectations of true interoperability are threefold. First, interoperable applications should be 
able to integrate related functional sequences in a seamless and user transparent manner. 
Second, this level of integration assumes the sharing of information from one application to 
another, so that the results of the functional sequence are automatically available and similarly 
interpreted by the other application. And third, any of the applications should be able to enter or 
exit the integrated interoperable environment without jeopardizing the continued operation of the 
other applications. These conditions simply cannot be achieved by computer software that 
processes numbers and meaningless text with predetermined algorithmic solutions through hard-
coded dumb data links. 
Past approaches to interoperability have basically fallen into three categories. Attempts to create 
common architectures have largely failed because this approach essentially requires existing 
systems to be re-implemented in the common (i.e., new) architecture. Attempts to create bridges 
between applications within a confederation of linked systems have been faced with three major 
obstacles. First, the large number of bridges required (i.e., the square of the number of 
applications). Second, the fragility associated with hard-coded inter-system data linkages. Third, 
the cost of maintaining such linkages in a continuously evolving information systems 
environment. The third category of approaches has focused on achieving interoperability at the 
interface boundary. For anything other than limited presentation and visualization capabilities, 
this approach cannot accommodate dynamic data flows, let alone constant changes at the more 
useful information level. 
These obstacles to interoperability and integration are largely overcome in an information-centric 
software systems environment by embedding in the software some understanding of the 
information being processed. How is this possible? Surely computers cannot be expected to 
understand anything. Aren't they just dumb electronic machines that simply execute programmed 
instructions without any regard to what either the instructions, or the information to which the 
instructions apply, mean? The answer is no, it is all a matter of representation (i.e., how the 
information is structured in the computer). 
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The Notion of ‘Information-Centric’ 
The term information-centric refers to the representation of information in the computer, not to 
the way it is actually stored in a digital machine. This distinction between representation and 
storage is important, and relevant far beyond the realm of computers. When we write a note 
with a pencil on a sheet of paper, the content (i.e., meaning) of the note is unrelated to the 
storage device. A sheet of paper is designed to be a very efficient storage medium that can be 
easily stacked in sets of hundreds, filed in folders, bound into volumes, folded, and so on. 
However, all of this is unrelated to the content of the written note on the paper. This content 
represents the meaning of the sheet of paper. It constitutes the purpose of the paper and governs 
what we do with the sheet of paper (i.e., its use). In other words, the nature and efficiency of the 
storage medium is more often than not unrelated to the content or representation that is stored in 
the medium. 
In the same sense, the way in which we store bits (i.e., 0s and 1s) in a digital computer is 
unrelated to the meaning of what we have stored. When computers first became available they 
were exploited for their fast, repetitive computational capabilities and their enormous storage 
capacity. Application software development progressed rapidly in a data-centric environment. 
Content was stored as data that were fed into algorithms to produce solutions to predefined 
problems in a static problem solving context. It is surprising that such a simplistic and 
artificially contrived problem solving environment was found to be acceptable for several 
decades of intensive computer technology development. 
When we established the Collaborative Agent Design Research Center at Cal Poly in 1986, we 
had a vision. We envisioned that users should be able to sit down at a computer terminal and 
solve problems collaboratively with the computer. The computer should be able to continuously 
assist and advise the user during the decision-making process. Moreover, we postulated that one 
should be able to develop software modules that could spontaneously react in near real-time to 
changing events in the problem situation, analyze the impact of the events, propose alternative 
courses of action, and evaluate the merits of such proposals. What we soon discovered, as we 
naively set out to develop an intelligent decision-support system, is that we could not make much 
headway with data in a dynamically changing problem environment. 
Initially focusing on engineering design, we had no difficulties at all developing a software 
module that could calculate the daylight available inside a room, as long as we specified to the 
computer the precise location and dimensions of the window, the geometry of the room, and 
made some assumptions about external conditions. However, it did not seem possible for the 
computer to determine on its own that there was a need for a window and where that window 
might be best located. The ability of the computer to make these determinations was paramount 
to us. We wanted the computer to be a useful assistant that we could collaborate with as we 
explored alternative design solutions. In short, we wanted the computer to function intelligently 
in a dynamic environment, continuously looking for opportunities to assist, suggest, evaluate, 
and, in particular, alert us whenever we pursued solution alternatives that were essentially not 
practical or even feasible. 
We soon realized that to function in this role our software modules had to be able to reason. 
However, to be able to reason the computer needs to have something akin to understanding of 
the context within which it is supposed to reason. The human cognitive system builds context 
from knowledge and experience using information (i.e., data with attributes and relationships) as 
its basic building block. Interestingly enough the storage medium of the information, knowledge 
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and context held by the human brain is billions of neurons and trillions of connections (i.e., 
synapses) among these neurons that are as unrelated to each other as a pencilled note and the 
sheet of paper on which it is stored. 
What gives meaning to the written note is its representation within the framework of a language 
(e.g., English) that can be understood by the reader. Similarly, in a computer we can establish 
the notion of meaning if the stored data are represented in an ontological framework of objects, 
their characteristics, and their interrelationships. How these objects, characteristics and 
relationships are actually stored at the lowest level of bits (i.e., 0s and 1s) in the computer is 
immaterial to the ability of the computer to undertake reasoning tasks. The conversion of these 
bits into data and the transformation of data into information, knowledge and context takes place 
at higher levels, and is ultimately made possible by the skillful construction of a network of 
richly described objects and their relationships that represent those physical and conceptual 
aspects of the real world that the computer is required to reason about. 
This is what is meant by an information-centric computer-based decision-support environment. 
One can further argue that to refer to the ability of computers to understand and reason about 
information is no more or less of a trick of our imagination than to refer to the ability of human 
beings to understand and reason about information. In other words, the countless minuscule 
charges that are stored in the neurons of the human nervous system are no closer to the 
representation of information than the bits (i.e., 0s and 1s) that are stored in a digital computer. 
However, whereas the human cognitive system automatically converts this collection of charges 
into information and knowledge, in the computer we have to construct the framework and 
mechanism for this conversion Such a framework of objects, attributes and relationships 
provides a system of integrated software applications with a common language that allows 
software modules (now popularly referred to as agents) to reason about events, monitor changes 
in the problem situation, and collaborate with each other as they actively assist the user(s) during 
the decision-making process. One can say that this ontological framework is a virtual 
representation of the real world problem domain, and that the agents are dynamic tools capable 
of pursuing objectives, extracting and applying knowledge, communicating, and collaboratively 
assisting the user(s) in the solution of current and future real world problems. 
Definitions: Data, Information, and Knowledge 
It is often lamented that we human beings are suffering from an information overload. This is a 
myth, as shown in Fig.1 there is no information overload. Instead we are suffering from a data 
overload. The confusion between data and information is not readily apparent and requires 
further explanation. Unorganized data are voluminous but of very little value. Over the past 15 
years, industry and commerce have made significant efforts to rearrange this unorganized data 
into purposeful data, utilizing various kinds of database management systems. However, even in 
this organized form, we are still dealing with data and not information. 
Data are defined as numbers and words without relationships. In reference to Fig.2, the words 
—town“, —dog“, —Tuesday“, —rain“, —inches“, and —min“, have little if any meaning without 
relationships. However, linked together in the sentence: "On Tuesday, 8 inches of rain fell in 10 
min."; they become information. If we then add the context of a particular geographical region, 
pertinent historical climatic records, and some specific hydrological information relating to soil 
conditions and behavior, we could perhaps infer that: "Rainfall of such magnitude is likely to 
cause flooding and landslides." This becomes knowledge. 
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 Fig.3: Unassisted problem solving Fig.4: Limited data-processing assistance 
Context is normally associated solely with human cognitive capabilities. Prior to the advent of 
computers, it was entirely up to the human agent to convert data into information and to infer 
knowledge through the addition of context. However, the human cognitive system performs this 
function subconsciously (i.e., automatically); therefore, prior to the advent of computers, the 
difference between data and information was an academic question that had little practical 
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significance in the real world of day-to-day activities. As shown in Fig.3, the intersection of the 
data, human agent and context realms provides a segment of immediately relevant knowledge. 
The Data-Centric Evolution of Computer Software 
When computers entered on the scene, they were first used exclusively for processing data. In 
fact, even in the 1980s computer centers were commonly referred to as data-processing centers. 
It can be seen in Fig.4 that the context realm remained outside the computer realm. Therefore, 
the availability of computers did not change the need for the human agent to interpret data into 
information and infer knowledge through the application of context. The relegation of 
computers to data-processing tasks is the underlying reason why even today, as we enter the 21st 
Century, computers are still utilized in only a very limited decision-support role. As shown in 
Fig.5, in this limited computer-assistance environment human decision makers typically 
collaborate with each other utilizing all available communication modes (e.g., telephone, FAX, 
e-mail, letters, face-to-face meetings). Virtually every human agent utilizes a personal computer 
to assist in various computational tasks. While these computers have some data sharing 
capabilities in a networked environment, they cannot directly collaborate with each other to 
assist the human decision makers in the performance of decision-making tasks. Each computer 
is typically limited to providing relatively low-level data-processing assistance to its owner. The 
interpretation of data, the inferencing of knowledge, and the collaborative teamwork that is 
required in complex decision-making situations remains the exclusive province of the human 
agents. In other words, without access to information and at least some limited context, the 
computer cannot participate in a distributed collaborative problem-solving arena. 
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In this regard, it is of interest to briefly trace the historical influence of evolving computer 
capabilities on business processes and organizational structures. When the computer first 
became more widely available as an affordable computational device in the late 1960s, it was 
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applied immediately to specialized numerical calculation tasks such as interest rate tables and 
depreciation tables (Fig.6). During the early 1970s, these computational tasks broadened to 
encompass bookkeeping, record storage, and report generation. Tedious business management 
functions were taken over by computer-based accounting and payroll applications. By the late 
1970s, the focus turned to improving productivity using the computer as an improved automation 
tool to increase and monitor operational efficiency. 
In the early 1980s (Fig.7), the business world had gained sufficient confidence in the reliability, 
persistence, and continued development of computer technology to consider computers to be a 
permanent and powerful data-processing tool. Accordingly, businesses were willing to 
reorganize their work flow as a consequence of the functional integration of the computer. More 
comprehensive office management applications led to the restructuring of the work flow. 
By the late 1980s, this had led to a wholesale re-engineering of the organizational structure of 
many businesses with the objective of simplifying, streamlining, and downsizing. It became 
clear that many functional positions and some entire departments could be eliminated and 
replaced by integrated office automation systems. During the early 1990s, the problems 
associated with massive unorganized data storage became apparent, and with the availability of 
much improved database management systems, data were organized into mostly relational 
databases. This marked the beginning of ordered-data archiving and held out the promise of 
access to any past or current data and reporting capabilities in whatever form management 
desired. 
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 Fig.7: Evolution of business intelligence (B) Fig.8: Evolution of business intelligence (C) 
However, by the mid 1990s (Fig.8), the quickening pace of business in the light of greater 
competition increased the need for a higher level of data analysis, faster response, and more 
accurate pattern detection capabilities. During this period, the concepts of data-warehouses, 
data-marts, and On-Line Analytical Processing (OLAP) tools were conceived and rapidly 
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 implemented (Humphries et al. 1999). Since then, the term ‘business intelligence’ has been 
freely used to describe a need for the continuous monitoring of business trends, market share, 
and customer preferences. 
In the late 1990s, the survival pressure on business increased with the need for real-time 
responsiveness in an Internet-based global e-commerce environment. By the end of the 20th 
Century, business began to seriously suffer from the limitations of a data-processing 
environment. The e-commerce environment presented attractive opportunities for collecting 
customer profiles for the implementation of on-line marketing strategies with enormous revenue 
potential. However, the expectations for automatically extracting useful information from low-
level data could not be satisfied by the methods available. These methods ranged from relatively 
simple keyword and thematic indexing procedures to more complex language-processing tools 
utilizing statistical and heuristic approaches (Denis 2000, Verity 1997). 
The major obstacle confronted by all of these information-extraction approaches is the 
unavailability of adequate context (Pedersen and Bruce 1998). As shown previously in Fig.4, a 
computer-based data-processing environment does not allow for the representation of context. 
Therefore, in such an environment, it is left largely to the human user to interpret the data 
elements that are processed by the computer. 
Methods for representing information and knowledge in a computer have been a subject of 
research for the past 40 years, particularly in the field of ‘artificial intelligence’ (Ginsberg 1993). 
However, these studies were mostly focussed on narrow application domains and did not 
generate wide-spread interest even in computer science circles. For example even today, at the 
beginning of the 21st Century, it is difficult to find an undergraduate computer science degree 
program in the US that offers a core curriculum class dealing predominantly with the 
representation of information in a computer. 
The Representation of ‘Context’ in a Computer 
Conceptually, to represent information in a computer, it is necessary to move the context circle 
in Fig.4 upward into the realm of the computer (Fig.9). This allows data to enter the computer in 
a contextual framework, as information. The intersection of the data, context, and human agent 
circles provide areas in which information and knowledge are held in the computer. The 
prevailing approach for the practical implementation of the conceptual diagram shown in Fig.9 is 
briefly outlined below. As discussed earlier (Fig.2), the principal elements of information are 
data and relationships. We know how data can be represented in the computer but how can the 
relationships be represented? The most useful approach available today is to define an ontology 
of the particular application domain in the form of an object model. This requires the 
identification of the objects (i.e., elements) that play a role in the domain and the relationships 
among these objects (Fig.10). Each object, whether physical (e.g., car, person, building, etc.) or 
conceptual (e.g., event, privacy, security, etc.) is first described in terms of its behavioral 
characteristics. For example, a car is a kind of land conveyance. As a child object of the land 
conveyance object, it automatically inherits all of the characteristics of the former and adds some 
more specialized characteristics of its own (Fig.11). Similarly, a land conveyance is a kind of 
conveyance and therefore inherits all of the characteristics of the latter. This powerful notion of 
inheritance is well supported by object-oriented computer languages such as C++ (Stroustrup 
1987) and Java (Horstmann and Cornell 1999) that support the mainstream of applications 
software development today. 
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However, even more important than the characteristics of objects and the notion of inheritance 
are the relationships that exist between objects. As shown in Fig.12, a car incorporates many 
components that are in themselves objects. For example, cars typically have engines, steering 
systems, electric power units, and brake systems. They utilize fuel and often have an air-
conditioning system. 
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For several reasons, it is advantageous to treat these components as objects in their own right 
rather than as attributes of the car object. First, they may warrant further subdivision into parent 
and child objects. For example, there are several kinds of air-conditioning systems, just as there 
are several kinds of cars. Second, an air-conditioning system may have associations of its own to 
other component systems such as a temperature control unit, a refrigeration unit, an air 
distribution system, and so on. Third, by treating these components as separate objects we are 
able to describe them in much greater detail than if they were simply attributes of another object. 
Finally, any changes in these objects are automatically reflected in any other objects that are 
associated with them. For example, during its lifetime, a car may have its air-conditioning 
system replaced with another kind of air handling unit. Instead of having to change the attributes 
of the car, we simply delete the association to the old unit and add an association to the new unit. 
This procedure is particularly convenient when we are dealing with the association of one object 
to many objects, such as the wholesale replacement of a cassette tape player with a new compact 
disk player model in many cars, and so on. 
The way in which the construction of such an ontology leads to the representation of information 
(rather than data) in a digital computer is described in Fig.13, as follows. By international 
agreement, the American Standard Code for Information Interchange (ASCII) provides a simple 
binary (i.e., digital) code for representing numbers, alphabetic characters, and many other 
symbols (e.g., +, -, =, ( ), etc.) as a set of 0 and 1 digits. This allows us to represent sets of 
characters such as the sentence "Police car crossing bridge at Grand Junction." in the 
computer. However, in the absence of an ontology, the computer stores this set of characters as a 
meaningless text string (i.e., data). In other words, in the data-centric realm the computer has no 
understanding at all of the meaning of this sentence. As discussed previously, this is 
unfortunately the state of e-mail today. While e-mail has become a very convenient, 
inexpensive, and valuable form of global communication, it depends entirely on the human 
interpretation of each e-mail message by both the sender and the receiver. 
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Now, if the "Police car crossing bridge at Grand Junction." message had been sent to us as a 
set of related objects, as shown at the bottom of Fig.13, then it should be a relatively simple 
matter to program computer-based agents to reason about the content of this message and 
perform actions on the basis of even this limited level of understanding. How was this 
understanding achieved? In reference to Fig.13, the police car is interpreted by the computer as 
an instance of a car object which is associated with a civilian organization object of kind police. 
The car object automatically inherits all of the attributes of its parent object, land conveyance, 
which in turn inherits all of the attributes of its own parent object, conveyance. The car object is 
also associated with an instance of the infrastructure object, bridge, which in turn is associated 
with a place object, Grand Junction, giving it a geographical location. Even though this 
interpretational structure may appear primitive to us human beings, it is adequate to serve as the 
basis of useful reasoning and task performance by computer-based agents. 
The Popular Notion of ”Intelligent Agents‘ 
Agents that are capable of reasoning about events, in the kind of ontological framework of 
information described above, are little more than software modules that can process objects, 
recognize their behavioral characteristics (i.e., attributes of the type shown for the objects in 
Fig.11), and trace their relationships to other objects. It follows, that perhaps the most elementary 
definition of agents is simply: —Software code that is capable of communicating with other 
entities to facilitate some action“. Of course this communication and action capability alone does 
not warrant the label of intelligent. 
The use of the word intelligent is more confusing than useful. As human beings we tend to judge 
most everything in the world around us in our image. And, in particular, we are rather sensitive 
about the prospect of ascribing intelligence to anything that is not related to the human species, 
let alone an electronic machine. Looking beyond this rather emotional viewpoint, one could 
argue that there are levels of intelligence. At the most elementary level, intelligence is the ability 
to remember. A much higher level of intelligence is creativity (i.e., the ability to create new 
knowledge). In between these two extremes are multiple levels of increasingly intelligent 
capabilities. Certainly computers can remember, because they can store an almost unlimited 
volume of data and can be programmed to retrieve any part of that data. Whether, computers can 
interpret what they remember depends on how the data are represented (i.e., structured) in the 
software. 
In this regard, the notion of intelligent agents refers to the existence of a common language (i.e., 
the ontological framework of information described earlier) and the ability to reason about the 
object characteristics and relationships embodied in the informational structure. Increasing levels 
of intelligent behavior can be achieved by software agents if they have access to existing 
knowledge, are able to act on their own initiative, collaborate with other agents to accomplish 
goals, and use local information to manage local resources. 
Such agents may be programmed in many ways to serve different purposes (Fig.14). Mentor 
agents may be designed to serve as guardian angels to look after the welfare and represent the 
interests of particular objects in the underlying ontology. For example, a mentor agent may 
simply monitor the fuel consumption of a car or perform more complex tasks such as helping a 
tourist driver to find a particular hotel in an unfamiliar city, or alert a platoon of soldiers to a 
hostile intrusion within a specified radius of their current position in the battlefield (Pohl et al. 
1999). Service agents may perform expert advisory tasks on the request of human users or other 
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agents. For example, a computer-based daylighting consultant can assist an architect during the 
design of a building (Pohl et al. 1989) or a Trim and Stability agent may continuously monitor 
the trim of a cargo ship while the human cargo specialist develops the load plan of the ship (Pohl 
et al. 1997). At the same time, Planning agents can utilize the results of tasks performed by 
Service and Mentor agents to devise alternative courses of action or project the likely outcome of 
particular strategies. Facilitator agents can monitor the information exchanged among agents 
and detect apparent conflicts (Pohl 1996). Once such a Facilitator agent has detected a potential 
non-convergence condition involving two or more agents, it can apply one of several relatively 
straightforward procedures for promoting consensus, or it may simply notify the user of the 
conflict situation and explain the nature of the disagreement. 
An Information-Centric Transition Architecture 
An information-centric decision-support system typically consists of components (or modules) 
that exist as clients to an integrated collection of services. Incorporating such services, the 
information-serving collaboration facility (Fig.15) communicates to its clients in terms of the 
real world objects and relationships that are represented in the information structure (i.e., the 
underlying ontology). The software code of each client includes a version of the ontology, 
serving as the common language that allows clients to communicate information rather than 
data.
 Fig.15: Information-centric interoperability. Fig.16: Transitioning to an information-centric
 architecture. 
To reduce the amount of work (i.e., computation) that the computer has to accomplish and to 
minimize the volume of information that has to be transmitted within the system, two strategies 
can be readily implemented. First, each client can register a standing request with the 
collaboration facility for the kind of information that it would like to receive. This is referred to 
as a subscription profile, and the client has the ability to change this profile dynamically during 
execution if it sees cause to ask for additional or different information. For example, after 
receiving certain information through its existing subscription profile, a Mentor agent 
representing a squad of Marines may decide to request information relating to engagement 
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events in a different sector of the battlefield, henceforth. By allowing information to be 
automatically pushed to clients, the subscription service obviates the need for database queries 
and thereby greatly reduces the amount of work the computer has to perform. Of course, a 
separate query service is also usually provided so that a client can make one-time requests for 
information that is not required on a continuous basis. 
The second strategy relates directly to the volume of information that is required to be 
transmitted within the system. Since the software code of each client includes a version of the 
ontology (i.e., common language) only the changes in information need to be communicated. For 
example, a Mentor agent that is watching over a squad of Marines may have more than 100 
objects included in its subscription profile. One set of these objects represents an enemy unit and 
its warfighting capabilities. If this unit changes its position then in reality only one attribute (i.e., 
the location attribute) of one object may have changed. Only the changed value of this single 
object needs to be transmitted to the Mentor agent, since as a client to the collaboration facility it 
already has all of the information that has not changed. 
How does this interoperability between the collaboration facility and its clients translate into a 
similar interoperability among multiple software applications (i.e., separate programs dealing 
with functional sequences in related domains)? For example, more specifically, how can we 
achieve interoperability between a tactical command and control system such as IMMACCS 
(Pohl et al. 1999) and a logistical command and control system such as SEAWAY (Wood et al. 
2000)? 
Since both of these software systems are implemented in an information-centric architecture, the 
underlying information representation can be structured in levels (Fig.16). At the highest level 
we define notions, concepts and object types in general terms. This overarching common core 
ontology sits on top of any number of lower level application specific ontologies that address the 
specific bias and level of granularity of the particular application domain. For example, in the 
core ontology an ‘aircraft’ may be defined in terms of its physical nature and those capabilities 
that are essentially independent of its role in a particular application domain. In the tactical 
domain this general description (i.e., representation) of an ‘aircraft’ is further refined and biased 
toward a warfighting role. In other words, the IMMACCS application sees an aircraft as an 
airborne weapon with certain strike capabilities. SEAWAY, on the other hand, sees an aircraft as 
an airborne mobile warehouse capable of transporting supplies from one point to another. 
The interoperability capabilities of an information-centric software environment will also allow 
agents in one application to notify agents in other applications of events occurring in multiple 
domains. For example, the Engagement Agent in the tactical IMMACCS application is able to 
advise appropriate agents in the logistical SEAWAY application whenever a Supply Point ashore 
is threatened by enemy activity. This may result in the timely rescheduling or redirection of a 
planned re-supply mission. The agents are able to communicate across multiple applications at 
the information level through the common language of the ontological framework. Similarly, the 
SEAWAY application is able to rely on the ICODES (Pohl et al. 1997) ship load planning 
application to maintain in-transit cargo visibility, down to the location of a specific supply item 
in a particular container on-board a ship en-route to the sea base. 
One might argue that this is all very well for newly developed applications that are by design 
implemented in an information-centric architecture, but what about the many existing data-
centric applications that all perform strategic and indispensable functions? These existing legacy 
applications constitute an enormous investment that cannot be discarded overnight, for several 
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reasons. First, they perform critical functions. Second, it will take time to cater for these 
functions in the new decision-support environment. Third, at least some of these functions will 
be substantially modified or eliminated as the information-centric environment evolves. 
As shown in Fig.16, data-centric applications can communicate with information-centric systems 
through translators. The function of these translators is to map those portions of the low level 
data representation of the external application that are important to the decision-making context, 
to the ontology of the information-centric system. Conversely, the same translator must be 
capable of extracting necessary data items from the information context and feed these back to 
the data-centric application. Typically, as in the case of IMMACCS (Pohl et al. 1999), this 
translation capability is implemented as a universal translator that can be customized to a 
particular external application. The translator itself, exists as a client to the information-serving 
collaboration facility (Fig.15) of the information-centric system and therefore includes in its 
software code a version of the ontology that describes the common language of that system. 
Conclusion 
While the capabilities of present day computer-based agent systems are certainly a major 
advancement over data-processing systems, we are only at the threshold of a paradigm shift of 
major proportions. Over the next several decades, the context circle shown in Fig.17 will 
progressively move upward into the computer domain, increasing the sector of "relevant 
immediate knowledge" shared at the intersection of the human, computer, data, and context 
domains. Returning to the historical evolution of business intelligence described previously in 
reference to Figs. 6, 7 and 8, the focus in the early 2000s will be on information management as 
opposed to data-processing (Fig.18). Increasingly, businesses will insist on capturing data as 
information through the development of business enterprise ontologies and leverage scarce 
human resources with multi-agent software capable of performing useful analysis and pattern-
detection tasks. 
An increasing number of commercial companies are starting to take advantage of the higher level 
collaborative assistance capabilities of computers to improve their competitive edge and 
overcome potential customer service difficulties. A good example is the timely detection of the 
fraudulent use of telephone credit card numbers. Telephone companies deal with several million 
calls each day, far too many for monitoring by human detectives. Instead, they have 
implemented intelligent computer software modules that monitor certain information relating to 
telephone calls and relate that information to the historical records of individual telephone users. 
The key to this capability is that telephone call data such as time-of-day, length of call, origin of 
call, and destination are stored in the computer as an information structure containing data 
objects, relationships, and some attributes for each data object. For example, the data 
”Columbia‘ may have the attributes international, South America, uncommon telephone call 
destination, attached to it. In addition, relationships are established dynamically between 
”Columbia‘ the telephone number of the caller, the telephone number being called, the time-of-
day of the call, and so on. The result is a network of objects with attributes and relationships that 
is very different from the data stored in a typical commercial data-mart. This network constitutes 
information (rather than data) and allows hundreds of software agents to monitor telephone 
connections and detect apparent anomalies. What is particularly attractive about this fairly 
straightforward application of information-centric technology, is that the software agents do not 
have to listen in on the actual telephone conversations to detect possibly fraudulent activities. 
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However, from the telephone company‘s point of view this use of expert agents saves millions of 
dollars each year in lost revenues. 
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 Fig.17: Evolving human-computer partnership Fig.18: Evolution of business intelligence (D) 
Toward the mid 2000s, we can expect some success in the linking of such ontologies to provide a 
virtually boundless knowledge harvesting environment for mobile agents with many kinds of 
capabilities. Eventually, it may be possible to achieve virtual equality between the information 
representation capabilities of the computer and the human user. This virtual equality is likely to 
be achieved not by the emulation of human cognitive capabilities, but rather, through the skillful 
combination of the greatly inferior artificial cognitive capabilities of the computer with its vastly 
superior computational, pattern-matching and storage facilities. 
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INTRODUCTION
 
It has been stated, possibly by Napoleon, that an army marches on its 
belly. Of course, it was understood by everybody that "belly" 
signified all that an army needs for a campaign or a mission. And this 
is perhaps how the concept of Logistics has entered the military 
conciousness. But once entrenched in the military, this concept has 
penetrated into the civilian world. This has not necessarily been 
beneficial to the understanding of what Logistics is, or should be. 
Vulgarization of a concept leads to it becoming a buzz word, and in 
many instances with little understanding of the complexities 
pertaining to that concept. I believe that this is the case for Logistics. 
In this talk I wish to to present an analysis of Logistics that will 
emphasize the overarching role that Logistics plays in military affairs. 
I want to preface my presentation with an apology to those members 
of this audience who are logisticians by profession (or have dealt with 
logistics throughout their respective careers).  I nevertheless hope 
that even these persons will find some fresh insights in my discussion 
of what Logistics is all about ( my first topic). My next topic is a 
discussion of Decision Support Systems , which includes a description 
of their role and actual implementation, in particular the modern 
approach to their construction. I continue with a vision of Logistics 
for the 21st century. Among other items, this section describes the 
various projects that the ONR Logistics Program is actively 
supporting at present and some planned projects as well. I conclude 
with a general summary. 
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Keynote Address 
Rear Admiral Jay M. Cohen
 
Chief of Naval Research
 
United States Navy
 
(Editor s Apology:  Unfortunately due to equipment failure RAdm Cohen s address could not be 
recorded during the Workshop. With his kind permission we have included in these proceedings 
a copy of his address to the House Armed Services Committee of the US Congress, delivered on 
the 26th of June, 2001.) 
Mr. Chairman, distinguished members of the subcommittee, thank you for this 
opportunity to discuss the Department of the Navy s Science and Technology Program. 
When Admiral Clark assumed the watch from Admiral Jay Johnson last summer, he said that our 
people were our first priority.˚ His Marine Corps counterpart, General Jones, is equally 
committed to doing everything we can for his few and proud Marines. 
One of the most important ways we can keep our people and recruit more like them is to give 
them the best working conditions possible.˚ While the bedrock of our Navy and Marine Corps is 
good leadership, technology is the foundation that rests on that bedrock.˚ Admiral Clark has 
directed me, as Chief of Naval Research, to make science and technology work for our people in 
the Fleet.˚ And since I also wear the hat of Assistant Deputy Commandant (Science and 
Technology) for the Marine Corps, I answer to the same marching orders from General 
Jones make science and technology work for the Marine.˚ So I will couch quite a bit of my 
testimony today in terms of what we re doing to deliver capabilities for Sailors and Marines.˚ I 
think we have a great record, a sound process, and a terrific future. 
As Chief of Naval Research, I want to protect our warfighters from technological surprises, 
while giving them the tools to inflict surprises on our adversaries.˚ The business of surprise is 
especially important today.˚ The threats we face are too variable to yield to the clear responses 
available during the Cold War.˚ I would like to draw out one fundamental lesson from the Cold 
War and other more recent situations as uncertainty increases, options increase in value.˚ My 
priorities electric warship, missile defense/space, human factors, environment, and 
efficiency will offer out of the box  capability options; it s my job to give the Secretary, and 
the CNO, the Commandant, technology options they can exercise at need. 
Our science and technology strategy balances long-term interests with short-term needs. The 
health of our science and technology base our ability to discharge our national naval 
responsibilities, to remain a smart buyer of science and technology, and to get capabilities into 
the hands of the operating forces  ultimately depends upon a balanced portfolio from basic 
research through advanced technology development and manufacturing technology. 
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I especially look forward to incorporating Secretary Gordon England s industry perspective on 
maximizing the Department of the Navy s precious technology investments.˚ 
For the next Navy and Marine Corps, we are concentrating our science and technology 
investment into focused programs designed to provide a critical mass of support that will yield 
Future Naval Capabilities (FNCs).˚ I recently restructured the program to combine overlapping 
efforts, and I added two programs Electric Warship and Combat Vehicles Technology (which 
will focus on bringing the advantages of electrical technologies to the naval warfighters), and 
Littoral Combat and Force Projection (which includes both combat and expeditionary logistics 
capabilities), which will focus on Marine Corps requirements in projecting power from the beach 
in-land.˚ The other ten FNCs (in no priority order) are: 
Autonomous Operations will focus on dramatically increasing the performance and 
affordability of Naval organic unmanned vehicle systems;
 Capable Manpower will focus on selection and training to provide fully prepared Sailors 
and Marines through human-centered hardware and systems;
 Knowledge Superiority and Assurance will focus on issues of connectivity and knowledge 
superiority for distributed Naval forces to ensure common situation understanding, increased 
speed of command, interoperability, and dynamic distributed mission planning and execution 
across all echelons;
 Littoral Antisubmarine Warfare will provide effective capability to detect, track, classify 
and neutralize anti-access threats imposed by enemy submarines, in support of power projection 
ashore;
 Missile Defense will focus S&T necessary to detect, control, & engage projected theater 
ballistic & cruise missiles as well as enemy aircraft threats;
 Organic Mine Countermeasures will focus on an organic MCM capability to shorten the 
MCM tactical timeline and eliminate the need for manned operations in a minefield;
 Platform Protection strives to win or avoid engagements with evolving threats either in-
stride or while engaged in projecting power from the sea;
 Time Critical Strike will focus S&T that provides a substantial reduction in the engagement 
timeline against time critical mobile targets, theatre ballistic missiles, weapons of mass 
destruction, C4I centers and armored vehicles;
 Total Ownership Cost Reduction seeks to significantly decrease costs associated with 
acquisition, operation and support and to develop methods to accurately predict costs and assess 
return on investment; and,
 Warfighter Protection will focus on protecting Warfighters to reduce casualties in the 
emerging Expeditionary Maneuver Warfare battlespace. 
74
 
I have directed my people to get close to the Fleet and the Force, to be alert to their needs and 
swift to respond to them.˚ We are working to enhance their quality of service.˚ As we connect 
better with our customers the operating Fleet and Force we are undertaking some novel 
initiatives to reduce the cycle time of our technologies.˚ I have established a program I call 
Swamp Works .˚ This takes high-risk, high-payoff technologies, puts the right stakeholders 
together, and gets a product into the hands of the operators who need it.˚ Swamp Works  efforts 
are intended to be technically risky I anticipate a 90% failure rate because leap-ahead work is 
always technically risky.˚ 
Force protection crosses all technologies.˚ New materials for hull protection, advanced sensors, 
next generation decision support systems, autonomous platforms, and, ultimately, directed 
energy weapons all of these are technological responses to the asymmetric threats our forces 
encounter as they remain forward deployed. 
Another priority I mentioned is human factors and quality of service.˚ Our young people will join 
and stay with us if we give them meaningful and challenging missions, and if we give them the 
means to accomplish those missions.˚ The biggest morale-killers on a ship can be those 
repetitious, labor-intensive, dirty maintenance jobs that have to be done.˚ Naval science and 
technology offers solutions: coatings that don t have to be scraped and chipped; fault diagnostics 
that tell you when a bearing is about to fail; condition-based maintenance that saves time and 
resources.˚ And the smart people we have in the Fleet today deserve to work with systems that 
are engineered with the human being in mind.˚ Human-centric systems, because the system is 
made for the Sailor and Marines not vice-versa.˚ These include embedded training that helps 
Sailors and Marines work smarter, stay proficient, and learn new skills.˚ There is also no greater 
satisfaction in Sailors  and Marines  working lives than accomplishing their mission and getting 
home to their loved ones. 
Additionally, we are working to field hearing protection systems and vaccines to keep our 
Sailors and Marines healthy.˚ We are working on more effective firefighting tools and 
techniques.˚ We continue to work on environmentally friendly technologies such as the active 
noise cancellation program that may help our fighter jets to coexist with the ever-increasing 
civilian population around our bases. 
Our laboratories are vital for our Nation s development of future, essential warfighting 
capabilities.˚ The labs perform a variety of related functions associated with the development of 
new war-fighting systems and the insertion of new technology into legacy systems.˚ The Navy is 
working with Department of Defense in developing a process to implement the authority for 
direct hiring that Congress provided for the labs.˚ I support this authority and believe it will 
improve the workforce and the efficiency of our laboratories.˚ I will be happy to report back to 
you our progress in this matter.˚ I hope you will visit our world class corporate laboratory, the 
Naval Research Laboratory, here in Washington, DC. 
With the assistance and support of the Vice Chief of Naval Research, Brigadier General William 
Catto, who is with me here today, I focus on the Navy and Marine Corps of today, tomorrow and 
after-next  (the one that will fight and win battles in 2020 and beyond).˚ I have given examples 
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above of initiatives in progress for today and tomorrow.˚ The Navy and Marine Corps after-next 
will be based on discoveries just being made today.˚ To ensure we get the technology and 
development concepts right, a robust cycle of innovation, validated by experimentation that leads 
to transformation, must continue.˚ It is a process without end; new technologies evolve, new 
ideas are born, new innovations must be experimented with, resulting in further transformation.˚ 
It is a process as old as the Navy and Marine Corps, and as relevant as the need for a strong 
national defense today, tomorrow and always.˚
 The United States has a Navy and Marine Corps second to none in the world, thanks to 
America s investment in science and technology.˚ I have committed to a science and technology 
program that ensures our technological superiority continues in this new century and a program 
that has the Sailor and Marine at its center. 
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Themes 
Military operations are examined from many perspectives, and few are as challenging to capture 
adequately as decision-making. This effort may fall short as well, but it will not be for lack of 
having a conceptual framework within which to present basic issue—the absence of detailed 
tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) to support decision-making during the execution phase 
of operations. To make the case for the publication of detailed, generic TTPs for command post 
operations to be developed at the Service level, it is necessary to describe the decision-making 
process the TTPs are intended to support. Important supporting themes along the way include: 
Doctrine – to include tactics, techniques, and procedures 
Command Posts and Operations Centers 
Tactical Information 
Commander-Staff Teamwork 
Technical, Tactical, and Digital Proficiencies 
Decision-making revolves around a flow of information that commences with a requirement to 
conduct military operations. At the brigade, regimental, and battalion levels, the requirement 
from higher headquarters (HHQ) to conduct operations initiates the . . . 
1 Orders from HHQ that include the HHQ commander’s intent, concept of operations, and 
the tasks assigned to the subordinate and supporting units, which generates . . . 
2 The unit’s own restated mission, commander’s intent, concept of operations, tasks to 
subordinate and supporting units, an operations order, and . . . 
3 Once the unit begins to execute the order, a torrent of situational information. 
Situational information now becomes the grist of decision-making related to the current 
operations order and to the successive orders. The challenge, even in the brave new Network 
Centric world, is how to get the right information to the decision-maker in sufficient time for him 
or her to make effective decisions. This challenge is described in five sections: (1) the Doctrine 
Gap, (2) the Current Situation, (3) Decision Models, (4) Tactical Information, and (5) A 
Strawman TTP Development Process. 
1 ~ The Doctrine & TTP Gap 
In a sense, decision-making is relatively simpler at the team, squad, platoon, and company levels 
that at echelons commanded by colonels and generals. The small unit leader is able to monitor 
and assess the situation almost entirely through his own senses. He sees, hears, smells, feels, and 
77 
 even tastes the information upon which he will decide to press on with his current plan or modify 
it. Even in sensory contact with his surroundings, uncertainty is frequently present, and the 
decision is reached applying a “sixth” sense, intuition. Important to note, lacking a staff, the unit 
leader builds his plan using the Troop Leading Procedures. In effect, he uses a doctrinal process 
to develop his scheme of maneuver and fire support plan. During execution, he uses doctrinal 
techniques, rehearsed many times, to take advantage of fleeting opportunities or to react to 
problems, e.g., calls for fires, hand and arm signals to change formation, immediate action drills, 
etc. Thus, he is equipped by doctrine to plan his five-paragraph order, and to lead the unit during 
execution, making adjustments to his plan as necessary. 
For lieutenant colonels and above, and their staffs, sensing the battle is more complex.2  Getting 
an accurate picture of the battle now requires surrogates and abstractions to supplant the 
“senses.” This is true whether the CP is equipped simply with acetate covered maps, FM tactical 
radios, and 3M “stickies” or with the increasingly sophisticated C4ISR technologies. Now the 
commanders have help. They have a staff and equipment whose propose is to provide the 
relevant information necessary for decision-making, in effect, to be the surrogate for his own 
senses. Like the small unit leaders, the lieutenant colonels and above develop their plans and 
orders within a robust doctrinal framework. But unlike the small unit leaders, the lieutenant 
colonels and above do not have a robust, integrated doctrinal framework within which they 
acquire information and make decisions during the execution of their plans. More to the point, 
their staff members do not have a framework—either conceptual or detailed—to focus their 
collective efforts on providing timely relevant information to the decision-maker. They have 
pieces of a framework, some at a Service doctrinal level, some at a schools level, and some at a 
unit SOP level. But they have nothing that quite equates to small unit immediate action drills 
where every man in the team knows his role and the roles of the rest of the men in the element. 
In retrospect, the absence of integrated conceptual and detailed doctrine (to include TTP) on 
decision-making during the execution phase is surprising, really. Both the Army and the Marine 
Corps have gone to impressive lengths to analyze, understand, codify, promulgate, and train to 
their doctrines for decision-making during the planning phase of an operation. But not decision-
making during execution. For years, the efforts of commanders and staffs to become proficient 
in decision-making during the execution phase have advanced largely on the strength of oral 
tradition and tribal lore. With the exception of unit level standing operating procedures (SOP) 
for command post operations (see discussion below), which have always been prepared by the 
unit, individuals have had few other materials to study in preparation for command post 
exercises (CPX) or field training exercises (FTX). Thus, when the unit finally begins the CPX, 
or FTX, or even the command and control experiment, individual proficiencies pick up where 
they left off at the end of the last exercise and collective proficiencies start at the level of the 
least proficient individual—and the cycle of the old brave teaching the young brave commences 
again.3  Not only is this inefficient, the ability to train to consistent standards is simply not 
possible. The braves carry the tasks, the conditions, and the standards around in their heads. 
They aren’t written down, not even on the teepee walls. 
Not only is the absence of integrated, conceptual and detailed doctrine for decision-making 
during the execution phase not good for training and readiness, it is not good for material 
development either. Why? Because the user cannot clearly articulate his requirement, at least 
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not on the basis of a documented process that the material is expected to support, speed up, or 
possibly even supplant. The person representing the user community can only guess based on 
his experience what functions the material should provide.4 
Thus two good reasons can be identified to develop conceptual and detailed doctrine for 
decision-making during the execution phase. First, the doctrine is necessary for unit readiness 
and individual and collective proficiency. Second, it provides a doctrinal framework within 
which to articulate material requirements for decision support systems. 
As background, an interesting paradox is at work. Each system proposed is designed to facilitate 
decision-making at a battlefield functional level. For example, the Advanced Field Artillery 
Tactical Data System (AFATDS)—a system common to the Army and the Marine Corps—is 
designed to facilitate supporting arms decision-making and fire support coordination. It is a 
superb system, and is designed such that in the right circumstances, it could almost be set on 
“automatic pilot.” It still has some developmental bugs to be worked out, particularly in the 
effort to integrate it fully into the Army Battle Command System (ABCS), but as a stand-alone 
system, it is very, very capable. The hardware system is also supported by an excellent system 
users manual (SUMs). While most SUMs tend to be written at the operator level, the AFATDS 
SUM is written so the roles of the section NCO and officers vis-à-vis the system are clear. But 
appropriately, the SUM does not describe the integration of the system’s capabilities into the 
overall sequence of actions in a maneuver unit or MAGTF command post. Another document is 
necessary for this purpose. 
The paradox then, is that even when the stand-alone system is well designed for the battlefield 
functional area it supports, the documentation to fully integrate the system—from the operator, 
the NCO, and the section officer level—into the command post process for decision-making 
during current operations must be accomplished by someone other than the material developer. 
Not all systems come from the developer with the roles of the NCOs and section officers as well 
defined as the role of the operator. But each system is a MAJOR element within a command 
post’s information flow, and the NCO and section officer are integral to that process. A related 
reality is that the Service cannot build up from the inputs and outputs of the system to the 
commander’s need for information. The Service must to build down from its conceptual 
framework for decision-making to determine what the section officer, NCO, and operator in the 
fire support coordination center (FSCC) must be doing to support that information flow, in 
addition to attending to the purely stovepipe functions of the AFATDS system. 
Models and TTPS 
In effect, the Services must decide on the conceptual framework for current operations decision-
making, then build the TTPs/SOPs to provide timely, relevant information to the commander 
while concurrently continuing to enter information into the systems and appropriately acting 
upon the information produced by the systems. More pointedly, what is needed is (1) a cognitive 
model of decision-making at the colonel level that encompasses expectations, information flow, 
assessment, and the actual decision, (2) a team process model describing the commander–staff 
team interactions throughout the execution phase, (3) clear definition of the commander’s and 
staff’s information requirements, and (4) detailed TTP describing the collective tasks within and 
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among the staff sections, and the individual tasks of each person with a role in the information 
flow. 
2 ~ The Situation 
Historically, command post SOPs have been the unit commander’s responsibility and 
prerogative. The Services have developed basic doctrine for CPs—describing the organization, 
manning, principal duties staff members, general operations of the CP (displacement, watch 
standing, security, etc.), and material and equipment—but not unit level command post 
procedures. Currently, the Army is preparing a draft field manual, FM 6-0.6, TTP for CP 
Operations. The draft updates earlier references on CP matters and generally describes the 
“theory and nature” of CPs, but it will not include procedural details for the planning, 
preparation and execution cycle. The Marine Corps’ Doctrine Division currently has in the field 
for review the Coordinating Draft of Marine Corps Warfighting Publication 6-2, MAGTF 
Command and Control. The draft is similar to the Army publication, and includes chapters on 
Information Management and Command and Control Warfare. The Doctrine Division also has 
plans for a MCWP 6-21, Tactics, Techniques and Procedures for Command Echelons. The 
current outline indicates that this document is also intended to be general in nature, and not 
prescriptive with respect to internal techniques and procedures.5 
At the organizational level, based on a small sample of SOPs from units in the 4th Infantry 
Division, unit SOPS have not changed very much in twenty years. They tend to have one 
chapter outlining basic procedures within the unit command post. Another chapter may describe 
the unit’s adaptation of the Army’s military decision-making process (MDMP), but not the 
complexities of decision-making during the execution phase of an operation. As seen in Table 1, 
Brigade Combat Team Battalion Task Force DS Artillery Battalion
Chapter 1 - Force Protection
Chapter 2 - Command, Control And 
Communications
Chapter 3 - Maneuver 
Chapter 5 - Fire Support Coordination
Chapter 4- Intelligence And Electronic 
Warfare
Chapter 6 -
Mobility/Countermobility/Survivability
Chapter 7 - Nbc Operations
Chapter 8 - Air Defense
Chapter 9 - Logistics
Chapter 10 - Personnel Service Support
Chapter 11 - Intelligence Reports
Chapter 12 - Operations Reports
Chapter 13 - Logistics Reports
Chapter 14 - Personnel Reports
Chapter 15 – Religious Support Operations
Chapter 16 – Medical Operations
Preface: Commander’s Combat 
Rules
A: Command and Control
B: Maneuver
C: Intelligence and Security
D: Combat Service Support
E: Engineer Operations
F: Fire Support Operations
G: Air Defense Operations
H: NBC Operations
I: Checklists / Load Plans
J: Reports
CONTENTS INDEX
CARD 100 Fire Support Planning and 
Coordination
CARD 200 Coordination of Tactical 
Operations
CARD 300 Firing Battery
CARD 400 Survey
CARD 500 Combat Service Support 
Operations
CARD 600 Communications
CARD 700 Digital Troubleshooting
CARD 800 NBC
CARD 900 Intelligence
CARD 1000 Risk Management
CARD 1100 Secondary Checks
CARD 1200 FDC Checks
CARD 1300 Firing Incident Checklists
CARD 1400 Checklists
CARD 1500 Report Formats
Table 1 Chapter Headings from Unit Tactical SOPs 
a list of chapter headings extracted from three unit tactical SOPs, the remaining chapters tend to 
have checklists related to specific tactical operations that are common to two or more 
subordinate or supporting units within the command. 
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This is not to suggest that unit tactical SOPs are not important. SOPs of this nature are useful 
and necessary documents, and reduce the amount of coordinating and special instructions that 
have to be written into operations orders. The point is that unit SOPs are not the type of written 
techniques and procedures envisioned in the Models and TTP paragraph above, but currently, at 
least in the Army (and based on this very small sample), they are the state-of-the-art with respect 
to decision-making within tactical command posts.6 
One other special class of publications directly related to decision-making during operations is 
important to the discussion. These are the reference publications published by commands 
responsible for professional military education or other commands with a direct interest in 
doctrine and training. The texts are similar to the unit SOPs in that they highlight key tactical 
knowledge distilled from the Services’ field manuals and warfighting publications. They also 
gather under one cover the Services’ weapons capabilities and equipment performance 
information, in effect, the “know how” an officer and NCO needs in order to be, in the words of 
the 2d Leadership Principle, “. . . technically and tactically proficient.” 
In the interest of brevity, this group is listed in Table 2 along with the proponent and the URL 
where the reader can locate them. The bottom three documents listed are evidence of the 
transition in C2 support tools from maps and FM radios to the digital C2 systems now being 
fielded and in various stages of experimentation and development. 
Source Title URL, etc.
Battle Command Battle Lab -Leavenworth 
Command and General Staff College 
Battle Command Handbook 
Student Text 100-3, Battle Book
Http://cacfs.army.mil
 Handbook
Http://www-cgsc.army.mil
 Organizations
 Center for Army Tactics
    ST 100-3 Online
MAGTF Staff Training Program Pamphlet 5-0.3, MAGTF Planner’s Reference Manual 
Pamphlet 6-5, The Planner’s Guide to C2PC 
Http://www.usmc.mil
 Units
 By location
 Virginia – Marine Air Ground Task Force 
Staff Training Program Center
 Publications – Pamphlets 
TRADOC System Manager, FORCE XXI Digital Operating Guide for Brigade and Batta lion 
Staffs, ABCS, v 6.1 
Not available via Http. 
Warrior – T Army Battle Command System (ABCS) Version 6.2 
Smart Book
Http://www.atsc.army.mil
 WarMod XXI
 Warrior-T  [Call “Contacts” fo r passwords]
Table 2 Reference Publications Bearing on Decision-Making 
In fact, none of these documents address decision-making during the execution phase of an 
operation, either, but they are important sources of information for a battle staff.7,8  The 
information needs to be accounted for in some way in the Optimum TTP.9 
Finally, a word on the Services’ doctrinal publications bearing most directly on decision-making 
during current operations. On the Army side, the Combined Arms Doctrine Directorate at the 
U.S. Army Command and General Staff College currently has in final draft FM 6-0, Command 
and Control. As stated in the preface, the manual provides common, authoritative understanding 
of the authority, fundamentals concepts, and application of command and control of Army 
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 operations. It describes the art of command and the science of control. It introduces Mission 
Command as the preferred philosophy of command, defines control within command and 
control, and describes decision-making during execution (emphasis added). The manual is 
written both at a conceptual and detailed level, with the details still relatively conceptual in tone. 
It is an excellent document. It promises to fill a long standing gap, and it would be a key 
reference in developing the Optimum TTP. 
The Marine Corps Doctrinal Publication series addresses decision-making entirely at a 
conceptual level. MCDP 1, Warfighting sets the broad architecture; MCDP 6, Command and 
Control, defines it further; and MCDP 1-3, Tactics refines elements in MCDP 6. The 
Coordinating Draft of MCWP 6-2, MAGTF Command and Control, provides additional 
organizational detail. 
Thus far the discussion has attempted to make the case that TTP should flow from concepts, 
preferably doctrinal concepts. The Army is on the verge of publishing relatively detailed 
doctrine on decision-making during execution. The Marine Corps, as depicted on the Doctrine 
Division’s doctrinal hierarchy diagrams, has no plans to provide Service level doctrine beyond 
the conceptual documents already in the field. The tentative conclusion is that neither Service 
will publish doctrinal publications in the near term that will provide sufficient detail to frame the 
TTP. 
3 ~ Decision Models 
Earlier the discussion stated that what is needed is (1) a cognitive model of decision-making, (2) 
a team process model, (3) clear definition of information requirements, and (4) detailed TTP 
describing the collective tasks within and among the staff sections. In effect, while the objective 
is to develop TTP, logic requires starting with the actual cognitive decision-making process. 
A Cognitive Model 
The decision-making process for planning and execution decisions is highly cognitive. The 
process has been described extensively in the literature of psychology and increasingly in 
military periodicals and papers written by officer students during their attendance in professional 
military education. Indeed, the Marine Corps Gazette has featured articles by Dr. Gary Klein, 
one of the foremost cognitive psychologists in the United States. Dr. Klein has written 
extensively on the subject of “recognition-primed decisions” and the function of expertise and 
intuition in decision-making. Prior to his research and espousal of recognition-primed decisions, 
military officers were trained to believe that all decisions, to include decisions during execution, 
had to be preceded by the development of two or more courses of action (COA) and a trade-off 
analysis to identify the best alternative. Never mind the reality that commanders in time 
constrained circumstances tended to size-up the situation and personally prescribe the single 
COA they intended to execute. Clearly, Dr. Klein’s research, writings, and many presentations 
broke the multiple COA logjam, and have significantly influenced every other military and 
academic writer addressing the topic. That said, the recognition-primed decision (RPD) model is 
not sufficient by itself to describe the full range of factors influencing a commander’s decision 
during current operations. 
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In 1998, an Army Research Laboratory effort attempted to expand on the RPD model to account 
for other factors known to influence a commander’s decision. These factors are implicit or 
referred to in the RPD descriptions but are not the point of emphasis. The factors are 
sufficiently important that they needed to be highlighted in a more comprehensive model of 
military decision-making. The ARL project director believed that a cognitive model of a 
military decision had to account more fully for three other factors: 
1	 That the decision-maker’s frame of reference for the decision was significantly 
influenced by his military training, education, experience, together with the mental 
images created by the HHQ order and the unit’s detailed plans bearing on the current 
situation, 
2	 That the cognitive function of situation monitoring needed to be expanded. This 
concerned specifically the periods when either the plan was fully on track or “nothing 
was happening,” and then cues or triggers caused the decision-maker to begin to assess 
the changing situation, and make a decision. And finally, 
3	 That many military decisions are made under conditions of uncertainty, not recognition, 
and that cognitive decision strategies under these conditions needed to be explained in 
more detail. 
The team combined a detailed literature review with field observations at a series of Army 
advanced warfighting experiments (AWE). The intention was to fit the models to the actual 
decision-making processes observed in the field, not fit the observations to the models. Figure 3 
lists the principal concepts, researchers, and articles representing the researchers’ views that 
became the nucleus of the integrated cognitive model: 
Researcher(s) Article (See bibliography) Emphasis in the Integrated Model
Beach Image Theory: Personal and 
Organizational Decisions
The function of military training, education, 
experience in decision-making, together with the 
mental images created by the HHQ order and 
the unit’s detailed plans bearing on the current 
situation 
Rouse and Valusek Evolutionary Design of Systems 
to Support Decision Making
Situation monitoring and the onset of situation 
assessment
Klein A Recognition-Primed Decision 
(RPD) Model for Rapid 
Decision Making 
Recognition-primed decisions 
Lipshitz and Strauss Coping with Uncertainty: A 
Naturalistic Decision-making 
Analysis
Coping with uncertainty; cognitive strategies to
with which to make effective decisions under 
conditions of uncertainty.
Table 3 Cognitive Decision Models Bearing on Military Decision Making 
The resulting model is portrayed in Figure 1, Integrated Cognitive Model of the Commander’s 
Decision Process (Adelman, et al., 1998). 10 
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Coping with Uncertainty Recognition-Primed Decision 
Figure 1, Integrated Cognitive Model of the Commander’s Decision Process 
The purpose here is not to describe the development and logic flow of the model; rather it is to 
provide an example of a cognitive model specifically developed to describe a military 
commander’s decision-making process during the execution phase of an operation. As a 
footnote to this model, the lead author for the Draft FM 6-0, Command and Control, said that the 
model—the graphic and the detailed discussion—contributed significantly to the decision 
process model described in that publication. 
A Commander-Staff Team Process Model 
The research effort that produced the cognitive model also produced the beginning of a 
commander-staff team process model. This model has grown over the past three years from one 
diagram and a list to four diagrams and a different list. It starts with a description of what the 
commander and staff actually monitor (mostly). 
Tactical Deltas 
The ARL effort produced insights not only into the cognitive process, but also into the factors 
that most frequently caused a ground maneuver commander to consider making a decision. As 
this analyst examined decision after decision, the most common elements to all of them was that 
the decision involved (1) a subordinate or supporting unit, or an enemy unit, or a piece of 
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Unit
or 
Key Terrain
A Delta Involving a . . . 
Situation at the Unit or Terrain Feature
terrain—no surprise—and (2) a condition had changed with respect to the unit or terrain that was 
not consistent with the plan as currently set. In effect, as the situation monitoring continued in 
the command post, the commander or a staff member noticed that one or more units’ situations 
had changed in a way that was not as projected in the plan, and the change had the potential to 
create an opportunity or cause a serious problem.11  The differences between the plan and the 
current situation were termed “tactical deltas.” Tactical deltas indicated an opportunity had 
presented itself, or that a unit would not be able to accomplish an assigned task The implications 
of the delta normally lead to a decision. The decision would always result in either changing one 
or more units’ task(s) (and normally the purpose), or changing the direct support provided to one 
or more units, or changing a graphical control measure to provide a spatial advantage to a key 
unit. Small deltas between the plan and the situation that did not impair the mission normally did 
not cause the commander to make a decision (although, a decision to make no change is still a 
decision). 
The changes in situations that would generate active assessment always reflected back on some 
element of the unit’s mission. Situations varied in gravity from a unit not being able to 
accomplish a minor task to situations so serious as to put the HHQ commander’s end state at 
risk. So, very simply, the commander and staff monitored the situation focusing on the units and 
the key terrain. They were alert specifically for changes in a unit’s situation that affected its 
ability to accomplish assigned tasks. When they detected a delta, they assessed the situation in 
the context its implications for their accomplishment of their mission, and in very serious cases, 
its implications for their HHQ commander’s mission and intentions.12  Figure 2 is a graphic of 
the major elements in the monitoring and assessment of tactical deltas. 
Critical Images
HHQ Commander’s Intent
Tasks Specified by HHQ Commander
Communications
Movement
Time
Strength
Sustainment
Combat
Effectiveness 
Unit Commander’s Intent
Unit’s Restated Mission
Concept of Operations
Task(s) and Purpose assigned to subordinate and supporting units
Current 
Location
Current or 
Imminent 
Contact with 
the Enemy
Tactical Delta: the variance at this moment 
between perceived ground truth and 
the plan, and the implications 
of the variance for the 
critical images
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 Tactical Deltas 
Cognitively speaking, once a delta is detected, the commander or a staff member assesses it to 
determine the implications with respect to the critical images. The commander can make a 
decision entirely without input, and in time sensitive cases that was observed to happen. But it is 
also true that give time for discussion, the commanders also sought input from their staffs. 
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Picture “A Decision” 
Once the commander staff interaction begins with respect to a given delta, a simple process 
unfolds, although some of the deliberations can be very complex depending upon the situation. 
Figure 3 is a diagram of the commander-staff process as the commander decides what to do 
relative to a emerging tactical delta. 
O O D A O 
OBSERVE ORIENT DECIDE ACT OBSERVE 
Determine 
CRITICAL 
Delta’s 
Solicit Input 
• Subordinate 
Unit COs 
• Staff DECIDE 
Complete 
Staff 
Actions 
Issue/Direct 
FRAGO 
Preparation 
by ALCON RehearseWargame Execute 
Monitor DECIDE Direct Execute 
(1) (1) (1) (1) (1) 
Assess 
Complete 
Assessment 
When Time is 
Severely Constrained . . . 
The Commander 
Assesses the Situation 
Determines Critical Deltas 
Completes the Assessment 
& 
Decides 
by himself 
Observe
Delta(s)
 
 
Continue 
Monitoring 
Present in each current 
operations decision 
(1) Time Permitting 
Figure 3 A Single Decision During Current Operations 
It is a rare operation when the unit accomplishes its mission and achieves the HHQ commander’s 
end state with only a single decision having been made during the execution phase. A more 
interesting picture emerges when a series of notional decisions are arrayed in terms of the 
specifics of an operations order. 
Picture the Decision in Terms of the Plan 
Figure 4 represents graphically the decisions reached during the planning process. It shows the 
conceptual and tasking components of the operation order (OPORD) that the unit is attempting to 
execute. In the conceptual portion of the order, the commander has expressed his intent and his 
concept of operations. In the tasking part, he assigns tasks (with purpose) to his subordinate and 
supporting units. The battle staff must understand the purpose of each subordinate unit task as well 
as the subordinate unit commanders understand them. In almost every situation, a tactical delta(s) 
arises while a unit is attempting to accomplish an assigned task. Thus the assessment must clearly 
include the implications of the situation with respect to the purpose for which the task was 
assigned. If one purpose is in jeopardy, other elements of the plan are in jeopardy. In Figure 4, the 
time is just prior to H-hour. The unit has completed its rehearsal and is poised to attack. 
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Figure 4 Planning Decisions and the Operations Order 
Now complete the graphic by crossing the line of departure, executing the assigned tasks, and 
achieving the commander’s end state. Figure 5 is a notional view of a series of decisions made 
during the execution phase. The small bars on the right side of the graphic represent decisions 
arrived at through the commander-staff group process in Figure 3. Once the command crosses the 
line of departure, the plan becomes fluid. The thinking adversary is also flexing his will. 
Variances—tactical deltas—are beginning to be received in the command post. 
During the execution phase, the battle staff monitors and assesses each variance, paying particular 
attention to the implications of the information with respect to the overall plan. The information is 
assessed for the degree to which it has the potential to affect, or is already affecting the concept of 
operations. Exactly what action(s), if any, are decided is a function of the situation and the 
expertise of the officers participating in the assessment. Their role is to understand whether the 
implications of the information are positive, neutral, or adverse to friendly actions currently 
underway, or planned, and to know what options to outline and recommend to the commander. 
Through discussion with the staff, the commander reaches a decision. Once the decision is made, 
and the fragmentary order is issued, the situation monitoring continues. 
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Figure 5 Decisions Made During Current Operations 
The initial series of tactical tasks in an operations order are normally reasonably well synchronized. 
Once the operation starts, the tactical information flowing into the command post can cover each 
battlefield functional area and every facet of the commander’s OPORD—and therefore, each piece 
of tactical information that passes the data filters bears on the overall synchronization. The 
commander and staff attempt to understand what each piece of information means in terms of the 
synchronization. They will determine what must be done with respect to the particular 
information, how that action affects the overall synchronization, and what must be done to 
maintain the synchronization that still applies. As the operation continues, the well-choreographed 
synchronization begins to be overcome by cascading events, and the staff continues to synchronize 
the following actions literally “on the fly.” 
The hard part is timing the movement and relocation of committed assets—the reserve, artillery 
batteries, ADA units, engineer platoons, forward support units, tactical bridging, etc.—to ensure 
they are in position to continue to support the main and supporting efforts, as necessary. This 
timing frequently needs to be worked out with all interested parties listening to the discussion. 
Teamwork and “know how” are critical. Circumstances will determine whether the discussion 
should take place at the situation map (digital or analog), or off-line. 
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In effect, the current pieces of tactical information are being assessed for implications of the 
actions associated with that information—and if the actions were left to continue, how they would 
affect the current plan. Clearly, and at frequent intervals, two or more elements of information 
have to be considered a whole. But whether the commander deals with single elements of tactical 
information or clusters of information considered as a complex whole, he tends to make his 
decisions serially. 
These activities do not bring to mind the recognition of a series of patterns setting in motion a 
grand response.  They bring to mind a multifunctional group of competent, proficient persons 
performing fast-paced, serial problem solving to keep a fluid enterprise on track toward a goal—a 
goal, which, in the beginning, had been determined to be feasible and acceptable. 
4 ~ Tactical Information 
More granularity accrues to the decision models by considering the decision support 
environment in the command posts, particularly number of persons involved in the information 
flow. This section looks briefly at one command post simply to appreciate the numbers of 
people and systems in it. The section also considers the commanders information requirements. 
“A” Command Post 
Consider the environment in which many decisions are made, the command post. The reason is 
to highlight the number of persons with active roles in supporting the decision process, and to 
have a sense of the physical environment in which information flows and decisions are made.13 
Figure 6, on the following page, is a sketch of an Army light infantry tactical operations center 
(TOC) in a recent advanced warfighting experiment focused on the Army Battle Command 
System (ABCS).14  The figure shows 34 + persons in the TOC, a surprising number, but perhaps 
not, considering the number of functional activities the battle staff performs in the space. The 
purpose is not to enumerate the activities, they can be discerned by examining the sketch, nor is 
it to highlight features of the layout. The purpose is to spark the reader’s imagination—given the 
number of soldiers and C4ISR systems—of the torrent of information this colony is capable of 
producing, particularly considering the ABCS systems in the sketch are only one node in a wide 
area network of many nodes. Yet, parenthetically, having observed five of these operations 
centers over several weeks, the analyst has yet to observe an occasion when the commander and 
key staff members have been in a condition of “information overload.” This is not to say the 
potential does not exist, it simply has not occurred to date. The units have not won all their 
engagements, but the shortcomings on these occasions were having too little information, 
particularly top down intelligence, not having an overload of information. In fact, the shortfalls 
were people not knowing how to process information that was present or was reasonably 
available from other nodes.15  The absence of adequate TTPs contributed to their lack of 
proficiency. 
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Figure 6 A Digitized Army Brigade Tactical Operations Center 
The command post exists to enable the commander to command and control his units in 
accomplishing their assigned mission. During the execution of each mission, uncontrollable 
external circumstances almost always arise, necessitating a series of decisions adjusting the plan. 
The oxygen that enables these decisions is information. It is useful to ask again, what 
information? Within the CP, where does it come from? Who provides it? How is irrelevant 
information screened out? Who does that screening? This set of questions has implications for 
command post TTPs/SOPs. 
Information Requirements 
Generally, a discussion of information requirements centers on whether or not the Commander’s 
Critical Information Requirements (CCIR) include everything a battalion, regimental, or brigade 
commander needs to know and to be apprised of by the battle staff.16  The answer is that it 
depends on a person’s viewpoint. After a recently concluded AWE, and concerned that 
discussions of information overload never advance to addressing specifics, this analyst attempted 
to list the specific information that a commander needs during the execution phase. The idea 
was that if people cannot clearly describe the specifics of information overload, perhaps it is 
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possible to forestall information overload by stating clear criteria for the information that should 
be actively processed. Given a list, such as the one below, if the flow of information were still 
overwhelming, then pare down this list. The list in Table 4 was purely a heuristic exercise; 
another analyst would compile a different list. The larger point is that if a doctrine developer can 
identify the information categories to a reasonable degree, this facilitates identifying each battle 
staff member’s responsibilities to the commander for required tactical information. 
1 Higher Headquarters orders as soon as they arrive (warning orders, fragmentary 
orders, operations orders) 
2	 Current and predicted enemy situation in the unit’s areas of interest (AI) and area 
of operations (AO)
3	 Critical incidents involving ROE , Fratricide, civilians or public affairs in the AO, 
and political-military interests appropriate to the echelon of command 
4	 Information received answering the higher headquarters commander’s CCIR 
5	 Information received answering the commander’s o wn CCIR
6	 Information related to Decision Points 
7	 Status of subordinate, supporting, and adjacent units relative to their progress in 
accomplishing assigned tasks and purpose. 
Within this category, the commander needs to know the progress o r problems 
encountered in executing the Reconnaissance and Surveillance Plan; and 
again, the progress of each subordinate and supporting unit in the context of 
the discussion of “tactical deltas.” 
8	 Changes in status of data and voice communications 
9	 Changes in status or the projected status of logistics by key classes of supply and 
personnel specifically as each affect the capability of the unit to accomplish the 
current mission and operations now in the process of being planned. Some of this 
will be duplicative of the FFIR in the CCIR (see definitions below). 
10	 Immediate appraisal of the emergence of other unexpected or unforeseen events, 
which affect the higher headquarters commander’s intent or the commander’s own 
intent, or are problems of such magnitude that only the commander can address 
them.
Table 4 The Commander’s Information Requirements During the Execution Phase 
It is also important to remember that once operations commence in a contingency area, the 
planning phase of the next operation runs concurrently with the execution of the current 
operation. For instance, the commander is now forward at a tactical CP in the midst of the 
current operation. Receiving the HHQ warning order for the next phase of the major operation 
or campaign, he calls the nucleus of his operational planning team (OPT) forward to be briefed 
on the IPB related to the mission, and the OPT’s initial mission analysis of the order. Given this 
information, he then provides them guidance on the COA development and analysis, giving the 
OPT the information they need to continue planning. In this case, necessarily, the commander is 
dealing with information from different phases in two sequential operational cycles. 
The discussions of the command posts and the information requirements are intended to 
highlight the necessity for command post TTPs to link individuals within the CPs to the 
information they routinely work. The CP environment has always been more complex than the 
“tried and unused” CP SOPs managed to covey. Perhaps the environment was so complex that 
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attempting to work through the details was “too hard,” and it was easier of salute the idea that the 
procedures within a command post were the prerogative of the commander. With the advent of 
the digitized C2 systems, the environment is even more complex. As mentioned earlier, it is 
interesting that both the Army and the Marine Corps have published very detailed doctrine for 
decision-making during the planning phase, but have expended little effort on execution 
decisions. Planning decisions have always been considered to be more analytical than execution 
decisions. The people that describe them as exercises in Newtonian logic have a point. At the 
same time, although more complicated, execution decisions are far more fathomable than to say 
they are essentially a “blow of the eye,” the application of “intuition” to “situational awareness.” 
The ”models” discussion (and the studies upon which it is based) suggests that current operations 
decisions at the battalion, regiment and brigade (not at the company and below) are as analytical 
as planning decisions, but they are generally made in time-compressed circumstances, on the 
basis of one course of action, and frequently the commander does so under conditions of 
considerable uncertainty. And, yes, the commander’s tactical judgment, resulting from training, 
education, experience, and intuition, is very important. But the judgment needs to be fed timely, 
relevant information. Focused TTPs, developed on the basis of sound concepts and models, can 
leverage the judgment. 
5 ~ A Strawman TTP Development Process 
The doctrine developer cannot leap from the models to writing the TTP without several 
intermediate steps. Unless the developer appreciates the “team” nature of the activity, the TTPs 
are likely to resemble the individual task lists in the current SOPs. While a task analysis will be 
necessary later in the process, the first tier analysis is to reach a consensus on the nature of the 
decision making process during the execution phase. The models presented earlier are not the 
final answer to the model question, simply a useful start point. The second tier analysis is to 
identify the commander-battle staff team proficiencies necessary at the aggregate level. Driving 
this approach is the increasing presence of digitization and the need to ensure its capabilities are 
factored into the TTP starting from the top down, not from the operator up. The third tier 
analysis, closely related to the second, is to split out the proficiencies necessary within the 
functional teams (operations, fires support, intelligence, etc.). The fourth tier is the individual 
tasks, but it includes the “know how” a battle staff member should have in his or her active 
memory or cargo pocket. 
2d Tier ~ Commander-Battle Staff Team Proficiencies: teamwork more 
productive than task work 
Among the more interesting of the Army’s research initiatives related to digitization and the 
teamwork necessary within command posts is an effort to develop a “multilevel systems model 
of the Army Battle Command process,” and specifically, the team processes necessary to 
increase proficiency amid the increase in information systems (IS) and information technology 
(IT). The idea is simply that at the center of a C4ISR system lays a distributed human decision-
making process—a process that can be supported by technology; but, a process that is still 
governed by human interactions. How people, teams, and human organizations use and adapt to 
new information systems and information technology, new procedures, new organizational 
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structures, and new environmental complexities remains at the heart of the performance issue. 
Previous research on decision-making under high time stress conditions suggests that the greatest 
increase in battle staff proficiency will occur in the area of teamwork, not individual task work. 
Behaviorally Anchored Rating Scales 
The idea has been to identify from a behavioral science perspective, the team proficiencies 
needed to exercise effective command and control, then develop sets of assessment scales for 
each team proficiency area identified. The technique used is a training adaptation of a personnel 
performance appraisal methodology called behaviorally anchored rating scales (BARS). The 
technique has been used to develop training support packages for Army and Air Force aircrews 
in cockpit resource management and for hospital emergency room staffs. Teamwork in cockpits 
and emergency rooms is characterized by the need for information and time-critical decisions. 
In fact, ARL has completed a pilot effort to identify commander-battle staff team proficiencies. 
The project focused on developing commander-staff proficiency rating scales to be used by 
observer controllers, and is not focused on command post TTP, per se.  The project reached its 
objectives, and while the BARS that have been produced are short of the detail needed for TTP, 
the products indicate what could be accomplished with a very rigorous application of the classic 
BARS development method. 
A “Reverse Engineered” Prototype 
Because the project was a prototype, Dr. Dennis Leedom, the director and a very experience 
cognitive psychologist with 30 + years experience in military training analysis and cognitive 
research activities, developed an initial set of 17 “battle command” proficiencies (Leedom, 
1999). He built the list based on his extensive knowledge of the literature pertaining to the 
subject, and, of course, his considerable experience. In classic BARS development, the 17 
proficiencies would have been developed entirely on the basis of input from military 
practitioners. The military persons are absolutely critical to the process because they are the 
subject matter experts (SME); the psychologists in the classic BARS development process are 
facilitators and scale development experts only. The military SMEs and the psychologists 
together develop the behavioral scales. In this case, military SMEs were not available, and since 
the project was a prototype, the project commenced with an educated “best guess” set of 
performance dimensions. 
With that as background, it is interesting to note that the 17 team proficiencies in Table 4, below, 
are written in generic, non-military language. They could apply as easily to a civilian 
organizational environment as a to a military unit. Dr. Leedom’s paper provides behavioral 
descriptions of each proficiency, which make clear that the proficiencies are intended to for 
military applications.17  That said, a military reader may conclude on first reading that a number 
of the performance dimensions, even if they were written in military language, may not be right. 
That’s okay. The point here is only to layout a proven technique for developing the top-level 
team proficiencies, then developing the collective proficiencies within each staff and liaison 
team section. 
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Performance Area Behavioral Proficiency
Establish 1 Clarify Expected Roles and Contributions of Individuals -Teams
Team–Organizational 2 Establish Clear Strategy for Knowledge Management 
Structure & Process 3 Establish Effective Information Exchange Practices 
4 Establish Supportive Behaviors and Error Monitoring 
5 Align Decision Authority With Decision-Making Capacity
6 Employ Proper Mix of Decision Strategies for Each Situation 
Manage 7 Effectively Manage the Collaborative Debate Process 
Decision and Production 8 Sequence and Communicate Decisions and Assumptions 
Strategies 9 Employ Proper Mix of Production Strategies for Each Situation 
10 Balance Push-Pull of Information Flow to Decision-Makers
Manage External 11 Maintain Attentional Scanning Across Multiple Decision Threads 
Situation Awareness 12 Verify Key Information Inputs and Employ Proper Risk Management 
Process 13 Manage Battlespace Images and Their Cognitive Shaping Influence 
14 Anticipate and Prepare for the Emergence of Complexity 
15 Manage Task Priority, Task Sequencing, and Information Cost 
Monitor & Adjust 16 Manage Process Error Associated With Staff Rotation and Handover 
Team–Organizational
Process
17 Practice Continual Self-Critique and Organizational Learning
Table 4 Prototype List of Commander-Staff Team Proficiencies 
The proficiencies are actually fairly broad, and encompass several sub-proficiencies, or “team 
tasks.” The project team’s challenge was to decompose the 17 proficiencies into the sub-
proficiencies, then develop three behavioral descriptions of each sub- proficiency ranging from 
highly effective behavior, to basically effective behavior, to ineffective behavior. Again, in 
classic BARS development, the process of developing the behaviors is based entirely on the 
input of the military SMEs. In fact, in a classical BARS development project, the first step is to 
develop a large number of descriptions of behaviors the military SMEs have actually seen in the 
field related to the entire functional area, or the job being studied. The SMEs literally write each 
behavior on a 3x5 card. The second step is for the SMEs to cluster the behaviors into stacks 
related to the major tasks that comprise the total job. These stacks are referred to as performance 
dimensions, although in Table 4, they are listed under “Behavioral Proficiency.” For example, 
performance dimensions for a staff officer would include “planning skills” and “coordinating 
skills.” Some of the described behaviors in the stack will achieve highly effective results; some 
will achieve only acceptable results, and some will produce unsatisfactory results. The military 
SMEs, not the psychologists, assess the effectiveness of each behavior in the performance 
dimension. The third step is to array all the behaviors in each stack in order from most effective 
in achieving the result, to least effective. In some BARS projects, numerical scales are assigned 
to the range of behaviors.18 
The result is a set of scales for each major dimension of the overall job, and each set of scales 
identifies behaviors that a trainer, for instance, is likely to see when observing people performing 
the task. 
Thus a trainer could observe the staff performing the particular activity, identify the staff’s 
behaviors on the list of behaviors (the BARS), and subsequently be able to counsel the staff on 
their performance in getting the job done. The staff being counseled would normally agree that 
the behaviors identified by the trainer were in fact an accurate description of manner in which 
they were conducting themselves when observed, thus validating the observations. The next step 
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would be improving the staff’s proficiencies so they could move to the next level of 
effectiveness. 
In fact the project team quickly confirmed that each of the basic 17 team proficiency dimensions 
contained easily identifiable sub-proficiencies. This is not surprising given the complexity of the 
entire commander–battle staff–command post environment. Table 5 shows two proficiency 
dimensions from Table 4, each with several sub-proficiencies. 
3 - Establish Effective Information Exchange 
Practices
8 - Sequence and communicate decisions and 
assumptions
Use doctrinal terms and standard formats 
Transfer clear, timely, complete information 
Verify information receive and validate its 
implications for the on-going plan (when 
appropriate)
Acknowledge receipt
Verify acknowledgement
One third, two thirds rule and planning timelines 
Timely warning orders and interim planning products 
Use of Liaison Officers
Table 5 Examples of Proficiency Dimensions and Sub-Proficiency Dimensions 
Calibrating the Effort 
As the reader will sense from the following example of a prototype set of BARS, the detailed, 
scaled behavioral descriptions are one level of effort further than necessary to develop effective 
TTPs. But the basic BARS development process, particularly the involvement of the military 
SMEs to identify the full range of team proficiencies and sub-proficiencies, represented in small 
part in Table 5, is a very sound method. Supplemented with a robust literature review, and 
tailored to recognize the expertise of the participants, the classical BARS development approach 
would accelerate an effort to develop sound team level TTP. That said, the following table 
provides an example of the team behaviors for one sub-proficiency in Table 5. 
Observational Focus 
One Third, Two Thirds Rule & Planning Timelines. Does the battle staff complete planning and 
issue the operations order within the one-third, two-thirds guideline? Does the battle staff develop 
an internal planning timeline very soon after receipt of mission and adhere to it? Does the battle 
staff subsequently coordinate timelines with it’s higher headquarters, and issue an expanded 
planning-briefing-rehearsal timeline to it’s subordinate units? 
Exceeds standards (Rating 7): Battle staff performance of sequencing and communicating 
decisions and assumptions enhances team effectiveness (Few if any errors). 
The commander and staff are well-disciplined to execute their planning requirements within the 
1/3 – 2/3’s allocation of time. The staff first determines the amount of time in the 1/3 allocation, 
then determines 1/4 of the time, and allocates the 1/4 to the MDMP planning tasks. Once 
planning is underway, the XO or S3 coordinates with HHQ to determine the times for the brief 
back to HHQ and the HHQ’s rehearsal. The S3, with the CO’s approval, issues the unit’s own 
briefing and rehearsal times to the subordinate units. 
Meets standards (Rating 4): Battle staff performance of sequencing and communicating 
decisions and assumptions contributes to team effectiveness (Recoverable errors). 
The commander and staff normally executes their planning requirements within the 1/3 – 2/3’s 
allocation of time. The staff first determines the amount of time in the 1/3 allocation, and further 
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allocates it to the planning tasks. The staff tends to wait for the higher headquarters to announce 
its briefing and rehearsal schedule. The S3, with the CO’s approval, issues the unit’s own briefing 
and rehearsal times to the subordinate units. 
Below standards (Rating 1): Battle staff performance of sequencing and communicating 
decisions and assumptions jeopardizes team effectiveness (Unrecoverable errors). 
The battle staff invariably overruns the allocated time, taking up to 1/2 the time available. The 
staff simply has difficulty completing all the steps within the time intervals they initially 
determined. The unit tends to wait for the higher headquarters to announce the briefing and 
rehearsal schedule, and as a result, frequently does not begin to coordinate this schedule until they 
have completed their operations order. This causes other subordinate units to have to cancel key 
activities. 
Table 6 Example of Prototype BARS for One Sub-Proficiency 
The BARS developed to this level would be useful in a training situation, but are clearly more 
than is needed to establish the full range of team proficiencies for a comprehensive command 
post TTP. The object is to identify the multilevel systems model of commander-battle staff team 
proficiencies, and a traditional task analysis may not be the methodology for the effort. But the 
basic BARS development process, particularly the involvement of the military SMEs would 
identify the full range of team proficiency dimensions, and the third tier staff and liaison section 
proficiencies as well. The BARS technique can include more than one group of military SMEs, 
and arguably it should. The effort to identify the effective team level behaviors should be as 
inclusive as possible. 
It is feasible for a project team comprised of military SMEs to identify TTP simply on the basis 
of a literature review, small group discussions, and interviews. The group would want observe 
several exercises, as a group, as part of the process. The output of the effort is likely to be 
oriented more to individual and section tasks, than to commander-staff level team proficiencies. 
But this approach is far preferable to no TTP at all. 
Any approach to developing TTPs that will describe the flow of information within the command 
post to get the right information to the commander for decision-making is an acceptable 
approach. It is even more acceptable if it is sufficiently descriptive that persons performing 
duties in a command post can read the document before an exercise to improve their personal 
proficiency. 
Summary 
This short paper covered a relatively broad stretch, relying on the reader’s curiosity to look a 
second time at the detail in the tables and figures to fill in detail I have passed over. Time and 
space did not permit explanations of the usefulness of the integrated cognitive model, for 
example, but the implications of simply understanding the range of strategies in which decision-
makers tacitly deal with uncertainty are significant. Some of the coping mechanisms would not 
occur to a person naturally, but being aware of them adds insight and future stratagems to the 
reader’s store of tactical judgment. The process model is useful as well. It should cause the 
reader ask exactly what the range of staff drills should be to deal with the most frequent of the 
tactical deltas across each of the battlefield functional areas. Figure 5, showing the series of 
decisions made during the execution phase, suggests the staff has a vital role in ensuring at the 
end of each fragmentary order that the remaining shards of the original order and the urgent new 
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tasks are all synchronized toward key tasks, and still contributing to the original intent if that is 
still feasible. The list of commander’s information requirements is a simple strawman, but it 
provides a framework for commanders and their staffs to continue their discussions of critical 
information, or start if they have not done so already. 
The behaviorally anchored rating scale methodology of identifying what people and teams do is 
a solid technique for getting a group of military officers and NCOs talking about what need to be 
done in a command post. Other techniques will reach the same objective, but this is an 
interesting one that has been tried recently on commander-battle staff team proficiencies. 
Finally, I have attempted to make the case for doctrine focused on decision-making during the 
execution phase. The doctrine needs to include a cognitive description of the process, a 
commander-battle staff team description, and it needs to reach down to the TTP for teamwork in 
the increasingly digitized command posts in the land warfare Services. Information technology 
has the potential to support the cognitive processes, or frustrate them because of bad design. 
Either way, the TTP are so complicated it is unreasonable to expect battalion, regimental, and 
brigade commanders to work them out at the unit level. Detailed, generic TTP for digitized 
command post operations are DOTES/DOTMPL responsibilities. 
# 
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ENDNOTES
 
1  Referring to Army brigades which, like Marine regiments, are normally commanded by a colonel and are 
comprised of three battalions. 
2 The lieutenant colonel and colonel level decision situations are the most challenging because they are the first two 
echelons where the commander is out of personal sensory distance of the battle, but they have the shortest windows 
within which to access the situation and make a decision. This means the quality of the information they receive 
from their own units and from Higher headquarters must be very good and very timely. The window is so short that 
the intelligence systems at the higher headquarters are hard pressed to provide fused, analyzed intelligence to the 
“colonel” commands in time for the commanders to use it effectively. 
3 In some cases in the “high tech” command posts, due to the older braves being not nearly so computer savvy as the 
young braves, the roles have been slight reversed. Fortunately, in increasing numbers of cases, the senior NCOs 
have recognized the necessity to become computer literate, and the old brave model is reasserting itself. 
4 Hypothetically, the absence of a conceptual and detailed frame work as basis for requirements could also result in 
requirements people identifying a less urgent requirement as the focus for development and experimentation. 
5 Of interest, the Marine Air Ground Task Force Staff Training Program (MSTP) Center’s home page features a 
series of training materials used by the MSTP staff during their training events with Marine units and groups. A 
slide in the lesson materials for the “Execution” class says that (1) commanders us SOPs to standardize routine or 
recurring actions not needing their personal involvement, (2) SOPs include specifics on the organization, functions, 
and responsibilities of a particular commander’s staff, (3) organization for combat that differs from day-to-day 
operations should be clearly defined by the command’s SOP, and (4) benefits of SOPs are (a) simplified, brief 
combat orders, (b) enhanced understanding & teamwork among commanders and staff, (c) established synchronized 
staff drills, and (d) established abbreviated or accelerated decision-making techniques. (c) and (d) are interesting, 
but at the moment, the author has no examples of Marine Corps unit SOPs to comment on the manner in which the 
units have described the synchronization drills and the abbreviated decision-making techniques. 
6 With respect to Marine Corps SOPs, during the brief window in which I prepared this paper, I did not have the 
opportunity to request and review any Marine Corps MEU, RLT, or BLT level command post SOPs. My 
expectation is that the MEU level SOPs, in particular, would be comprehensive, and would have detailed discussions 
of the rapid planning process. I had the opportunity two years ago to watch the MCWL’s Special Purpose MAGTF 
(X) work on their SOPs and was impressed by the technique they used to trace decision threads among multiple 
locations, particularly for fire support coordination decisions. 
7 The efforts and products of two organizations need to be highlighted. The Marine Corps’ MSTP staff has 
produced a series of “MSTP Pamphlets” addressing a score of command and control topics at a more detailed level 
than is currently found in the Marine Corps doctrinal publications. In addition, the MSTP staff makes available on 
their home page the training aids for many of the classes they conduct for MAGTF staffs and other groups, such as 
classes in the Marine Corps University. The entire set of materials is a valuable resource for persons interested in 
the human dimension of command and control. Similarly, TRADOC task organized a small group of officers, 
NCOs and civilians to provide direct support to the FORCE XXI training development effort. Called “Warrior T,” 
the group has published a series high quality training materials designed to assist the training efforts of the 4th 
Infantry Division, the Army’s “First Digitized Division (FDD),” at Fort Hood, TX. 
8 Neither FM 101-5-1 nor MCRP 5-12x contains a definition of the term “battle staff.” The term comes up 
sufficiently frequently that a working definition is useful. DRC has used the following in project reports to ARL. 
The battle staff is the combination of coordinating and special staff officers and NCOs in a command post or 
operations center with the functional (e.g., intelligence, operations) and battlefield functional area expertise (FSC, 
ALO, Combat Engineer) necessary to monitor and assess operations; to provide decision support to the commander 
during the execution phase of the operation; to provide effective coordination among higher, adjacent, supporting, 
and subordinate commands; and to provide continuous future operations planning. Normally comprised of the 
command’s senior coordinating and special staff officers, and the other staff officers and NCOs on the current watch 
in the command post. With respect to sleep cycles, the senior staff members are battle staff members on a 24-hour 
basis, and are recalled from rest as needed. 
9 The Optimum TTP is an open definition at this point. The TTP could be adequately described in one, two, or more 
nested documents depending upon the comprehensiveness of the development process. 
10 Persons interested in an electronic copy of the paper, contact the author at JimM@drc.com. 
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11 The operational events the team observed were all built around conventional operations, and involved no civilians 
on the battlefield. But clearly, if civilians had been present, the monitoring would have included changes in civilian 
situations that affected the unit’s ability to accomplish its mission. 
12 The term “assessment” as used here is slightly different from the MSTP use of the term. Here it is meant 
specifically as the cognitive activity a person directs at a specific situation in order to determine the seriousness of 
the situation and what should be done to correct it or minimize it. 
13 In fact, commanders make many decisions when they are forward on the battlefield, connected to the operations 
center by FM voice radio or data communication, or both, or not connected at all. 
14 The unit commander determines the layout of his own TOC. The analyst has seen six different brigade TOC 
configurations during the on-going ABCS experimentation, and while each was laid out differently, obviously, the 
functions being performed by the battle staffs were all essentially the same. 
15 The fact is, nobody present—not the participants, the observer-controllers, the analysts—really knew how to 
process and correctly filter all the information present or not present because it had not been requested. The TTP 
had not been worked out, and still have not been worked out. 
16 CCIR: the information required by the commander that directly affects his decisions and dictates the successful 
execution of operational or tactical operations. CCIR normally result in the generation of three types of information 
requirements: priority intelligence requirements (PIR), essential elements of friendly information (EEFI), and 
friendly force information requirements (FFIR). In the interest of brevity, definitions of PIR, EEFI, and FFIR are 
available in MCWP 5-12 series and FM 101-5-1, as well as several of the MSTP pamphlets available at the MSTP 
home page. 
17 Nonetheless, the idea that proficiencies area as applicable to civilian organizations is interesting and in a sense, 
makes a prima facia case for their utility. 
18 The psychologist’s role is to act as a facilitator and social scientist. With respect to the latter, particularly when 
the BARS are to be used as performance appraisal instruments, the psychologist ensures proper attention is paid to 
reliability and validity in both the clustering step and the scaling step. 
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If the key to symbolic reasoning is representation then it certainly follows that the foundation of 
expert-system-based, decision-support systems is the rich manner in which the entities, concepts, 
and notions relevant to the domain space(s) are represented [4, 10]. This requirement can be 
accommodated through the development and employment of one or more ontologies. An 
ontology in this sense can be defined as a relationship-rich, typically object-based representation 
of the entities, concepts, and notions relevant to the domain(s) of operation. The problem arises 
when two or more of these systems, each operating over a potentially extensive ontology attempt 
to collaborate with each other. While collaboration within each of these systems may be based on 
very high-level descriptions of entities, concepts and notions, it will undoubtedly be subject to 
various application-specific biases. For example, in a tactical command and control system an 
entity such as an M1A1 tank may be viewed, and therefore represented as a tactical asset. In this 
case the bias would be toward tactical utility. However, in a logistics system the same M1A1 
tank would most appropriately be viewed as a potential supply item with emphasis on logistical 
inventory and supply. In both cases, however, the subject is still the exact same M1A1 tank with 
basic characteristics. The difference resides in the manner in which the tank is being viewed by 
each of these systems. Another term for this bias-based filter is perspective. Perspective is not 
only a natural component of the way in which we perceive the world but moreover should be 
viewed as a highly beneficial and desirable characteristic. Perspective is the ingredient in an 
ontology-based decision-support system that allows for the representation of domain-specific 
notions and bias. For example, if a decision-support system is to assist in the formulation of 
logistical supply missions then it is more appropriate, and beneficial for an entity such as a 
howitzer to be primarily viewed as a supply item instead of a tactical asset. If viewed as a supply 
item the description of a howitzer could provide great detail in terms of the items shipping 
weight, shipping dimensions, tie-down points, etc. In the context of a tactical command and 
control system such information is essentially irrelevant and certainly not of primary focus. What 
would be relevant in such a tactical system would be characteristics such as projectile range, 
effective casualty radius, advancement velocity, etc. Again, it may be the exact same howitzer 
that is being discussed between the two disparate systems. However, it is being discussed within 
two different contexts exhibiting two distinctly different perspectives. While collaboration within 
or across systems supported by the exact same perspective-based representation performs well, 
the problem arises when collaboration needs to occur between systems or system components 
where the perspectives are in fact not the same and potentially drastically dissimilar. In this unto 
common case, the extent to which systems can collaborate on events and information is 
essentially limited to low-level data-passing with receivers having little or no understanding of 
content and implication. Simply stated, the problem at the heart of interoperability between 
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symbolic reasoning-based systems resides in the means by which information-centric systems 
exhibiting wholly, or even partially disparate perspectives, can interoperate at a meaningful and 
useful level. 
The solution to this dilemma can take primarily two different directions. The first of these paths 
focuses on the development of a universal ontology. Such an ontology would represent a single, 
all inclusive view of the world. Each system would utilize this representation as the core 
informational basis for operation. Since each system would have knowledge of this common 
representation of the entities, notions, and concepts, interoperability at the information level 
would be clear and concise requiring no context-diminishing translation. However, as 
straightforward as this may appear there are two major flaws with this approach. First, in 
practicality it is highly unlikely that such a universal description could actually be successfully 
developed. Considering the amount of forethought and vision this task would require, such an 
undertaking would be of monumental scale as well as being plagued with misrepresentation. 
Inevitably, certain notions or concepts would be inappropriately represented in a particular 
domain in an effort to model them adequately in another. 
The second flaw with the universal ontology approach is less obvious but perhaps even more 
destructive. Considering the number of domains across which such an ontology would need to 
encompass the resulting ontology would most likely be comprised mainly of generalities. These 
generalities would typically only partially represent the manner in which any one particular 
system wished to see the world. In other words, due to the number of perspectives a universal 
ontology would attempt to represent, the resulting ontology would ironically end up being just 
the opposite, a perspective-absent description falling far short of system needs and expectations. 
While perspective was the cause of the original interoperability problem it is still a highly 
valuable characteristic that should not only be preserved but should be wholeheartedly embraced 
and promoted. As mentioned earlier, perspective is a valuable and useful means of conveying 
domain-specific notions and bias, which are crucial to information-centric decision-support 
systems. To omit its presence is to significantly reduce the usefulness of an ontology and 
therefore the effectiveness of the utilizing decision-support system(s). This coupled with the 
highly unlikely potential for developing such a comprehensive, inter-domain description of the 
world renders the universal ontology approach both unrealistic and wholly ineffective. 
The second, more promising solution to interoperability between decision-support systems 
introduces the notion of a perspective filter. Based on the fa ade design pattern [1, 2, 3] 
perspective filters allow core entities, concepts and notion accessible to interoperating systems to 
be viewed in a more appropriate form relative to each collaborator s perspective. In brief, the 
fa ade pattern allows for a certain description to be viewed, and consequently interacted with in 
a more appropriate manner. Similar to a pair of infrared night vision goggles, overlaying a filter 
may enhance or refine otherwise limited information. In the case of ontology-based collaboration 
this filter essentially superimposes a more perspective-oriented, ontological layer over the initial 
representation. The filter may not only add or modify the terminology and constraints of the core 
descriptions but may also extend and enhance it through the incorporation of additional 
characteristics. These characteristics may take the form of additional attributes and relationships 
as well as refining constraints. For example, Figure 1 illustrates the use of a logistically oriented 
perspective filter over a core description of conveyances. Note first that while the core 
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conveyance ontology appears to represent only a limited amount of bias the effectiveness of 
perspective filters certainly does not require such a general core description. If the core ontology 
were heavily biased toward a foreign set of perspectives it would simply mean that the 
perspective filters would need to be more extensive and incorporate additional constraints, 
extensions, etc. However, for clarity of illustration a limited, rather general core ontology was 
selected. 
Figure 1 — Partially Derived Logistics Ontology 
Core to the logistics perspective presented in Figure 1 is the notion of a transport. However, 
although the logistics system may have a notion of all of the types of conveyances (i.e., vessels, 
vehicles, and aircraft) represented in the core ontology it, in the context of this example, may 
only consider vessels and rotary aircraft as potential transports. In this situation it would be 
valuable to represent this refined constraint in the ontology forming the representational heart of 
the logistics system while still employing the core conveyance ontology. As Figure 1 illustrates, 
representing such refinement can be accomplished by explicitly introducing a constrained notion 
of a transport in the application-specific filter ontology. An abstract Transport is defined to have 
two specific derivations (VesselTransport and HelicopterTransport). At this point it is 
immediately apparent that a vehicle is not a transport candidate. In the context of the example 
logistics system transports can only be VesselTransports or HelicopterTransports. The task now 
becomes linking these two system specific notions to the core conveyance ontology. Relating 
these two transport types to their conveyance ontology counterparts can be achieved in two 
different ways. For illustration purposes, the definition of VesselTransport adopts the first 
method while HelicopterTransport employs the second. The first method defines an explicit 
relationship between the VesselTransport and the core description of a vessel outlined in the 
conveyance ontology. Utilizing this approach, obtaining the core information relative to the 
corresponding Vessel from a VesselTransport requires both knowledge of their relationship in 
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addition to another level of indirection. For reasons of performance and logical integrity, both of 
these requirements may not be desirable. 
The second method, illustrated in Figure 1 using HelicopterTransport, avoids both shortcomings 
inherent in the first approach. In this case, HelicopterTransport exists as a fa ade, or filter, which 
transparently links at the attribute level into the core RotaryAircraft description. That is, each 
attribute of RotaryAircraft desired to be exposed to users of HelicopterTransport is explicitly 
declared in the fa ade. For example, since the maximum range of travel is relevant to the 
definition of a HelicopterTransport the maxRange attribute of RotaryAircraft (inherited from 
Conveyance) is subsequently exposed in the HelicopterTransport fa ade description. By virtue of 
being declared in a fa ade any access to such an attribute would be transparently mapped into the 
corresponding attribute(s) on which it is based. In the case of the range attribute of 
HelicopterTransport, access would transparently be directed to the inherited maxRange attribute 
of RotaryAircraft. Notice also the use of alternative terminology over that used in the core 
ontology (i.e., range vs. maxRange). It should also be noted that the derivative nature of a fa ade 
attribute is not limited to mapping into another attribute. Rather, the value of a fa ade attribute 
may also be derived through calculation, perhaps based on the values of multiple attributes 
residing in potentially several different core objects. In either case, the fact that the value of the 
fa ade attribute is derived is completely transparent to the fa ade user. 
Another perspective-oriented enhancement to the core ontology illustrated in Figure 1 is the 
notion of a SupplyMission. Being a fundamental concept in the example logistics system a 
supply mission essentially relates supply items in the form of equipment to the transports by 
which they will be delivered. Once again, the definition of a logistics-specific notion (i.e., supply 
items) is derived from a notion defined in the core ontology (i.e., equipment). In this case, an 
explicit relationship is declared linking SupplyMission to zero or more Equipment items. Since, 
from the perspective of the logistics system Equipment scheduled for delivery are viewed as 
items that are to be supplied, the term supplyItems is used as the referencing nomenclature. Such 
an enhancement demonstrates the ability to integrate new concepts (i.e., supply missions) with 
existing core notions. 
In the context of interoperability among information-centric, decision-support systems 
significant benefits could be obtained from essentially drawing relevant concepts and notions 
into a system s local set of perspective-rich, filter ontologies. As the above example illustrates, 
key components of these perspective-oriented ontologies could be derived from a set of core, 
relatively unbiased common notions forming the basis for informational collaboration among 
systems. There are several benefits to adopting this approach. Collaboration among information-
centric, decision-support systems would take place in terms of various core ontologies (i.e., 
Conveyance) with each collaborator viewing these core entities, concepts and notions according 
to its own perspective. Figure 2 briefly extends the logistics example presented in Figure 1 
showing collaboration between the original logistics system and a tactical command and control 
system. Collaboration between these two example systems is in terms of the common, core 
ontologies on which they share their derivations. A conveyance is still a conveyance whether it is 
viewed in the context of logistics or tactical command and control. To represent domain-specific 
notions (e.g., transport, supply item, tactical asset, etc.) each collaborating system would apply 
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 the appropriate filter. Although discussing a conveyance from partially disparate perspectives 
both systems can collaborate about core entities, concepts , and notions. 
Figure 2 — Two disparate domains linked into the same core ontology 
Another advantage of supplementing core, non-system-specific ontologies with perspective rich 
filters is the preservation of both time and effort during the development of such information-
centric systems. Core ontologies could be archived in a sort of ontology library forming a useful 
reference assisting in the development of new system ontologies. Models created for new 
decision-support systems could make use of this ontology library as a strong basis for deriving 
system-specific filters. In addition, such a process would promote the use of common core 
descriptions increasing the potential for interoperability even further. 
Interoperability between disparate decision-support systems is crucial to the operational 
effectiveness of information-centric, decision-support systems. As the emergence of such 
systems increases the need to support inter-system collaboration at the information level 
becomes increasingly critical. By constraining valuable, perspective-based biases to local, 
system-specific filter ontologies coupled with the use of core, relatively unbiased ontologies, 
interoperability between disparate information-centric decision-support systems becomes both 
feasible and effective. 
References 
[1] Buschmann F, D Schmidt, H Rohnert, and M Stal; "Pattern-Oriented Software Architecture: 
A System of Patterns"; Vol. 2, John Wiley and Sons, New York, New York, 1996. 
[2] Buschmann F, R Meunier, H Rohnert, P Sommerlad, and M Stal; "Pattern-Oriented Software 
Architecture: A System of Patterns"; Vol. 1, John Wiley and Sons, New York, New York, 1996. 
129 
 [3] Fowler M; "Analysis Patterns: Reusable Object Models"; Addison-Wesley, Reading, 
Massachusetts, 1997. 
[4] Gomez-Perez, A., N. Juristo and J. Pazos (1995); ’Evaluation and Assessment of Knowledge 
Sharing Technology’; in Mars N. (ed.) Towards Very Large Knowledge Bases - Knowledge 
Building and Knowledge Sharing 1995, IOS Press, Amsterdam (pp.289-296). 
[5] Hay D.; "Data Model Patterns: Conventions of Thought"; Dorset House, New York, New 
York, 1996. 
[6] Hayes-Roth F, D Waterman and D Lenat (eds.); "Building Expert Systems"; Addison-Wesley, 
Reading, Massachusetts, 1983. 
[7] Orfali R, D Harkey and J Edwards; "The Essential Distributed Objects Survival Guide"; John 
Wiley and Sons, Inc., New York, New York, 1996. 
[8] Pohl J, A Chapman, K Pohl, J Primrose and A Wozniak; "Decision-Support Systems: 
Notions, Prototypes, and In-Use Applications"; Technical Report, CADRU-11-97, CAD 
Research Center, Design Institute, College of Architecture and Environmental Design, Cal Poly, 
San Luis Obispo, CA, January, 1997. 
[9] Pohl J; "Human-Computer Partnership in Decision-Support Systems: Some Design 
Guidelines"; in Pohl J (ed.) Advances in Collaborative Design and Decision-Support Systems, 
focus symposium: International Conference on Systems Research, Informatics and Cybernetics, 
Baden-Baden, Germany, August 18-22, 1997 (pp. 71-82). 
[10] Tansley D. and C. Hayball (1993); ’Knowledge-Based Systems Analysis and 
Design: A KAD Developers Handbook , Prentice Hall. 
130 
    
 
 
 
 
  
    
 
 
The Architecture of a Case Based Reasoning Application 
Michael A Zang 
Senior Software Engineer
 
CAD Research Center
 
Cal Poly, San Luis Obispo
 
Abstract 
This paper provides an overview of select architectural concepts, structures, and mechanisms 
employed in the development of the Collaborative Agent-Based Control and Help System 
(COACH). COACH is an Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored system to demonstrate 
the feasibility and utility of a software system based on the Integrated Cooperative Decision 
Model (ICDM Architecture) to facilitate repairs to naval systems by inexperienced personnel. 
ICDM is a joint product of the CAD Research Center and CDM Technologies.   The  
architectural underpinnings of COACH have subsequently been applied to the development of 
other ONR projects such as the Ordnance Tracking and Information System (OTIS), and the 
Shipboard Integrated Logistics System (SILS). 
Introduction 
During the initial phases of the COACH project three fundamental design concepts were 
identified that were not well addressed by the technology embodied in ICDM at that time. 
1. Probabilistic diagnosis is at the core of most repair problems. 
2. It is not practical to hard code rules to deal with every repair situation. 
3. Repairmen must be able to interact with the system in a hands free manner. 
The case based reasoning paradigm provided solutions to the problems associated with all three 
concepts. While not a core feature of the paradigm, most implementations support probabilistic 
notions. A core feature of the paradigm is the capability to add cases over time and the 
simplistic nature of the underlying knowledge format is ideally suited to end-user or automated 
extensions to the knowledge base, which in essence enables the enveloping system to learn over 
time. The question and answer format coupled with the text based similarity mechanisms 
provided by the paradigm are naturally suited to speech-based interactions with the system. 
The remainder of this paper focuses on the ICDM architecture, its underlying concepts, and the 
extensions incorporated to provide case base reasoning facilities. Additional details on the case 
based reasoning paradigm are not provided in this paper. 
Software Architecture 
Since this paper is to deal with architecture it should begin with a definition of the architecture of 
a software system. Unfortunately there appears to be as many definitions as there are authors in 
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this field of endeavor. In fact entire web site are devoted to the question what is software 
architecture (CMU 2001). For example, one definition is The high-level division of a system 
into major sub-systems and their dependencies (Fowler 239). This definition is fairly non-
concise, where is the line drawn between high level and low level, between major subsystem and 
minor subsystem. Also this definition says nothing about the core mechanisms with which the 
subsystems collaborate, which is equally important if not more than the dependencies. 
Another definition is The set of significant decisions about the organization of a software 
system (Booch, et al 1999b). The problem with this definition is that what is considered 
significant is fairly arbitrary. In practice, a significant decision is probably defined as those the 
system architect got to in the time allocated to produce the system architecture document. 
These issues have lead me to define the architecture of a software system as the underlying 
model from which the system is specified and implemented. Traditionally this model has been 
resident in the minds of the designers, developers, and project managers associated with the 
system. With the advent of the Universal Modeling Language (UML) (see Fowler and Scott 
1997) and supporting computer aided software engineering (CASE) tools, this model can now be 
captured in a standard, consistent, and persistent format. Note this model grows and changes 
over time but at any instant in time it provides the current conception of the system architecture. 
PackageName: Architectural Specification 
PackageName: Modelling Tool 
PackageName: Models PackageName: Views PackageName: Diagrams 
Documents
Model 1 
View1.1 
View1.2 
Diagram1.1.1 
Diagram1.1.2 
Figure 1 Architectural Specification 
One or more models may represent the system architecture. An example of a possible 
breakdown is the user domain model, system model, and development model. The user domain 
model is essentially an analysis tool used to understand the user community their responsibilities, 
organizational structure, existing information system environment. It may also be used to 
capture the knowledge acquisition process and structure of the resulting artifacts. The system 
model captures the structure software under development and will be discussed throughout the 
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rest of this paper. The development model captures the development environment and processes 
as well as the project management aspects of the system such as milestones, deliverables, tasks, 
and timelines. 
While the underlying models represent the system architecture, the architecture is specified 
through views, diagrams, and documents as depicted in Figure 1. One of the particularly 
powerful aspects of UML is that it is built on an underlying formal grammar. This allows views 
and diagrams to show specific aspects of the system while contributing to an underlying self-
consistent model that is much to complex to depict in any one picture. This approach allows 
Software Architecture specifications to exist at the multitude of different scopes and levels 
typically required as shown in Figure 2. 
<< Development Pattern >> 
PackageName: Architectural Levels 
Deployment 
<< level >> 
Physical 
<< level >> 
Logical 
<< level >> 
Functional 
<< level >> 
Executable 
<< level >> << import >> 
<< import >> 
<< import >> 
<< realize >> 
PackageName: Architecural Scopes 
<< Development Pattern >> 
Analysis 
Design 
Implementation 
<< refine >> 
<< refine >> 
Contractual 
<< refine >> 
Figure 2 Architectural Scopes and Levels 
In addition to UML the architectural approach to these projects extensively utilizes the pattern 
approach to software engineering. Software Engineering patterns provide the industry with the 
means to capture proven solutions to software engineering problems in a generic system 
independent manner. A well-documented pattern provides a unique descriptive name, describes 
a software engineering problem in regards to a specific context, and presents a well-proven 
generic scheme for its solution. Patterns in software engineering are most associated with 
software design due to the classic reference Design Patterns by the gang of four that introduced 
the industry to the pattern concept (Gamma et al 1994); however, they are equally applicable 
across the ranges of scale and abstraction within the discipline. 
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In order for patterns to achieve their primary purpose of capturing expertise for reuse by others 
they must be organized and catalogued in a pattern system that allows pattern users to quickly 
find the patterns that address their current issues. In addition to providing an organizational 
scheme to its constituent patterns, a pattern system should provide a sufficient base of patterns, 
describe all constituent patterns in a uniform manner, identify relationships between patterns, and 
show how to apply and implement its constituents. 
Common top-level pattern categories are shown in Figure 3. Analysis patterns capture 
conceptually related domain model entities in a generic fashion that crosses individual domain 
boundaries providing for the reuse of concepts and allowing for the direct sharing of information 
between domains. Architectural patterns provide problem solution sets that focus on the system 
as a whole. Design patterns are similar to architecture patterns except that they provide a lower 
level focus on the design subsystems rather than the system as a whole. An idiom is low-level 
programming language specific pattern that describes how to implement particular aspects of a 
software component or subsystem.   An  example  of  a  good  pattern system is provided in 
Bushman 1996. 
PackageName: Pattern System 
Architectural Pattern 
Design Pattern 
Idiom 
Analysis Pattern 
Figure 3 A Pattern System 
Patterns are a particularly useful tool for developing and specifying the architecture of a software 
system. They provide software system architects with the means to quickly identify existing 
solutions to their architectural problems and provide the architectural design team with a high 
level descriptive vocabulary with which to discuss design issues. They also capture past 
experience which guards against major mistakes. This is especially important at the architectural 
level where a poor choice may not be evident until later on in the development process resulting 
in costly reworking of the system. They are also very useful in the documentation process as 
they provide a wealth of information in a very abbreviated format. 
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Physical Architecture 
The physical architecture addresses the runtime aspects if the system. It specifies the system 
executables and the runtime components from which they are assembled. Runtime components 
such as dynamic link libraries, Java Jar files, ActiveX controls are built from the source level 
artifacts specified in the Logical Architecture. 
The top level underpinnings of the ICDM architecture are best described by the Blackboard 
Pattern. This classical architectural pattern has been employed successfully by the artificial 
intelligence (AI) community since the early 1970 s as an approach to problems for which no 
deterministic solution strategies are known. The name blackboard was chosen because the 
approach parallels the situation in which human experts sit in front of a real blackboard and work 
together to solve a problem (Bushman 1996). 
The blackboard architecture employs a collection of independent programs (knowledge sources) 
that work cooperatively on a common data structure (blackboard). Each program is specialized 
for solving a particular part of the overall task, and all programs work together on the solution. 
The specialized programs are completely independent of each other. They do not call each other 
and there is no predetermined sequence for their activation. The direction taken by the system is 
primarily determined by the current state of the solution. This type of data directed control 
facilitates experimentation with different types of algorithms and allows experimentally derived 
heuristics to control processing. 
Prior to the development of COACH a distributed object server and communication facility had 
been incorporated into ICDM along with a rule-based inference engine and object management 
layer (OML) for use by end-user client applications. In this arrangement the object server plays 
the role of the blackboard. The individual agents operating within one or more agent engine 
instances play the role of knowledge sources. The managers within the agent engine instances 
provide control over the application of knowledge to the solution being developed by the 
associated agent federation. The human users, through their client applications, provide an 
additional source of knowledge and control as depicted in Figure 4. 
The incorporation of one or more human users distinguishes this architecture from traditional 
blackboard implementations that were designed to solve problems for users rather than with 
them. The partnership between human users and the software agents (knowledge sources) 
eliminates the control problems often associated with blackboard architectures. Humans can 
keep the developing solution on track and provide the stimulus to get it going again when stalled. 
The same data-driven features that provide for the interaction of diverse independent software 
agents may also be employed to simultaneously link spatially distributed human users into a 
collaborative environment; thereby realizing an information age version of the conceptual 
stimulus for which the blackboard pattern is named. 
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<<executable>><<executable>> 
<<Architectural Pattern>> 
Blackboard 
Object Server 
Agent Engine 
<<executable>> 
Recall Engine 
<<executable>> 
Search Engine 
<<executable>> 
Client Application 
Control/Knowledge Source Blackboard 
Control/Knowledge Source 
Knowledge Source 
Knowledge Source 
Figure 4 The Physical Architecture 
In support of the identified requirements for COACH a case based reasoning facility was 
incorporated into ICDM in a manner similar to the existing Agent Engine, which prompted the 
name Recall Engine. Each Recall Engine instance manages multiple recall sessions supported 
by one or more case bases. Either a human user or a software agent may invoke a recall session. 
The question and answer dialog used to drive forward the probabilistic values of the retrieved 
cases associated with the session is posted on the blackboard; thereby, allowing the developing 
solution to be viewed by all participating knowledge sources. By linking the text based 
questions to objectified observation concepts and answers to objectified phenomenon human 
users may respond to the dialog in a natural text based manner while agents may respond with 
their knowledge in an objectified manner. 
This same basic pattern for extending the architecture was repeated to support the OTIS 
requirement to dynamically plan optimal routes for the movement of ordnance aboard Navy 
carriers. The Search Engine provides a generic graph searching facility. Each Search Engine 
instance can manage multiple graphs whose arc weights are dynamically calculated through links 
to objectified entities within a domain specific instance model, which may in turned be queried 
by both agents and users for the results of specific searches of various types. 
ICDM Subsystems 
ICDM utilizes a combination of templated subsystems and code generation to provide high-level 
domain specific functionality in a generic fashion. This approach greatly decreases the 
development time of any particular system while ensuring robust performance. The approach 
utilizes high—level specification formats, such as UML, wherever possible to define the domain 
specific ontology and logic of a system. Code generators are then employed to translate the 
high-level specifications to the low-level targets specified in the subsystem templates. 
Subsystems may be precompiled much like a commercial database system in which case the 
templated entities are loaded at runtime to tailor it to the domain. This is the approach used by 
the Agent, Recall, and Search Engines. Alternatively the code generators may produce entities 
that are compiled into the subsystem as is done with the Object Server. In addition to providing 
the templated entities, some subsystems may require certain base level entities in the domain 
specific ontology like the observation and action packages required by the Recall Engine. The 
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subsystems also require the means to communicate in a distributed fashion. This capability is 
provided by the CORBA implementation of the Object Broker Pattern (Bushmann et al 2000). 
These ideas are captured in Figure 5. 
PackageName: ICDM Framework 
<< framework >> 
PackageName: Object Server 
<< subsystem >> 
OML 
{Imported} 
<client proxies,server proxies,server implementations,default knowledge,properties> 
PackageName: Agent Engine 
<< subsystem >> 
<agent logic,knowledge representation,interests,properties> 
PackageName: Recall Engine 
<< subsystem >> 
<case logic,default knowledge,properties> 
<<design pattern>> 
Object Broker 
PackageName: Platform 
CORBA 
client elements server elements 
platform elements 
PackageName: ontological framework 
<<analysis pattern>> 
Observation 
<<analysis pattern>> 
Action 
Figure 5 ICDM Subsystems 
Logical Architecture 
The logical architecture specifies the source and compile-time artifacts from which the physical 
architecture is built. The top-level local design addresses the need to share system components 
across families of similar systems and to specifically identify and capture the core technology of 
the company independent of any particular project. It partitions the design artifacts into four 
interdependent relaxed layers as depicted in 
Figure 6. The unique aspects of a specific system design are grouped into the ICDM system 
layer. The artifacts contained in this layer leverage heavily on the subsystems and service 
libraries provided by the underlying ICDM Framework layer and must be considered in relation 
to the framework to be fully understood. 
137 
    
 
   
 
 
   
The general design artifacts applicable to a wide-range of decision support systems have been 
abstracted from existing systems over the years into the ICDM framework, ICDM toolkit, and 
ICDM guidelines, which are representative of the research center s core technology.  The toolkit 
provides the development and build environment including the code generators, which transform 
ICDM System layer artifacts into subsystem targets specified in the ICDM Framework layer. 
The ICDM guidelines provide informal descriptions of the ideal characteristics of a good 
decision support system and capture the vision of the center s directors, which serve as a 
backdrop against which system design decisions are evaluated. 
ICDM System 
<< systemModel >> 
ICDM Framework 
<< framework >> 
External Support 
Platform 
<<architectural pattern>> 
Relaxed Layers 
ICDM Toolkit 
<< import >> 
inputs 
<< import >> 
outputs 
ICDM Conventions 
Figure 6 Top-level System Design 
The Relaxed Layers pattern (Buschmann 1996) indicates the call level dependencies between the 
ICDM System layer and the ICDM Framework layer may only be in the direction from system to 
framework. The framework contains many high level subsystems that are indirectly dependent 
on the system layer to provide domain specific context. The subsystems work with these 
elements at the meta-level and therefore do not violate the call-level dependencies. These 
elements are often specified in a high-level form, such as UML, that is abstracted from any 
particular implementation. 
The External Support and Platform layers group the externally developed elements of the system. 
It is important to differentiate external design elements at the architectural level because they are 
relatively fixed and may limit the flexibility of the system to evolve over time. They may also 
have associated runtime issues such as licensing fees and runtime validation problems. The 
Platform layer is distinguishable from the External Support Layer in that it groups the relevant 
external elements provided by the computing infrastructure of the client enterprise. These 
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elements need to be distinguished from other external elements because their configurations and 
upgrades are outside the control of the system s developing organization. 
System Tiers 
The system specific design is further structured into three distinct tiers as described by the 
Information System pattern (Fowler 1997) as depicted in Figure 7. The Domain Tier provides a 
direct executable model of the system domain that is independent of any particular application or 
source data model. It represents the active core of the system and provides the central focus for 
the development effort. The Application Tier provides local applications to support domain 
interactions of specific user groups. The Data Tier provides for the persistent storage of the data 
that underlies the information represented by the domain model. 
PackageName: ICDM System 
Application Tier Domain Tier Data Tier 
Information System 
<<architecture pattern>> 
Figure 7 ICDM System Layer Structure 
The Information System pattern was selected to address the fundamental decision support system 
requirements to provide concurrent collaborative support to multiple users, to provide a high-
level objective model of the domain that provides the necessary context to support agent-based 
reasoning, and to interoperate with existing data based systems within the system domain. 
Domain Tier 
The core of this architecture is the Domain Tier. The Information System pattern assigns the 
responsibility of saving/restoring the associated domain model to/from the Data Tier to the 
Domain Tier. This responsibility is typically addressed by providing the individual domain 
model objects with the capability to save and restore themselves, which is reasonable for simple 
stand-alone systems that have the complete freedom to specify the storage format of their 
persisted elements.   Unfortunately, real-world systems are rarely this simple, especially those 
geared toward decision support. Decision support systems must interact with existing systems, 
taking feeds as necessary, and dealing with the fact that many systems with varying 
representations (ie. relational, hierarchical, flat files, etc.) may have to be accessed to get the 
integrated picture required to provide adequate decision support. 
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The code required to implement this type of external system interaction is substantial and will 
pollute the purity of the domain model masking its initial intent and limiting its utility in other 
contexts. This dilemma is addressed by partitioning these responsibilities of the Domain Tier 
between a Data Interface Tier and a Representation Tier as shown in Figure 8. The Domain Tier 
Representation provides the executable model of the domain, while the Domain Tier Data 
Interface assumes the responsibility for moving information between the Representation and 
Data Tier. This level of indirection also provides the system with the additional flexibility 
required to more easily adapt to Data Tier changes over time or due to local variations at 
different deployment locations. The Data Broker pattern (Fowler 1997) describes the internal 
structure and dynamic behavior of the Data Interface. 
PackageName: Domain Tier 
PackageName: Application Interface PackageName: Data InterfacePackageName: Representation 
Agent Logic 
Ontology 
Case Logic 
<<architecture pattern>> 
Facade 
<<architecture pattern>> 
Data Broker 
Figure 8 The Domain Tier 
The Domain Tier must also provide an interface for the various applications within the domain. 
The pure representational model is not ideally suited for this purpose due to the complex 
interrelationships and high-level domain specific type specifications. It also does not address the 
transactional nature of the interactions between the user applications and the domain. In order to 
address these deficiencies an additional fa ade (Fowler 1997) based sub tier tailored to the needs 
of the system s applications is inserted into the Domain Tier. This application interface is 
responsible for all accesses to the domain representation and does any processing other than that 
specifically required for the user interface. The addition of this layer also benefits the 
development process as it allows user interface and domain model design to occur in parallel 
somewhat independent of one another. Once these pieces stabilize facades are developed that 
map the interface into the domain. 
Within the context of this architecture, an information system utilizes a class based object model 
to represent the domain. Classes represent the types of things within the domain and are 
structured into a hierarchy that relates similar things. They serve as templates for the creation of 
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objects that specify object characteristics in terms of attributes, object behavior in terms of 
operations, and object context in terms of associations.   A  decision support system can be 
thought of as a value added extension to a traditional information system. Within the context of 
a decision support system, the information system object model is known as the ontology. The 
ontology provides the domain vocabulary upon which the agent logic is specified in the form of 
expert system rules. This logic is used to express the business rules of the domain, maintain 
high-level derived information, and to generate alerts and statements of implication. 
From the developer perspective, the rule-based representation of the agent logic is very flexible 
in dealing with dynamic change; however, since the rules are compile time entities they do not 
provide this same flexibility to system users at runtime. This is where the case logic is 
particularly useful. The case logic uses a fixed compile time model composed of problems, 
questions, actions, and their interrelationships. The domain specific nature of the case logic is 
therefore represented in the form of object instances rather than model classes. This allows the 
case logic to be dynamically extended or modified at runtime either directly or indirectly 
(through embedded system learning processes) by system users. The case logic is also expressed 
in a form that serves as an appropriate basis for English based, interactive dialogs between the 
system and the system users to zero in on appropriate courses of action. 
Summary 
The continued evolution of the ICDM architecture to address system specific requirements has 
greatly enhanced development productivity and the quality of the client systems. The trend 
towards high-level model based (UML) specification for domain specific elements coupled with 
code generation to framework level targets is expected to continue. The capabilities of the 
Recall and Search engines continue to progress and the incorporation of other AI based domain 
facilities such as neural networks and probabilistic engines based on Bayes law are expected in 
the future. 
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Abstract. We present the results obtained by analyzing several IMMACCS agents with 
Pragati’s Multi-ViewPoint-Clustering Analysis (MVP-CA) tool. Key findings include: exposure 
of existing software architecture, generation of intermediate concept nodes to aid in user 
comprehension of the knowledge base, and detection of templatizable regions which could make 
the system more reusable and interoperable. Pragati’s Multi-ViewPoint-Clustering Analysis 
(MVP-CA) tool provides a support framework for analyzing large knowledge-based systems 
from multiple perspectives through clustering. It is a semi-automated tool that allows the user to 
focus attention on different aspects of the problem domain and thus provides a valuable aid for 
comprehension, maintenance, interoperability, integration and evolution of large and complex 
knowledge-based systems. MVP-CA generates usage-based knowledge trees by reverse 
engineering a knowledge base in a user-directed fashion. Often, the actual usage patterns are 
found to contrast in interesting ways with pre-declared class hierarchies such as the IMMACCS 
object model. The application of the MVP-CA tool provides a high-level functional view of the 
base ontology and the rules that use it. It augments the information-centric base ontology with a 
knowledge-centric view by extracting clusters of rules having a functional basis or role in the 
system. 
1. Motivation 
The IMMACCS (Integrated Marine Multi-Agent Command and Control System) system, 
developed by CAD Research Center, provides near real-time decision support for military 
command and control personnel in the form of enhanced situation awareness. It is an adaptive 
system that uses agents to filter and tag information according to its currency, relevance and 
reliability. IMMACCS works collaboratively, with the computer-based agents helping human 
users to solve the problem at hand. In order to be responsive to human intent, the system has 
been designed to process information, not just data. It accomplishes this goal by maintaining a 
global IMMACCS Object Model that allows it to access objects in terms of their behavioral 
characteristics and relationships to other objects. An agent engine is responsible for the 
environment’s dynamic problem-solving aspects. It generates the desired views of the battle 
space to support the planning and training activities. The informational aspects of the objects are 
thus separated from the logic aspects of the system. 
The bulk of the effort in building such multi-agent systems has thus been devoted to attempting 
to define the information nuggets or objects at a high-enough conceptual level. Such an ontology 
needs to capture the belief system for each agent so that the problem to be solved can be 
formulated in concrete as well as natural terms. In other words, the aim is to capture the real-
world problem environment in terms of all objects of interest in the environment, their 
behavioral characteristics, and their interrelationships, such that the problem solving aspects of 
143 
 
 
 
the agents can be simplified. Agent reasoning and collaboration can then take place in the 
context of such an ontology through formulation of simplified agent rules. 
Even though every effort needs to be taken to define the right information at the right conceptual 
level in the ontology, it is often the case that all the different aspects of object and problem 
definition cannot be foreseen a priori in the forward engineering phase of the project. Often 
certain subtle but important relationships become evident through time, after studying the 
patterns of data/information accesses in the system. In this project, we have shown the feasibility 
of detecting such patterns in the knowledge base through Pragati’s MVP-CA (Multi-ViewPoint 
Clustering Analaysis) technology, so as to expose the system in the context of how the various 
concepts are used in the knowledge base, as opposed to how they are declared.  By advocating 
such a reverse engineering approach,we provide a complementary perspective on the 
relationships of the concepts. The clusters provide us with a functional perspective on the degree 
to which concepts are inter-related in the system. Also if there are gaps across the declared 
concepts, then formation of intermediate level concepts is suggested by the system. Therefore, 
the advantage in reverse engineering these systems is that the knowledge being exposed has a 
functional basis, that is, one is conscious of how it is being used, as opposed to how they were 
declared. Hence, new connections across concepts can be created and defined contextually. 
In our experience with the IMMACCS system, we have discovered that even though the rules in 
the agents are well-organized in their respective groups, each rule is rather long, containing a lot 
of repeated clauses across the rules. Since each rule references many different types of objects 
from the object model, the knowledge base becomes very opaque from an understandability 
point of view; one has to frequently switch contexts in order to understand each rule. Often, a set 
of rules display only slight variations on a base concept. This implies either a need for additional 
structure in the object model to accommodate the variations, or else a need to factor the 
commonalities into higher-level rules. Such changes would serve to make the rule base more 
efficient and comprehensible. The strong similarity across groups of rules can also be exploited 
to formulate rule templates that would facilitate 
� identification of interoperable/reusable components in the system 
� new knowledge acquisition and 
� long-term maintenance of the rules 
In this paper we discuss our experiences of applying Pragati’s Multi-ViewPoint-Clustering 
Analysis (MVP-CA) prototype tool to expose such conceptual modules in a system, by 
performing a combination of statistical and semantic clustering on the rules in the system. These 
clusters can provide a foundation for building intermediate concept nodes in the knowledge base 
as they expose groups of rules in the context of their usage. As an alternative to the declared 
class-subclass hierarchy in the IMMACCS object model, MVP-CA tool semi-automatically 
generates a complementary knowledge tree by reverse engineering the knowledge base. Thus the 
application of the MVP-CA tool is shown to provide an even higher-level view of the base 
ontology, that is, augment the base ontology which is information-centric with even higher-level 
abstractions which promises to make the system knowledge-centric. 
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2. Multi-ViewPoint Cluster Analysis (MVP-CA) Technology 
Overview of the MVP-CA Tool 
Pragati’s Multi-ViewPoint-Clustering Analysis (MVP-CA) tool provides a framework for 
clustering large, homogeneous knowledge-based systems from multiple perspectives. It is a 
semi-automated tool allowing the user to focus attention on different aspects of the problem, 
thus providing a valuable aid for comprehension, maintenance, integration and evolution of 
knowledge-based systems (Mehrotra 1994, Mehrotra 1995b, Mehrotra 1996). The generation of 
clusters to capture significant concepts in the domain seems more feasible in knowledge-based 
systems than in procedural software as the control aspects are abstracted away in the inference 
engine. It is our contention that the MVP-CA tool can form a valuable aid in exposing the 
conceptual software structures in such systems, so that various software engineering efforts can 
be carried out meaningfully, instead of in a brute-force or ad-hoc manner. In addition, insight 
can be obtained for better reengineering of the software, to achieve run-time efficiency as well as 
reduce long-term maintenance costs. It is our intention to provide a comprehension aid base first, 
through our MVP-CA tool, for supporting all these software engineering activities (Mehrotra 
1999). 
The MVP-CA tool consists of two major stages: Cluster Generation and Cluster Analysis. In the 
Cluster Generation phase the focus is on generating meaningful clusters through clustering 
analysis techniques augmented with semantics-based measures. The clustering algorithm starts 
with each rule as a cluster. At each step of the algorithm, two clusters which are the most 
“similar” are merged together to form a new cluster. This pattern of merging forms a hierarchy 
of clusters from the single-member rule clusters to a cluster containing all the rules. The 
“similarity” of rules is defined by a set of heuristic distance metrics which measure the 
relatedness of two rules in a rule base. The type of information captured by the metrics is to 
some degree dependent on the class of the expert system being analyzed (Chandra 1986, 
Mehrotra and Wild 1995, Mehrotra 1995). By utilizing different distance metrics and parameters 
for those metrics, individual clustering runs are generated. Once clusters have been found, the 
Cluster Analysis Phase can proceed. In this phase, the user is aided by a set of detection routines 
that flag potentially interesting clusters. Parent clusters and child clusters help the user in either 
breaking up a high level concept into constituent concepts or combining lower level concepts 
into higher-level abstract concepts. Often the formation of higher-level concepts is reflected in 
the topology of the mergings, which can be visualized through dendograms presented by the 
tool. This then points to the groups that need to be examined more closely. The clustering and 
analysis process is iterative; results from one clustering run will often suggest a new set of 
parameters for a subsequent run. 
Overview of IMMACCS 
The FIRES agent is one of thirteen agents that have been built in IMMACCS. Some of the other 
agents are: Sentinel, Rules of Engagement (ROE), Engagements, Logistics, Hazard, Intelligence, 
Decision Point, Blue-On-Blue Agent. The FIRES agent responds to “Call for Fire” messages in 
the system. In response to such a message its purpose is to select the best weapon based on 
availability, deliverability and acceptability. To accomplish this goal it accesses concepts such as 
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range, time of flight, target type, urgency, circular error of probability (CEP), effective casualty 
rate (ECR), availability and rules of engagement (ROE) from the IMMACCS object model. The 
deconfliction rules in the FIRES agent also address the trajectory of the munitions relative to the 
position of other friendly assets and infra structure objects. The FIRES agent contains 49 COOL 
rules and is the largest knowledge base compared to the other thirteen in IMMACCS. The total 
number of rules across all agent rules in IMMACCS is 153. 
3. Experimental Results 
Multiple runs were performed with different parameter settings for the FIRES agent data set. In 
this section we discuss the results of those clustering runs.. We first describe the high-level 
software architecture and then present the three broad categories of concepts that were 
discovered, Conflicts, Targeting and Weapons. We can generalize the qualitative aspects of our 
results by stating that the clusterings helped us discover the following: 
� High-level software architecture 
o	 To aid comprehension of the knowledge base by helping us extract the “big” 
picture 
� Opportunities for insertion of intermediate concept nodes in the object model 
o	 To aid more efficient knowledge organization (static ontological engineering 
aspect) and 
o	 To aid with search and retrieval of concept terms (dynamic aspect) 
� Opportunities for template formation (structurally common axioms) in both intra- and 
inter-agent analysis 
o	 To aid detection of interoperable rule sets having a functional basis 
o	 To aid more efficient knowledge entry 
3.1 IMMACCS FIRES Agent’s Software Architecture 
Figure 1 provides a high-level view of the FIRES agent’s software architecture, as extracted 
using the MVP-CA clustering tool. Concepts have been identified at two levels. On the top-level 
we have discovered three main or broad categories of problem-solving concepts. We have called 
these the Weapons, Targeting and Conflicts group. The names for these groups have been coined 
in an attempt to categorize the various observation subgroups that were found to exist under the 
broad concept. In other words these groups consist of other subgroups feeding into the umbrella 
concept consisting of Weapons, Targeting or Conflicts. 
The subgroups that were found to exist under the Weapons group deal with either weapon 
capabilities or guided munitions or concentrate on various aspects of Weapon Presentation. The 
Weapon Presentation group further subdivides into the Weapon Selection and Weapon 
Recommendation groups. The Conflicts cluster had two parallel sets of rules that dealt with the 
concept of a weapon trajectory conflict due to a building or a rotary wing being in the way. The 
concept of Targeting yielded two major subgroups that utilize disjoint concepts of non-enemy 
entity near target and target range for the solution process. The discussions that follow will be in 
the context of these subgroups that were identified through the tool. 
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Figure 1: IMMACCS FIRES Agent’s Software Architecture (Extracted via MVP-CA) 
3.2 Intermediate Concept Formation 
Intermediate concept node formation is geared towards augmenting the system’s object model or 
ontology from a functional perspective. All the relationships in the object model are declared in 
the forward engineering phase of system development. Reverse engineering the system through 
clustering provides a “hind-sight” benefit in evaluating those relationships in the context of their 
usage. In other words, if a certain combination of concepts proves handy for providing a 
particular functionality, perhaps a composite concept addressing that functional aspect needs to 
be in place in the object model as an abbreviation or shorthand reflecting the reuse of the 
combination. Intermediate concept node formation is very akin to common factoring in compiler 
design where the code that is used repeatedly can be factored out and compiled in an optimized 
manner for run-time efficiency. It allows the user to formulate his/her ideas in terms of 
composite concepts so that, once a base rule captures the essence of the functionality in the 
common set, only the unique portions need to be mentioned in the new rules. We have 
mentioned in our preamble that each rule in IMMACCS is so long that the meaning is not 
immediately clear from a manual examination of the rule base. Clustering the rules in 
IMMACCS showed that repeated references were being made to the same objects in the object 
model, with only very minor variations across a rule set. Intermediate concept node formation 
attempts to abstract the commonalities across the objects in a rule cluster, so that the future rule 
formulations are simplified conceptually. 
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Thus, in order to reduce the opaqueness of the rules we have proposed the following solution for 
restructuring the rule base through the formation of intermediate concept nodes: 
1.	 Identify clusters of rules with similar content. 
2.	 Create an intermediate object to capture functional aspects of the rule cluster. 
3.	 Formulate a base rule with the intermediate object to capture the commonalities. 
4.	 Adapt original rules as a derivation from base rule and instantiation of the intermediate 
object. 
Figure 2: Term Usage for Conflicts Cluster 
Consider for example, the Conflicts cluster represented in Figure 2. It contains two subclusters: 
conflicts due to blocking rotary wing and conflicts due to blocking building. The figure shows the 
objects from the IMMACCS object model, such as Munitions, Entity, Position, etc. that are 
referenced by the rules in the cluster. Notice however, that the Rotary Wing is exclusive to one 
sub cluster and so is Structure and Dimension, because the arc from these nodes lead to only 
their respective sub clusters. Figure 2, and others that follow, represent visually how 
intermingled the various object nodes are with respect to the problem formulation. The 
cluster consists of the following rules: 
Rule # 44 FIRES::Structure_Trajectory_Weapon 
Rule # 45 FIRES::Structure_Trajectory_Entity 
Rule # 46 FIRES::Structure_Trajectory_Platform 
Rule # 47 FIRES::RotaryWing_Trajectory_Weapon 
Rule # 48 FIRES::RotaryWing_Trajectory_Entity 
Rule # 49 FIRES::RotaryWing_Trajectory_Platform 
Rules for Conflicts Cluster 
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 We present the Structure_Trajectory_Weapon rule from the FIRES agent in Program Segment 
1 to show its complexity. This rule fires if a building is blocking the trajectory of a weapon. 
While not detailed here, the other rules in the conflicts due to blocking rotary wing cluster, 
(defrule FIRES::Structure_Trajectory_Weapon
 
(declare (salience -5))
 
(object (is-a Agent)(name ?oFireAgent)(agentId "FIRES"))
 
(object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?oCFF)(targetLocation ?oTargetPos))
 
(object (is-a Position)(name ?oTargetPos)(latitude ?fTLAT)
 
(longitude ?fTLONG)(altitude ?fTa)) 
(object (is-a WeaponSelection)(name ?oWS)(CFFId ?oCFF) 
(cons $?lCONS)(pros $?lPROS)(choice FEASIBLE)(ammoType AMMO) 
(rating ?nRATING)(ammoId ?oMN)(weaponId ?oLW)(entityId ?oET)) 
(test (member$ "within range" $?lPROS))
 
(object (is-a Munitions)(name ?oMN)(maxSpeed ?V))
 
(object (is-a LethalWeapon)(name ?oLW)(encyclopedic FALSE)
 
(weaponAmmo ?oMN)(location ?WLoc)) 
(object (is-a TrackPosition)(name ?oWLoc)(latitude ?fENTLAT) 
(longitude ?fENTLONG)(altitude ?fSa)) 
(test (<> ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG 0)) 
(object (is-a Structure)(referenceName ?building) 
(location ?oBuildingPos)(structureDimension ?oDimen)) 
(object (is-a Dimension)(name ?oDimen)(height ?fheight)) 
(object (is-a Position)(name ?oBuildingPos&~?oTargetPos) 
(latitude ?fBLAT)(longitude ?fBLONG)(altitude ?fBa)) 
(test (InTheWay ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fBLAT ?fBLONG ?fTLAT ?fTLONG)) 
(test (not (member$ (str-cat ?building 
", potential obstacle in trajectory path") $?lCONS ))) 
(test (> 0 (TrajectoryCheck ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fSa ?fBLAT ?fBLONG 
(+ ?fBa ?fheight) ?fTLAT ?fTLONG ?fTa ?V))) 
=> 
(bind ?delta (TrajectoryCheck ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fSa ?fBLAT ?fBLONG 
(+ ?fBa ?fheight) ?fTLAT ?fTLONG ?fTa ?V)) 
(send ?oWS put-rating (+ ?nRATING (* 10 ?delta))) 
(send ?oWS put-cons (insert$ $?lCONS 1 (create$ (str-cat ?building 
", potential obstacle in trajectory path"))))) 
Program Segment 1: Original “Structure_Trajectory_Weapon” Rule 
Structure_Trajectory_Entity and Structure_Trajectory_Platform, are very similar to 
Structure_Trajectory_Weapon. 
Upon examination of rules 44, 45, and 46, we find that it is possible to factor out the rules’ 
shared object usage by introducing an intermediate concept node, 
ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding, as shown in Program Segment 2. 
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(make-instance of ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding 
; building-related slots 
(buildingName ?building) (buildingLatitude ?fBLAT) 
(buildingLongitude ?fBLONG) (buildingAltitude ?fBa) 
(buildingHeight ?fheight) 
; target-related slots 
(targetLatitude ?fTLAT) (targetLongitude ?fTLONG) 
(targetAltitude ?fTa) 
; munition-related slots 
(munitionMaxSpeed ?V) 
; weapon selection-related slots 
(weaponSelection ?oWS) (weaponId ?oLW) (ammoId ?oMN) 
(weaponRating ?nRATING) (weaponCons ?lCONS)) 
Program Segment 2: Intermediate Concept Node 
“ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding” 
We also introduce a new base rule, Structure_Trajectory, that abstracts the rules’ common 
functionality. This base rule appears in Program Segment 3. 
(defrule FIRES::Structure_Trajectory
 
(declare (salience -5))
 
(object (is-a Agent) (name ?oFireAgent)(agentId "FIRES"))
 
(object (is-a CallForFire) (name ?oCFF)
 
(targetLocation ?oTargetPos)) 
(object (is-a Position) (name ?oTargetPos) (latitude ?fTLAT) 
(longitude ?fTLONG) (altitude ?fTa)) 
(object (is-a WeaponSelection)(name ?oWS) (CFFId ?oCFF) 
(cons $?lCONS)(pros $?lPROS) (choice FEASIBLE) 
(ammoType AMMO) (rating ?nRATING)(ammoId ?oMN) 
(weaponId ?oLW)) 
(test (member$ "within range" $?lPROS)) 
(object (is-a Munitions) (name ?oMN) (maxSpeed ?V)) 
(object (is-a Structure) (referenceName ?building) 
(location ?oBuildingPos) (structureDimension ?oDimen)) 
(object (is-a Dimension) (name ?oDimen) (height ?fheight)) 
(object (is-a Position) (name ?oBuildingPos&~?oTargetPos) 
(latitude ?fBLAT) (longitude ?fBLONG) (altitude ?fBa)) 
(test (not (member$ (str-cat ?building 
", potential obstacle in trajectory path") $?lCONS ))) 
=> 
; create intermediate object 
(make-instance of ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding 
... [see above for full intermediate object definition])) 
Program Segment 3: New Rule Structure Trajectory 
Given the new object and the new rule described above, each of rules 44, 45, and 46 can be 
simplified. For example, a simplified Rule Structure_Trajectory_Weapon is shown in Program 
Segment 4. 
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(defrule FIRES::Structure_Trajectory_Weapon 
(declare (salience -5)) 
; match intermediate object 
(object (is-a ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding) 
(buildingName ?building) (buildingLatitude ?fBLAT) 
(buildingLongitude ?fBLONG) (buildingAltitude ?fBa) 
(buildingHeight ?fheight) (targetLatitude ?fTLAT) 
(targetLongitude ?fTLONG) (targetAltitude ?fTa) 
(munitionMaxSpeed ?V) (weaponSelection ?oWS) 
(weaponRating ?nRATING) (weaponCons ?lCONS) 
(ammoId ?oMN) (weaponId ?oLW)) 
(object (is-a WeaponSelection)(name ?oWS)( entityId ?oET)) 
(object (is-a LethalWeapon)(name ?oLW)(encyclopedic FALSE) 
(weaponAmmo ?oMN)(location ?WLoc)) 
(object (is-a TrackPosition)(name ?oWLoc) 
(latitude ?fENTLAT)(longitude ?fENTLONG)(altitude ?fSa)) 
(test (<> ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG 0)) 
(test (InTheWay ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fBLAT ?fBLONG ?fTLAT ?fTLONG)) 
(test (not (member$ (str-cat ?building ", potential obstacle in 
trajectory path") $?lCONS ))) 
(test (> 0 (TrajectoryCheck ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fSa ?fBLAT ?fBLONG 
(+ ?fBa ?fheight) ?fTLAT ?fTLONG ?fTa ?V))) 
=> … [same as the original rule] 
Program Segment 4: Simplified Rule Structure_Trajectory_Weapon 
Rules 45 and 46 would be similarly simplified. 
A similar operation can be carried out on rules 47, 48, and 49 by introducing a new intermediate 
concept node, ConflictDueToBlockingRotaryWing and a new base rule. In fact the two new rules 
that we introduce can be further factored out because they are fairly similar except for the 
difference as shown in Program Segment 5. 
Portion of rule for ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding: 
(object (is-a RotaryWing) (encyclopedic FALSE) 
(referenceName ?chopter) (location ?oChopterPos)) 
(object (is-a TrackPosition) (name ?oChopterPos) (latitude ?fBLAT) 
(longitude ?fBLONG) (altitude ?fBa)) 
Portion of rule for ConflictDueToBlockingRotaryWing: 
(object (is-a Structure)(referenceName ?building) 
(location ?oBuildingPos)(structureDimension ?oDimen)) 
(object (is-a Dimension)(name ?oDimen)(height ?fheight)) 
(object (is-a Position)(name ?oBuildingPos&~?oTargetPos) 
(latitude ?fBLAT)(longitude ?fBLONG)(altitude ?fBa)) 
Program Segment 5: Differences in rules for 
ConflictDueToBlockingBuilding and ConflictDueToBlockingRotaryWing 
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Thus by formulating a higher-level intermediate concept node, in this example 
ConflictDueToBlockingObject, we can significantly simplify the design of sets of related rules. 
No doubt the designer had such a concept in mind while writing the these six rules that appear in 
the above cluster. However, because the domain ontology does not have the infrastructure for 
defining composite concepts, the deficiency manifests itself in the rules being unusually long and 
unreadable. Revelation of such higher-level concepts would have taken tedious manual 
inspection without our tool. We could have used the rule names as being suggestive of the 
similarity across the rules; however, the strength of our tool lies in exposing these similarities 
without depending on the rule naming conventions. Moreover, as we have seen above, 
sometimes a central concept like conflict for the cluster has not been mentioned even once in the 
rule name. Hence it is dangerous to base any conclusions on such a superficial examination. 
Such revelations from clustering the system can be exploited to restructure rules for readability 
and reorganize the ontology hierarchy in the object model. The contention is that such an 
exercise would in the long run make knowledge entry more efficient and reliable while 
increasing the run-time efficiency of system because bulk of the instantiations will have to be 
invoked only once for a set of rules. 
3.3 Templatizable Clusters 
In this section we show the templatization application of clustering in the context of the targeting 
and weapon capabilities addressed by IMMACCS. Clustering juxtaposes structurally similar 
rules that can be generalized and used to generate templates. Thus certain portions of the code 
can be treated like the constants of an equation common to the various instantiations; the rest are 
the variable parameters. Such templates can be used as an aid to high-level knowledge entry as 
we illustrate in a couple of examples below. 
3.3.1 The Targeting Cluster 
Figure 3: Term Usage for Targeting Cluster 
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Within the general concept of targeting we discovered two subclusters, as shown in Figure 3. 
The first subcluster, which we call non-enemy entity near target , has only two rules. These are 
applicable when non-enemy entities, such as civilians or friendly forces, are near a target. The 
second subcluster, which we call target range, has six rules dealing with targets being in or out 
of range. Figure 3 shows that many objects such as Lethal Weapon, Entity, Weapon Selection 
etc. are used by both conceptual clusters. However, Munitions and CivilianOrganization are used 
exclusively by non-enemy entity near target and Platform is used only by target range. Notice 
that the majority of the objects are accessed by both clusters. 
The rules in the cluster are shown below and the template for the rules are given in Program 
Segment 6. The slots to be filled in the template are bold and in angle brackets. 
FIRES::Friend_Unit_Near_Target 
FIRES::Civilian_Entity_Near_Target 
If a new type of non-enemy entity different from civilian or friendly forces is identified—say, a 
non-aligned force—this template can be used to put the rules in place very quickly by giving the 
filler slots values for the new setting. The basic skeleton is in place now to perform this function 
efficiently and reliably. 
(declare (salience -5))
 
(object (is-a Agent)(name ?oFireAgent)(agentId "FIRES"))
 
(object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?oCFF) (targetLocation ?oTargetPos))
 
(object (is-a Position)(name ?oTargetPos)(latitude ?fTLAT)
 
(longitude ?fTLONG)) 
(object (is-a WeaponSelection)(name ?oWS)(CFFId ?oCFF) 
(cons $?lCONS)(pros $?lPROS)(rating ?nRATING) 
(ammoId ?oMN)(weaponId ?oLW)(entityId ?oET)) 
(object (is-a Munitions)(name ?oMN)(CEP ?nCEP)(ECR ?nECR)) 
(object (is-a LethalWeapon)(name ?oLW)(weaponAmmo ?oMN) 
(location ?WLoc)) 
(object (is-a TrackPosition)(name ?WLoc)(latitude 0.0) 
(longitude 0.0)) <non-enemy-entity> <optional-friend-code> 
(object (is-a TrackPosition)(name ?oENTPS)(latitude ?fENTLAT) 
(longitude ?fENTLONG)) 
(test(and (not 
(member$ <non-enemy-entity-near-target-message> $?lCONS)) 
(<= (kmDegDistance ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fTLAT ?fTLONG) 
(/ (+ ?nCEP ?nECR) 1000)))) 
=>
 
(bind ?d (DegDistance2 ?fENTLAT ?fENTLONG ?fTLAT ?fTLONG km))
 
(if (<= ?d 0) then (bind ?d 0.001)) <cep-binding>
 
(bind ?drating (* -15 (/ ?cep ?d)))
 
(send ?oWS put-rating (RatingPercentage ?nRATING ?drating))
 
(send ?oWS put-cons (insert$ $?lCONS 1
 
(create$ <non-enemy-entity-near-target-message>))))
 
Program Segment 6: Template for the group non-enemy entity near target
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 3.3.2 The Weapons Cluster 
There are three major subgroups within the general concept of weapons: weapon capabilities, 
weapon timing and weapon presentation. The majority of the objects from the object model are 
used by the rules in these major subgroups. Due to the information overload in each rule, in order 
to understand the rules functionally, one has to draw meaning from the rules based upon their 
structure, that is, on how they are being used, and not just on what is the content. Here, MVP-CA 
aids us by exposing this usage information. Details of all the various groups and subgroups have 
been discussed in the ONR final report (Mehrotra 2001). In this paper we choose the weapon 
presentation cluster for templatization. The rules in this cluster deal with various aspects of 
weapon selection and weapon recommendation, concepts which form the two major subgroups. 
As evidenced by Figure 4, Weapon Selection uses Entity, Munitions and Platform whereas 
Weapon Recommendation uses the extra concept of Alert from the object model. This group 
merges the concepts of “weapon selection” and “weapon recommendation”. 
Figure 4: Term Usage for Weapon Presentation Cluster 
The rules for weapon selection are 
FIRES::Recommend_Best_Weapon 
FIRES::Recommend_Feasible_Weapon 
FIRES::No_Best_Weapon_Recommendation 
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And rules for weapon recommendation are 
FIRES::WeaponSelection_NoPlatform_NoEntity 
FIRES::WeaponSelection_NoWeapon_NoPlatform_NoEntity 
FIRES::CreateWeaponSelection_Entity 
FIRES::CreateWeaponSelection_Entity_Platform 
Program Segment 7 shows a template for rules related to weapon recommendations. The rule 
saliences are set so a best weapon recommendation alert shows up before the list of feasible 
weapons. If there is no weapon recommendation, an alert to that effect shows up instead. 
(declare (salience <salience>))
 
(object (is-a Agent)(name ?oFireAgent)(agentId "FIRES"))
 
(object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?oCFF))
 
?lw <- (object (is-a LethalWeapon)(name ?oLW))
 
(object (is-a WeaponSelection)(name ?oWS)(CFFId ?oCFF)
 
(choice <specific-choice>)(rating ?nR1)(weaponId ?oLW) 
(ammoId ?oMN)(platformId ?oPF)(entityId ?oEN)) 
(not(object (is-a Alert)(alertAgent ?oFireAgent) 
(causeObjects ?oCFF ?oMN ?oLW ?oPF ?oEN))) 
=> 
(bind ?msg (WeaponSummary ?oWS)) 
(bind ?weaponName (send ?lw get-referenceName)) 
(make-instance (GetUniqueName Alert) of Alert 
(source "FIRES")(sourceReliability COMPLETELY) 
(referenceName (str-cat <recommendation-name> ?weaponName )) 
(alertMessage ?msg)(alertAgent ?oFireAgent) 
(causeObjects ?oCFF ?oMN ?oLW ?oPF ?oEN))) 
<specific-choice> can take the values: 
Best, Feasible
<recommendation-name> can take the values:
Recommend_Best_Weapon, Recommend_Feasible_Weapon
Program Segment 7: Template for weapon recommendation 
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Another interesting cluster worth mentioning was obtained for weapon timing in the guided 
munitions cluster. The following rules were members of this cluster: 
FIRES::Weapon_OnTime_Emergency 
FIRES::Weapon_NotOnTime_Emergency 
FIRES::Weapon_OnTime_Immediate 
FIRES::Weapon_NotOnTime_Immediate 
FIRES::Entity_Weapon_OnTime_Emergency 
FIRES::Entity_Weapon_NotOnTime_Emergency 
FIRES::Entity_Weapon_OnTime_Immediate 
FIRES::Entity_Weapon_NotOnTime_Immediate 
FIRES::Platform_Weapon_OnTime_Emergency 
FIRES::Platform_Weapon_NotOnTime_Emergency 
FIRES::Platform_Weapon_OnTime_Immediate 
FIRES::Platform_Weapon_NotOnTime_Immediate 
This cluster picks up rules related to various aspects of weapon timing: emergency, immediate, 
on time, or not on time. All rules in the above cluster follow the same naming pattern 
{Entity_,Platform_}_Weapon_{OnTime,NotOnTime}_ {Emergency,Immediate}. Many of the 
rules in this group are quite similar to each other, providing opportunities for templating and/or 
abstractions to higher levels of the ontology. For instance, if we compare the rule 
(FIRES::Weapon_OnTime_Emergency) and rule (FIRES::Weapon_NotOnTime_Emergency) we 
find that they are almost identical except for using opposite operators. This is a bit different 
from the examples of templating given in other observations (reference, for example, “non-
enemy entity near target”). Most of those examples illustrate parallel concepts such as “civilians 
near a target” and “friendly forces near a target”. Here, the concepts 
“Weapon_OnTime_Emergency” and “Weapon_NotOnTime_Emergency” are complementary 
rather than parallel. Parallel similarities occur between many of the rules, and are evident both 
through the rule naming covention and the clustering results. 
4.0 Results from Inter-agent Clustering 
In this section we present the results from clustering across agents in IMMACCS. Rules with 
striking similarities were found showing the role of clustering in exposing interoperability issues 
in the system, that is, functionalities that span across agents, and could perhaps impact future 
construction of similar systems. We found that clustering brought into focus rules across agents 
that had same rule names even though content was slightly different in each. When examined 
closely, each rule had been adapted just slightly for addressing the specialized behavior in their 
context. An example is presented in Program Segments 8, 9 and 10 for updating and 
acknowledging the Call for Fire Alert message. In the BLUEONBLUE and ROE agents the 
“causeObjects” object is referenced instead of the “affectObjects” as in the INTEL agent. The 
rest of the functionality across the rules is more or less similar, except for a few extra assertions 
being made in the consequent of the ROE rule for the SENTINEL agent. This proves that 
156 
   
  
clustering can provide opportunities for higher level concept formation across agents. They can 
be considered as prime candidates for templatization as well, across various agents, thus 
addressing the need for functional abstraction when designing various agents. 
(defrule BLUEONBLUE::UpdateAcknowledgedCFFAlertMessage
 
?agent <- (object (is-a Agent)(name ?agentName)(agentId "BLUEONBLUE"))
 
?cff <- (object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?cffName)
 
(acknowledged TRUE) 
(targetNumber ?targetNum&:(neq ?targetNum ""))) 
?alert <- (object (is-a Alert)(source "BLUEONBLUE") 
(alertAgent ?agentName) 
(causeObjects $?causeObjects&:(member$ ?cffName ?causeObjects))) 
=> 
(bind ?msgFormat 
(str-cat(send ?alert get-alertMessage) 
"%n“ "+++ ACKNOWLEDGED +++%n"" 
CallForFire has been acknowledged with%n"" target number %s")) 
(bind ?alertMessage (format nil ?msgFormat ?targetNum)) 
(send ?alert update-slot alertMessage ?alertMessage) 
(send ?alert update-slot acknowledged FALSE)) 
Program Segment 8: Rule for the BLUEONBLUE Agent 
(defrule INTEL::UpdateAcknowledgedCFFAlertMessage
 
?agent <- (object (is-a Agent)(name ?agentName)(agentId "INTEL"))
 
?cff <- (object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?cffName)
 
(source "INTEL") 
(acknowledged TRUE) 
(targetNumber ?targetNum&:(neq ?targetNum ""))) 
?alert <- (object (is-a Alert)(source "INTEL") 
(alertAgent ?agentName) 
(affectObjects ?cffName)) 
=> 
(bind ?msgFormat 
(str-cat(send ?alert get-alertMessage) 
"%n""+++ ACKNOWLEDGED +++%n"" 
CallForFire has been acknowledged with%n"" target number %s")) 
(bind ?alertMessage (format nil ?msgFormat ?targetNum)) 
(send ?alert update-slot alertMessage ?alertMessage) 
(send ?alert update-slot acknowledged FALSE)) 
Program Segment 9: Rule for the INTEL Agent 
5.0 Concluding Remarks 
In this project the feasibility of applying the MVP-CA tool to a multi-agent system was 
demonstrated. It has been shown that a semi-automated tool such as Pragati’s MVP-CA (Multi-
ViewPoint Clustering Analysis) tool can provide valuable aid for comprehension, maintenance, 
integration and evolution of expert systems by structuring a large knowledge base in various 
meaningful ways. The similarity in existing rule bases can be exploited by the MVP-CA tool to 
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“mine” the knowledge existent in them, thus paving the way for these systems to be elevated to 
becoming knowledge-centric, instead of remaining at the information-centric level. To achieve 
this goal, the knowledge in the system must be suitably abstracted, structured, and otherwise 
clustered in a manner that facilitates software engineering activities (Mehrotra and Barr 1998, 
Mehrotra et al. 1999a, Mehrotra et al. 1999b). Hence, by exposing the knowledge contained in 
knowledge-based system through the Multi-ViewPoint Clustering Analysis tool, we formulate a 
basis for addressing reusability, maintainability, and reliability issues for such systems. 
Clustering showed that the strong similarity across groups of rules can be exploited to build 
more hierarchically organized rules. It also showed how to reorganize the object model to suit 
the application demands in terms of slight variations on base concepts and how to discover as 
well as relieve some of the pressure points in the declared object model. Creation of intermediate 
concept nodes abstracts common functionalities and allows the user to think in terms of higher-
level concepts and goals. Clustering also helps to identify under/over-used concepts across 
agents which may be over/under-specified in the object model and make proper adjustments to 
the ontology or the rules. Formulation of templates can help facilitate new knowledge acquisition 
and long-term maintenance of the rules. Most importantly, clustering aids in the identification of 
common functionalities across agents and the identification of reusable components in the 
knowledge base, thus addressing interoperability issues in the system. 
(defrule ROE::UpdateAcknowledgedCFFAlertMessage 
(object (is-a Agent)(name ?agentName)(agentId "ROE")) 
?cff <- (object (is-a CallForFire)(name ?cffName) 
(acknowledged TRUE)
 
(targetNumber ?targetNum&:(neq ?targetNum "")))
 
?alert <- (object (is-a Alert)(source "ROE") 
(alertAgent ?agentName) 
(causeObjects $?causeObjects&:(member$ ?cffName 
?causeObjects)))
 
=>
 
(bind ?msgFormat (str-cat(send ?alert get-alertMessage)
 
"%n""+++ ACKNOWLEDGED +++%n"" 
CallForFire has been acknowledged with%n"" target number %s")) 
(bind ?alertMessage (format nil ?msgFormat ?targetNum)) 
(send ?alert update-slot alertMessage ?alertMessage) 
(send ?alert update-slot acknowledged FALSE)) 
(deffacts MAIN::SENTINEL_Facts 
(SENTINEL_RED_RANGE_METERS 4000.0) 
(SENTINEL_CFF_RANGE_METERS 500.0)) 
Program Segment 10: Rule for the ROE Agent 
6.0 Future Work 
Having shown the feasibility and usefulness of clustering a multi-agent command and control 
system such as IMMACCS, we are now poised to study the design issues to be considered for 
building reusable, interoperable ontologies. Even though the goal of an ontological engineer is to 
try and formulate the ontology in a general manner, in reality, the design issues in an ontology 
are influenced by the need to solve the problem at hand in an optimal fashion. Hence, an 
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ontology written for a specific problem slants the views in the ontology towards being efficient 
at formulating the problems in that class. The level of detail for an object definition, object type 
specification, an object’s placement in the ontological hierarchy to reflect its relationships to 
other objects in the ontology, all get influenced by the overall problem solving goals for the 
agent(s) that will use the ontology. This implicit bias poses a problem for reuse of the ontology 
for subsequent projects, in which agents have to often deal with a slight shift in focus on the 
problem solving aspects, while using a domain similar to the previous project. 
Due to the existence of biases in the existing ontology’s perspective, a new problem will likely 
be formulated in the old framework clumsily at best; in some cases, it may note be possible to 
formulate the problem at all. The good news is that ontological engineers can often provide 
insight into the types of modifications needed to render the old framework reusable for the new 
problem. However, the cost of understanding the complexities in the current ontology, recasting 
the new problem in the old framework and then deciding what changes should take place in the 
old ontology to effect a natural problem formulation, is an expensive proposition. The frequency 
with which old ontologies need to be recast as well as the extent to which they need to be recast, 
warrants that a high level approach be taken towards semi-automating some of the ontology 
redesign tasks. The focus of our future work will, therefore be to create a software support 
environment for building and reusing ontologies so that the cost of ontology design in multi-
agent systems is amortized over several different projects. The MVP-CA tool will help guide the 
design process by revealing important hidden relationships across objects in existing ontologies, 
so that they can be made explicit and usable for future construction of intelligent agent-based 
systems. 
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Abstract 
SEAWAY is an ICDM-based decision support application. A computational intelligence based 
planning agent is described that optimizes delivery of supplies according to a statement of 
requirements to a number of operational units onshore from a sea base. The statement of 
requirements contains required items, priorities, and time windows. A preliminary version of the 
planning agent that uses evolutionary computation has been demonstrated. This approach allows 
rapid planning, and rapid re-planning as the situation changes. 
Keywords 
SEAWAY, computational intelligence, evolutionary computation, planning agent. 
Introduction 
SEAWAY was developed as an ICDM-based decision-support application. ICDM provides a 
formalized architecture with a set of development and execution tools that can be utilized to 
design, develop, and execute agent-based, decision-support applications. The ICDM model has 
three layers, which are defined as illustrated in Figure 1. CDM Technologies, San Luis Obispo, 
California has coordinated and led SEAWAY development, including development of the ICDM 
model. 
Computational Intelligence 
Computational intelligence is a process or methodology involving computing (usually involving 
a computer) that exhibits an ability to adapt to new situations, and/or to self-organize, such that 
the system is perceived to possess attributes such as reason, decision, prediction, implication, and 
intention. Capabilities of a system with computational intelligence may include generalization, 
discovery, abstraction, and/or association. Put another way, computational intelligence 
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comprises practical adaptation and/or self-organization concepts, paradigms, algorithms, and 
implementations that enable or facilitate intelligent behavior in complex and changing 
environments (Eberhart et al. 1996). 
Presentation Tier 
Client User 
Interface 
Client User 
Interface 
Client User 
Interface 
Agent Server 
Agent 
Session 
Agent 
Session Agent 
Session 
Agent 
Session 
Agent Engine 
OODBMS 
Information Tier 
Information 
SubscriptionQuery Server 
Persistence 
Figure 1: ICDM system architecture 
Computational intelligence systems in silicon often comprise hybrids of paradigms such as 
artificial neural networks, fuzzy systems, and evolutionary computation systems, augmented 
with knowledge elements. Computational intelligence silicon-based systems are often designed 
to mimic or augment one or more aspects of carbon-based biological intelligence. 
Evolutionary computation (EC) comprises adaptive optimization and classification paradigms 
roughly based on mechanisms of evolution such as natural selection and self-organization. The 
evolutionary computation field includes genetic algorithms, evolutionary programming, genetic 
programming, evolution strategies, and particle swarm optimization. 
Primary application areas of EC include: 
•	 Optimization: finding the best possible solution to a complex problem (often NP hard) in 
the specified time. 
•	 Classification: operating in multiple-fault dynamic environments. 
•	 Explanation: providing explanation facilities for systems such as complex artificial neural 
networks 
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We view evolutionary computation as providing a foundation for computational intelligence. It 
seems to us to be in some sense the mortar that holds the bricks together. All of our recent 
applications involve evolutionary algorithms plus other components; the evolutionary paradigm 
is always present. 
An artificial neural network (ANN) is an analysis paradigm that is roughly modeled after the 
massively parallel structure of the brain. It simulates a highly interconnected, parallel 
computational structure with many relatively simple processing elements (PEs) (Eberhart et al. 
1996). ANNs are able to approximate any non-linear function to any specified degree of 
accuracy. 
Primary application areas of ANNs include: 
•	 Classification as reflected in decision theory: determining which of a set of predefined 
classes best represents an input pattern. 
•	 Associative memory: obtaining an exemplar pattern from a noisy and/or incomplete one. 
•	 Clustering, or compression: significantly reducing the dimensionality of an input. 
•	 Control systems: modeling a non-linear system as well as designing the control system. 
•	 Simulation: generation of structured sequences. 
Fuzziness refers to nonstatistical imprecision and vagueness in information and data. Fuzzy sets 
model the properties of imprecision, approximation, or vagueness. In a fuzzy set, fuzzy 
membership values reflect the membership extents (or grades) of the elements in the set. Fuzzy 
logic comprises operations on fuzzy sets, including equality, containment, complementation, 
intersection, and union; it is a generalization of crisp (two-valued) logic. 
Primary application areas of fuzzy systems include: 
•	 Control systems: controlling complex systems in real time. 
•	 Fuzzy expert systems: providing support in diagnostic and decision support systems 
For more complete discussions of computational intelligence, see (Eberhart et al. 1996) and 
(Eberhart et al. 2000). 
Objectives 
From the SEAWAY proof-of-concept definition (CDM Technologies, Inc. 2000), the scheduling 
agent is a future-plan agent, which is an agent session in the agent engine tier. It supports the 
satisfaction of logistical requirements through supply mission planning. However, there is no 
pre-determined performance objective. The performance can be evaluated from following 
perspectives: 
•	 Time of schedule optimization. 
•	 Dynamic scheduling. The agent can reschedule the delivery based on current progress. 
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 •	 Based on critical resources, there can be several optimization goals, for example, shortest 
time, and shortest path. For this project, the critical resources should be the number of 
assets and the time window of the supply points. So the maximum weighted quantity of 
supplies delivered is one kind of optimization goal. 
This intelligent scheduling agent is a part of the SEAWAY system and will be incorporated into 
the SEAWAY system as an agent session. More exactly, this capability exists as an 
app.agent.MentorAgent agent. 
The project staff at the Purdue School of Engineering and Technology at IUPUI includes Prof. 
Russell Eberhart (PI), Prof. Zina Ben-Miled (Co-PI), Prof. Yaobin Chen (Consultant), Xiaohui 
Hu, (Ph.D. Candidate), and Chen Wen (Graduate student). 
Framework 
Similar to the architecture of SEAWAY project, this scheduling agent can be divided into three 
layers: the interface layer, the translation layer, and the agent layer. Figure 2 shows the layers of 
the process. 
Interface 
Translation 
Agent 
Figure 2: Architecture (layers) of the scheduling agent. 
The interface layer deals with the communication between the scheduling agent and other parts 
of the SEAWAY system or possible user interfaces. 
The translation layer is a pre-processing and post-processing step. It communicates between the 
SEAWAY data and the parameters of scheduling agent, for example, distance between any two 
points, speed of assets, and loading and unloading times. Other factors such as weather 
parameters are transferred into the parameters in this level. It also translates the result into a 
format the other parts of SEAWAY can understand. 
The central agent layer is the schedule optimization agent that implements the core algorithm. 
Only standardized parameters are used for the algorithm. The process can be used for a wide 
variety of problems, i.e., the agent can be generalized to other kinds of scheduling problems. 
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Agent Algorithm 
In order to get an optimal or near-optimal result, there are several points in the scheduling system 
that need to be tuned: 
•	 Item delivery sequence. This is the main scheduling objective. 
•	 Asset s behavior. When loaded, what kind of delivery strategy should the asset adopt to 
obtain a better result? Strategy examples are loading sequence, priority sequence, and 
quantity sequence. 
•	 Base point-landing rules. Each base point has its own limitations, for example, limited 
landing positions for assets. 
For a scheduling system, there are a variety of approaches to accomplish the optimization 
(Cormen et al. 1990): 
1.	 Linear algorithms, such as greedy algorithms, Dijkstra s algorithm, Kruskal s algorithm, 
Prim s algorithm, etc. 
1.	 Expert systems. 
1.	  Computational intelligence (CI) tools such as genetic algorithms and particle swarm 
optimization. 
Linear algorithms refer to traditional ways to achieve the optimization based on detailed 
established mathematical models. For example, greedy algorithms assume the problem has two 
properties: a greedy-choice property and optimal structure, which are not easy to establish in this 
class of problem. Furthermore, when the conditions are dynamic (as they always are in this kind 
of problem), the model has to be re-established to accommodate the changes. 
An expert system is a computer application that performs a task that would otherwise be 
performed by a human expert . For example, there are expert systems that can diagnose human 
illnesses, make financial forecasts, and schedule routes for delivery vehicles. Some expert 
systems are designed to take the place of human experts, while others are designed to aid them. 
To design an expert system, one needs a knowledge engineer, an individual who studies how 
human experts make decisions and translates the rules into terms that a computer can understand. 
For this scheduling problem, it is not easy to get the knowledge from the scheduling system and 
it is also time-consuming to develop rules. More important, it is not suitable for dynamic 
systems, in which things always change unexpectedly. Traditional expert systems are also 
brittle.  If conditions move outside their domain of expertise, they can fail catastrophically. 
Now we look at CI tools. The optimization of asset behavior and base point landing rules can be 
predetermined, so the optimization is the main problem, and for a given environment there 
should be an optimal item delivery sequence. Therefore we can use computational intelligence 
tools to find an optimal or near-optimal solution, which could not be done by linear algorithms. 
Computational intelligence tools are an important means to solve non-linear problems. Possible 
solutions include genetic algorithms, genetic programming, evolution strategies, evolutionary 
programming, and particle swarm optimization. They share some common procedures in that 
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 they all generate an initial group of candidate solutions. The second step is to calculate the 
fitness values of the candidate solutions. Based on their fitness values, the system generates a 
new group of solutions according to some rules. The last step is to check if each solution meets 
the requirements; if so, the solution is acceptably near to the optimum; otherwise, the system 
goes back to the second step to repeat the procedure. 
Consider the characteristics of the scheduling agent, using a genetic algorithm as the approach. 
Genetic algorithms are a kind of optimization technique for functions defined in finite domains. 
All the possible solutions are mapped or encoded to a finite string. The algorithm will manipulate 
the string instead of the original problem. 
The two key points in the GA implementation are the solution encoding and the fitness function. 
In our problem, the solution is an optimized cargo delivery sequence. If every cargo item is given 
a number, the solution is a number sequence that can be represented by a finite string. Fitness 
values are computed for each individual of each population, and the values indicate how close 
the individuals are to the optimum. Based on the fitness values, the algorithm tries to update the 
population and finds the best fitness value for the problem. In this scheduling system, the fitness 
function can be a simulation process, which simulates the whole transferring process based on a 
given delivery sequence. In our case, the simulation result metric is how many missions have 
been completed. This is the fitness value of the sequence. Then we use genetic algorithm rules to 
generate the next generation of the population. By repeating the process, we can approach and 
find the optimum or acceptable near-optimum. 
Summary of Work Accomplished 
Our current work is mainly based on a demonstration scenario provided by CDM 
Technologies, San Luis Obispo, CA. They provided the following information: 
In the demonstration scenario, one sea base vessel sits approximately 50nm off the shore. We 
have one supply point on shore and we have two supply points inland. Assume a 50 nm distance 
between the sea bases and the shore-based supply point and assume a 75 nm distance between 
the sea base and the inland supply points. We have access to two types of transports, CH-53E 
helicopters and LCAC air-cushion transports. The CH-53Es can travel to either the shore or 
inland supply points, while LCACs can only travel to the shore supply point. We will have five 
units to supply (Unit 1 through Unit 5), but we will only deliver items to supply points, not to the 
actual unit location (requirements will state when a unit can receive cargo at a specific supply 
point). 
The objective of the first stage of the project is to develop a prototype of the scheduling agent. 
We have not incorporated detailed information about the SEAWAY architecture and interface 
standards, so our focus is on the agent layer of the project, the algorithm. 
The current system was developed on Java2 SDK 1.3. It includes over 20 source code modules. 
The majority of the code comprises the simulation process, i.e. the process used to maximize the 
fitness function of the algorithm based on the given demonstration scenario. However, it is 
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designed to have a great expandability and could be used for other similar kinds of scheduling 
systems. There are three main class types: start point, end point, and asset. Start point classes 
(e.g., seabase.java) deal with arranging and loading of cargo items, asset classes are kinds of 
transportation tools to move cargo items from start point to end points, and end point classes deal 
with the unloading of cargo items. 
For the starting point, the cargo item delivering sequence is determined by outside algorithms 
such as linear algorithms, expert system or CI tools. 
The asset manages the cargo items on it and tries to move it to the end point. The following is the 
status transfer diagram of the assets: 
Moving Moving 
Ready to Base Landing Base Ready to Load 
Loading 
Leaving Base 
Unloading 
Leaving Point Ready to Unload Landing Point Ready to Point 
Figure 3: The status transfer diagram of an asset 
After the end of the simulation, the simulation results are used to calculate the final fitness value 
for the given delivery sequence. 
The main (or entry) class for the simulation is PSETMain.class. To run the simulation, then, 
from within a Java environment, run \path\java PSETMain, where path is the path to java.exe, 
and PSETMain.class is in the current directory. 
A simple graphical user interface (GUI) was also developed for demonstration purposes, which 
shows the simulation process working, alongside a tabular list of asset activities. The list shows 
what is happening to each asset on a minute-by-minute basis. The user can choose which asset 
to view, and select the time interval between graphical updates on the screen. The default time 
between updates is 1,000 ms (one second). The user can specify a different time interval in 
milliseconds. For example, if it is desired to speed up the graphical presentation, the time 
interval can be shortened to 250 milliseconds or some other value less than 1,000. 
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The user can also specify the loss of an asset during the simulation, and the time at which the 
asset is lost. The algorithm runs as though all assets will be available for the entire simulation up 
to the time the asset is lost. A new schedule is then generated, optimizing the scheduling of the 
remaining activities without the lost asset. 
Since the project software was written in Java, the documentation capability of JDK1.3, called 
Javadoc, was used to provide the primary software documentation. Javadoc provides a series of 
HTML files, one for each Java class plus an index HTML file. To begin viewing the software 
documentation, it is suggested that the user click on the index.html file. 
Future Activities 
The next work tasks defined for the project are to: 
1.	 Refine the algorithm. Compare different types of computational intelligence tools and tune 
the parameters of the algorithm. A version that allows selection of a greedy algorithm, a 
genetic algorithm, or particle swarm optimization will be available soon. 
2.	 Incorporate the capability to change the statement of requirements during a simulation. 
3.	 Plug the agent session into the main SEAWAY platform (code). 
4.	 Apply the approach to other aspects of SEAWAY. 
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Introduction 
In October 1995, at the direction of the Commanding General of the United States Marine Corps 
Combat Development Command in Quantico, a handful of Marines and civilian scientists 
embarked on what is now called Project Albert. The fact that this date coincides with the 
beginnings of ROLF 2010 is not remarkable in and of itself. However, we believe that the 
intersection of the two efforts could, perhaps, turn out to be a collaboration remarkable not in 
coincidence, but in relevance. The two efforts, vastly different in focus, location, and 
methodology could, in combination, become a canonical example of non-linearity or at least 
exhibit the archetypical hallmark of non-linearity: the sum >> the parts. 
This combination is still in the making and should not be construed at this point as anything 
other than a developing idea. But it has actually matured to the point of having a designation and 
has been named after the Viking exemplar of maneuver warfare: Red Orm. Here we ll 
summarize Project Albert and ROLF 2010 before describing how they come together in the Red 
Orm project. 
Project Albert 
Project Albert uses a series of new models and tools, multidisciplinary teams, and the scientific 
method to explore questions. The approach utilizes the meta-technique called data farming to 
look at 21st Century questions from the perspective of the whole and lots of data points are 
needed to explore this whole . This meta-technique has been made possible by a convolution 
of advancements including: 
•	 Advances in agent-based models, i.e. distillations, which have the promise of capturing some 
of the adaptability and other key factors inherent in conflict. 
•	 Advances in computing power, which enables us to increase our volume of data. 
•	 Advances in our ability to organize, analyze, and visualize scientific data. 
•	 Advances in concepts on how to integrate across the spectrum of operations research 
techniques. 
Project Albert is a research effort, which embraces the process of Operational Synthesis; the 
focus is on looking at the whole rather than reducing systems into parts. This process is a 
complement to traditional Operations Analysis it supports the study of asymmetries, risks, and 
potentials through the use, inter alia, of distillations. In summary, Project Albert is designed to 
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develop new tools to capture emergent behavior in synthetic environments that over time will 
lead to more effective maneuver warriors. 
Articles in reference [1] as well as this book describe some initial efforts by the Marine Corps to 
understand the potential mesh of the nonlinear sciences and complex adaptive systems with the 
study of warfare. One such effort is the development of an agent-based model called ISAAC, a 
mobile cellular automata model in that the individual fighting entities, called agents, move 
through a lattice and carry information with them as they go. The agents are given 
characteristics which include: a default local rule set specifying how to act in a generic 
environment, goals directing behavior, sensors generating an internal map of environment, and 
an internal mechanism to alter behavior. The figure below is a snapshot (with arrows added) of 
the ISAAC distillations. We have ported ISAAC to the Maui High Performance Computer and 
run it many millions of times as part of a process we call Data Farming, described earlier in this 
book. Briefly, what we try to do is grow data in the area of interest that provide insight into the 
answers to our questions. The fundamental underlying principal here is that we need to look at a 
vast landscape of possibilities because of the uncertainty inherent in and the nonlinear nature of 
conflict. Thus our research so far has concentrated on methods to create, access, and understand 
large amounts of data from distillations. 
Figure. ISAAC snapshot. 
In the ISAAC distillation depicted above, the first group of parameters represents capabilities 
such as sensor and fire range. The next group of parameters, or p-weights, represents the 
personalities of the agents, or how they will move and select strategies. This is done by 
inputting a set of weights, which are used to rank possible moves according to the agent s 
proximity to the various types of agents and goals. The other inputs represent another tier of 
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adaptability, perhaps sociology, whereby the default personality is altered according to local 
threshold constraints. And finally, below the dark lines we see a tally of alive and injured 
agents one hit  creates an injury and two removes the agent from the play. 
Reference [1] describes some of the initial research efforts using ISAAC. One of the key areas 
of research is the examination of the role of intangibles such as cohesion, trust, and leadership in 
warfare. It should be stressed that these efforts are merely illustrative to this point. However, 
next generation distillations are now being tested at Quantico and at the Maui High Performance 
Computing Center and research has started on applying new distillations in real ways to real 
questions. 
Rolf 2010 
ROLF stands for "R rlig Operativ LedningsFunktion", in Swedish. Translated into English this 
means " Mobile, Joint Command and Control Function for the year 2010". ROLF suggests that 
small mobile units carry out overall joint command and control. The concept is not intended 
solely for combat applications, but has also been discussed for other uses, particularly within the 
field of total defence, e.g., for commanding peacetime rescue operations, and international 
operations. Details of ROLF can be found in reference [2]. Here we will describe three aspects 
of ROLF that we think likely differ from other concepts. First, the ROLF staff is quite small, a 
second difference is the seating, and the third is the nature of the display. 
The staff concept should be seen as a network of centers for excellence rather than individual 
cells of staff being united. Specifically, this means that different nodes, staff elements, in this 
network will work with different issues concurrently. In the initial architecture the intention is 
that a complete staff unit will include at least four staff elements. In order to create a robust 
network, there are a number of small and mobile elements that are less vulnerable than the 
traditionally big staff units. However, the size has certain implications. 
- Despite its smaller size, the ROLF staff still must do almost the same work as a traditional 
staff. The interconnections made possible by modern information technology may support 
this workload and relieve the staff of much of the need for co-ordination of the units. 
-
- Work in the ROLF staff is likely to be quite intense, requiring a number of shifts. This 
highlights the attendant problem of keeping continuity of command and control action 
despite the changes in personnel. 
The complexity and the dynamics of the command and control situation for a ROLF staff are 
assumed to create high uncertainty. It is reasonable to believe that no human could manage this 
environment by himself, and thus expert knowledge and competence must be instantly 
accessible. Other resources can be accessed through the net. In order to handle the situation a 
management team must be seated close together, in this case around the same table. The seating 
is chosen to facilitate the co-operation. We think that the seating around the same table will 
create at least two different advantages in handling complexity and dynamics. 
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- we believe that successful communication under the stressful conditions of battle is close and 
physical. This is the form of seating that humans have always chosen when they have 
serious matters to discuss, from the gathering of the early stone age people around the camp 
fire to the conference tables of modern board rooms. Serious discussions are possible only if 
psychological distance is minimised. There must be an opportunity for full communication, 
including body language and eye contact in order to gauge the mental state of the other 
persons in the staff. 
-
- the seating creates a common focus. There is a common display of the situation that the staff 
members can refer to in their discussions. This should facilitate the development of shared 
situational awareness. 
In order to illustrate and visualize the situations in different perspectives over time in a collective 
image in front of each participant in the staff element or in a number of elements, ROLF deviates 
from traditional means of combat representation. Traditionally, in the military environment there 
is a presentation of a 2D map that shows the so-called battle room. We believe that it is possible 
to present more informative situation maps by using new technologies and 3D, as well as 
multimedia techniques. This will improve not only the support for a trained group of individuals 
but also, hopefully, the perception of less highly trained people such as media representatives 
and politicians. The two main reasons for searching for new forms of presentations are: 
- At the same time as 3D solution is assumed to improve the perception, they also involve the 
risk of adding complexity. In our view, the need for a 3D display is a consequence of the 
concept of battle space. The battle space concept refers to a volume, rather than a surface. 
The fact that the battle space must be constructed mentally by each staff member raises the 
possibility that different staff members may construct different representations and this in 
turn may lead to misunderstandings. There may be little chance of sorting out these 
misunderstandings during the hectic pace of modern battle. 
-
- To support the decision process by improved ability to interact with the presentation. This is 
enabled by manipulation of the symbols in the representation directly by grabbing and 
moving them around and illustrating one s conception of the possibilities for action in the 
battle space. This is assumed to facilitate the dialogue between the participants in the 
environment, in the room as well as elsewhere in the network. 
Red Orm 
Red Orm seeks to significantly advance the state of the art in command and control. It focuses 
on human decision making processes, vice techno-centric decision environments. As such, its 
objectives are to discern, investigate and leverage key attributes of the decision-making milieu: 
•	 non-linearities of warfare — the influence of initial conditions and dynamics inherent in 
conflict 
•	 intrinsic human characteristics of warfare — previouslyunquantified attributes of fighting 
forces (e.g., trust, leadership, elan, fear, ) 
•	 co-evolving landscapes —the codependent adaptation of forces within the crisis-space 
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•	 crisis learning processes— adapting behavior to leverage own strengths and exploit 
opposing weaknesses to optimize mission accomplishment 
•	 crisis-space uncertainty and complexity — effectively managing and exploiting the fog 
and friction  of conflict and crisis 
•	 multi-dimensional reasoning —the human affinity for spatial environments, symbolic 
representations, common understanding of the crisis-space, and behavioral connotations 
in command team decision making 
•	 time criticality — the preeminence of the temporal domain in crises and an awareness of 
the time-uncertainty trade-space 
In support of the above Red Orm objectives, the plan is to mutually extend and collaboratively 
integrate current areas of research to generate a prototype command and control laboratory. 
Prototype development will be achieved through a process of evolutionary enhancement. The 
American partner will apply their expertise in data farming and new methods of modeling and 
simulation. This will be extended to encompass multi-resolution/variable granularity command 
behaviors, planning, course of action analysis, and crisis-space characterization and response, all 
augmented by high performance computing. The Swedish partner will apply their expertise in 
innovative command and control environments. This will be extended to encompass 
development of interactive, multi-modal, aspect-dependent, human-centric perception tools for 
command and control settings. 
In summary, we anticipate that in Red Orm the two partners will cooperatively investigate and 
develop user interfaces that integrate Project Albert and ROLF 2010 efforts, hopefully 
culminating in a working laboratory that will enable accelerated command and control 
innovation by both parties. And, in conclusion, we state our ultimate goal: to develop better 
ways to make decisions in support of maneuver warriors. 
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Abstract 
COTS middleware services promise to provide developers a high level platform that can 
be used to easily create distributed system that will run on any platform and across any 
network. While these middleware services work reasonably well on commercial wired 
networks, they can provide unacceptable levels of service when used on tactical 
networks. Our experience over the last four years shows that the causes of many of these 
failures is often related to a subtle interaction between the distribution model used by the 
middleware service, the underlying communication protocols it uses, and the transport 
services which are well supported by the tactical network. Re-implementation of specific 
key communication services components can be used to overcome many of these 
difficulties while continuing to use other middleware services unchanged. 
This paper discusses the implementation and evolution of a COTS middleware-based 
information distribution service supporting the distribution of a military Common 
Tactical Picture across existing and experimental military tactical networks. It presents 
lessons learned fielding selected middleware architectures and proposes additional 
services that should be considered in future middleware implementations. 
1 Overview: Powering A Revolution 
Recent years have seen significant changes in how we collaboratively share information 
using distributed computing systems. As recently as fifteen years ago, systems tended to 
be developed on large isolated machines with dedicated client access. Data was shared 
between systems by either using very primitive internal networks or more often by 
sneaker-net1. Organizations wanting/needing to share information more widely would 
occasionally band together to create dedicated networks providing a limited connectivity 
between key nodes (ARPA-net is an excellent example). As a result, data and 
information were very difficult to share or even locate. 
1 Sneaker-net refers to the process where a computer operator copies the file to be shared onto a disk and 
then walks it over to the other machine where it is uploaded. 
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Today s computing environment is very different. Significant increases in computing 
power and computer manufacturing allow computers to be commonplace appliance on 
both office and home desktops. Extremely capable networks, able to move a wide variety 
of information with relative ease, interconnect these same homes and offices. Data and 
information are rapidly becoming generally available commodities. Tools (such as 
search engines and web browsers) enable school children to locate and search data 
repositories for information of interest. Other tools (such as web servers, and 
applications servers) allow individuals and corporations alike to create their own data 
repositories which they can share as they see fit. These changes have had a profound 
impact on how we access and share information, and even on simple day-to-day tasks. 
For example, determining the current price of a stock 15 years ago would have required 
either a call to your broker, or installation of a fairly expensive dedicated ticker. Today 
this information is readily available from your browser as either a limited free service, or 
as an enhanced (say real time) pay-for-service commodity. 
While these changes are phenomenal, they are only a precursor of the next age in which 
we are able to share information rather than just data. 
2 Building Block Approach 
The revolution in how we share data and information was a result of several significant 
developments. Any of these developments on their own would be important, but all of 
them together provide a much more powerful environment for building information/data 
sharing systems. The five most significant developments include: 
•	 Powerful & Affordable Computing Resources 
•	 Widely available & highly Interconnected Networks. 
•	 Generic and Simple Data/Network Protocols (e.g., IP) 
•	 Simple and Generic Transport/Application Protocols (e.g. SMTP, IIOP, 
HTTP, FTP) 
•	 Application Services (e.g., CORBA, Web Servers) 
The last three are of significant interest and are shown in Figure 1. 
Web Server XML 
CORBA JINI 
IP Protocols 
Application Custom code (business logic, gui, etc.) 
Largely Commercial Off-the-Shelf (COTS) 
aka Middleware 
Figure 1. Typical Development Stack 
While physical networks (such as phone lines) were readily available, the process of 
writing/validating a protocol that would run over a variety of different networks (e.g., 
Ethernet, frame-relay, ATM, token ring, etc.) was arduous. The Internet Protocol (IP) 
provided a generic and very capable set of primitive services that allowed information to 
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move between systems. More importantly, it provided an abstraction layer that allowed 
packets of data to move between different types of networks, and alleviates programmers 
from having to deal with the internals of the physical network. Rather, they could spend 
their efforts on the applications rather than on the network. 
However, even IP wasn t enough to engender the revolution.  In the past 10 years, a set of 
very simple, but again powerful, transport and application protocols have been built 
which build upon the foundation of IP. Protocols such as HTTP implement a generic 
request-receive protocol where the client sends a request (in a specific format) to a server 
that processes the request and sends the data back to the client (again in a specific 
format). FTP is a similar service, but one specifically targeted to file transfer. SMTP 
likewise is responsible for moving email between machines. Other services such as the 
Internet Inter-Orb Protocol (IIOP) are more targeted towards moving information 
between client-server implementations on potentially different types of platforms. These 
services provide a stronger platform for developing data sharing systems. 
The combination of IP and transport/application services was enough to provide us with 
the basic tools needed. However, the ability for companies and individuals to rapidly 
(and effectively) build data/information sharing services relies on a wide variety of 
application building services (generically called middleware) such as CORBA, JINI, Web 
Servers, etc. For example, a web server allows any user who can write a simple HTML 
page (or use a program that knows how to change text and graphics into HTML) to 
publish the pages for anyone who has a web browser. The user is completely unaware of 
how information is being managed or distributed. Likewise, the JINI protocol provides 
an abstract mechanism for registering and locating services of interest (e.g., a color 
printer in the area, or a correlation service). Similarly CORBA provides a family of 
services for locating and accessing objects of interest — regardless of where they are 
located across the network. Finally, XML provides a similar service for organizing and 
transporting data in a structured and machine neutral format. 
These latter tools provide developers (and in some case regular users) with the ability to 
create sophisticated data/information processing and sharing facilities. Most of these 
services have been standardized by international or special focus groups and, a result, are 
available from a wide variety of commercial and free sources. 
3 Dreaming The Dream 
The development stack described in the previous section promises to provide a very rich 
programming environment. In an ideal world, these tools allow developers to concentrate 
on their customer s specific data handling and visualization requirements (a.k.a. mission 
needs) while relying on the lower layers of the development stack to handle issues such 
as how to locate or move data between machines. 
As usual, there is more than one way to solve the problem of moving and locating data. 
As a result, a number of competing (and usually incompatible) technologies have evolved 
(e.g., HTML/CGI Applications, CORBA, DCOM, client-server, etc.) Each of these 
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technologies promises many of the same capabilities (e.g., ability to move, secure and 
locate data), but often uses a very different model of information sharing. For example, 
the standard HTML (or web) model assumes that the client asks the server for 
information. Likewise, they support various types of information distribution — e.g., one-
to-one private communication (used for most web activities), one-to-many (such as 
watching a streaming video of a live event), or even many-to-many (such as a 
collaborative white-board session). Determining which of these technologies to use is 
difficult, and most organizations have a new breed of senior developer, often called a 
technologist, responsible for making the decision. 
The ease in which these technologies can be used to rapidly build commercial systems 
has had a significant impact on the large number of systems that are available today. It 
has caused a flurry of development focused on not only building the next generation 
system , but also in wrapping legacy systems so that they can take advantage of many 
of the new data/information distribution techniques (e.g., adding a web front-end to an 
existing inventory system.) 
In addition to ease of development, the development stack and the standardization 
process promise us a great amount of flexibility in using different COTS vendors. More 
recent efforts have resulted in a number of bridges which are intended to allow systems 
built on different technologies (say CORBA and RMI) to seamlessly interoperate. 
Like the commercial environment, the advent of these middleware services has spawned 
a great deal of interest in DoD, and an unprecedented number of new (and often 
incompatible) proposals from its contractors. 
4 Living The Nightmare 
For the past ten years, we have been building middleware-based applications for various 
DoD organizations such as EUCOM, USA, DISA, and more recently for the Marine 
Corps Warfighting Lab, and the Extending the Littoral Battlespace ACTD. 
Many of these systems have used different middleware technologies, but until recently 
have been targeted towards larger command and control environments comprised of 
fairly high end systems connected via state of the art networks. In general, we rarely (if 
ever) experienced problems with the amount of available network services. 
Our recent, and near-term, developments have increasingly focusing on systems where at 
least a part of the application is connected via a tactical network. Further, they are 
operating in an environment where the timeliness of information can be either life 
critical, or have a strong impact on tactical decisions. 
While we are strong believers that the use of COTS middleware can indeed provide us 
with the ability to rapidly develop data/information-sharing systems, our experiences 
over the past four years have shown that there are many pitfalls to this approach as well. 
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Many of these lessons were not fully learned until our systems failed to work in the 
tactical environment. These experiences have led us to adopt a set of approaches to 
developing and adapting middleware components and protocols supporting the tactical 
network environment. 
4.1 The Tactical Network Environment 
There are several important characteristics that differentiate a normal office or laboratory 
network from a tactical network. In summary these are: 
•	 Stability — Normal office networks are comprised of a carefully configured set 
of routers and cables. An on-site guru is generally responsible for properly 
configuring and maintaining the connections. The configuration for this type of 
network does not change very often. A tactical network is often comprised of a 
mobile communications nodes connected via a variety of RF links. In many 
instances, we are required to support a zero-footprint network which does not 
rely only on ANY stable (or pre-existing) nodes. The precise configuration of 
the network may be created dynamically and change often. The on-site guru s 
in the tactical environment have other things on their mind, and are not 
particularly available to reconfigure the network. 
•	 Connectivity — Normal office networks are generally well connected to each 
other. In fact we EXPECT our networks to be connected (if you don t believe 
me, disconnect your site s connection to the outside world and see how long it 
takes before the users start to scream — it won t be long.)   Tactical networks 
(particular those that are mobile) have a much lower level of connectivity. The 
level of connectivity is strongly influenced by RF characteristics (e.g., how the 
airplane s antenna is pointed while it banks, or EMI interference.) In general, 
connectivity in a tactical network is either: 1) carefully staged (such as setting 
up a fixed satellite ground terminal at a good line-of-sight location), or 2) ad-
hoc (occasionally network connectivity). The more mobile the resources, the 
more likely the latter will be true. 
•	 Throughput — Basic office networks have at least a T-1 bandwidth. Packet 
loss rates and packet latency are generally very low (no more than 3% and 250 
msec respectively). The resulting network is able to efficiently move 
information using traditional protocols such as TCP/IP. The throughput on 
tactical networks can be quite different and is impacted by a number of 
variables. The characteristics of RF signals and a mobile environment make 
packet loss much more likely and communications relays may add a significant 
amount of latency. Together these can severely limit the ability for generic 
communications protocols to work effectively. Finally, the amount of power 
available to fielded devices (particularly users who are already carrying packs 
and weapons) can severely limit the raw bandwidth that can be transmitted. 
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While many of these problems are similar to those we are starting to see in commercial 
cellular data-passing networks, the problems are different enough to look elsewhere. In 
addition to these significant differences, tactical networks must provide an unprecedented 
amount of security and flexibility in being able to adapt to various tactical needs. For 
example, the same network may need to dynamically support a large number of local 
users with a relatively high bandwidth, or a remote set of users via a lower bandwidth. 
4.2 Middleware Architectures 
As before, over the past few years, we have been involved with teams of developers from 
other government organizations and industry in building information sharing systems. 
During this period we have experimented with a number of different middleware 
architecture and at the same time have been run in an environment comprised of a 
number of different tactical networks. 
In this section, we ll briefly describe each of these systems, its middleware architecture 
and the tactical network(s) used to connect the users to the system. During each phase, 
we learned a number of lessons, but have distilled those down into a single lesson we 
learned concerning how middleware interacts with tactical networks. 
4.2.1 Web Portal Architecture 
The Urban Warrior experiments took place during the summer of 1998 in the San 
Francisco Bay area. The intent of these experiments was to evaluate the effectiveness of 
various techniques and tactics in dealing with conflicts in an Urban Environment.   The 
primary intent of the software system was to provide a Common Tactical Picture (CTP) 
representing the location of hostile, neutral, and friendly forces as well as allowing users 
to request actions by others (fires, medical evacuation, resupply, etc.) 
As shown in Figure 2, an information-centric decision support system (IMMACCS) was 
designed to support the information collaboration needs of the exercise. By intent, all 
IMMACCS components would communicate and exchange information solely via a 
common object model. A CORBA-based middleware system (Shared Net) was deployed 
aboard the USS Coronado. The Shared Net used the IMMACCS object model, with its 
rich associations, to provide an information-centric representation of the battlespace. 
Shared Net used a standard publish-subscribe model to distribute objects of interest to 
specific clients. IMMACCS Translators (MCSIT) were used to interface between 
existing military systems (GCCS, LAWS, & TSCM) that normally communicated via 
message-oriented protocols and the objectified forms used by the Shared Net. 
Unfortunately, due to personnel problems, earlier efforts to build an IMMACCS object 
model aware client had failed. Instead, users (both aboard ship in San Francisco, and 
those fielded in Oakland) were provided with a web browser, and used a web portal to 
access tactical information (such as location of enemy and friendly units as well as 
medical evacuation requests) maintained in the Shared Net. In effect, the web portal 
receives a service requests (via HTTP) from a small application running on top of the 
client s web browser, the web server responds to the request by making an appropriate 
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call to the underlying information service (in this case Shared Net). The web server then 
takes the information returned by the information service, and re-encodes it (often in 
HTML) and sends it to the client s web browser via HTTP. 
In a portal architecture, the user s client is generally nothing more than a COTS web 
browser augmented with a few (usually small) Java applets. The majority of the 
processing needed is done by the web server (and its associated processes) is related to: 
1) taking the information request provided by the client and converting it into a request 
that the underlying information store(s) can understand (e.g., converting to SQL), and 2) 
taking the information provided by the store(s) and converting it into a format that can be 
either directly displayed on a web browser, or one that can be interpreted by the client s 
Java applets. 
GCCS 
LAWS 
Ship s high 
speed network 
Web 
Server Shared Net 
TCP/IP & CORBA 
Web Browsers 
Web 
Browsers 
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Wireless LAN 
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Figure 2. IMMACCS over INITS 
The Urban Warrior exercise used a two-tier network (called INITS). The long haul was 
comprised of a multi-hop microwave link. Communications between the microwave 
tower and the fielded users was via a commercial wireless Ethernet (using the 802.11 
protocol). Microwave relays were generally pre-positioned in areas that would provide 
good connectivity to the ship. Amazingly enough, this involved shooting a signal from 
San Francisco to Oakland which passed between the top of San Francisco Bay and the 
bottom of the Oakland Bay Bridge. 
Performance 
The performance of the web portal architecture during the exercise was mixed. Users 
who were aboard ship were generally able to share information effectively. However, 
fielded users in Oakland rarely saw the same common picture as their counterparts 
aboard ship. In addition, the ship received very little position or tactical data from the 
fielded users. Overall, the system s ability to support the goal of the exercise (users 
fielded in an Urban environment) was poor. In trying to understand the poor 
performance, we looked at two components: the network and the web portal (the other 
components appeared to be working well and were not examined further.) 
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As before, shipboard clients worked well, but fielded clients did not. The primary 
difference between these users was the type of network used to connect them to the web 
portal. As is typical for software developers, we initially thought that the problem was in 
the network. However, other systems (such as a live streaming video feed and the 
standard network news protocol) were able to run across the same (INITS) network with 
little or no problem. 
Reviewing the web portal, we discovered that the portal had crashed a number of times 
and needed to be restarted. While not of significance in itself, it was worth examining 
and helped us in further evaluating the middleware architecture. 
Its important to note that both the web portal and the INITS network performed well in 
independent testing. However, something in the interaction between these two systems 
resulted in the poor field results. 
One possible problem was primarily related to the system s scalability. The web portal 
approach uses a web-standard request-reply communication model — in effect it is a 
private one-to-one communication between the client and the server. However, a CTP 
requires that all users receive approximately the same set of information so it is more 
akin to the one-to-many communication model. Under the one-to-one model, a single 
position update by a fielded user would result in each client downloading the new 
information. While not a problem with small numbers of users, it could be a problem 
with larger numbers. Combined with the slightly lower bandwidth of the INITS network, 
this could have been enough to cause the servers to time out  on the client s request. 
Lesson Learned:
 
While COTS middleware can help in rapidly building distributed systems, COTS approaches work
 
well only if the information distribution model they provide meets your needs.
 
4.2.2 CORBA Client-Server Architecture 
The IMMACCS system (described previously) continued to evolve. Based on our Urban 
Warrior experience, we made two significant changes: 
1.	 An IMMACCS Object Model aware client was developed in Java. 
2.	 Modifications were made to the Shared Net s information distribution services to 
enable it to handle a larger number of clients. Additionally, a service (similar to 
the CORBA event service) was provided that distributed only the part of objects 
that had changed (rather than the whole object). 
In effect the COTS CORBA middleware approach used by the Shared Net to 
communicate with the other IMMACCS servers (translators, agents, etc.) was extended to 
communicate with the Java clients. Together they replaced the web portal middleware 
approach with a client-server approach. 
Additionally, a tactical network being developed as part of the Extending the Littoral 
Battlespace (ELB) ACTD replaced the INITS network. The ELB network, called Warnet 
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uses a novel 3-tier approach combining VRC-99, TCDL, NTDR, and wireless 802.11 
links. Warnet nodes are mounted on HMMWVs, fixed wing aircraft, rotary aircraft, and 
ships. Users are equipped with 802.11 cards that connect them to the nearest Warnet 
node. Communication between the nodes is time-division-multiplexed and the number 
of slots assigned to communication between any two nodes can be configured to support 
the required bandwidth. Warnet also has the ability to broadcast in a one-to-many mode 
that enables all nodes to receive the same packet without requiring it to be individually 
broadcast to each node. Warnet represents a self-configuring network where the nodes 
are continuously entering and leaving the network. 
The combined system (shown in Figure 3) was field tested as part of ELB s Full System 
Test (FST-2) in Gulf Port, MI during August of 2000. This was the first time the 
systems had been run together. 
Java 
Clients 
Java 
Clients 
VRC-99 
Wireless LAN 
Wireless LAN 
VRC-99 
VRC-99 
GCCS 
LAWS 
TSCM 
Ethernet high 
speed network 
Shared Net 
TCP/IP & CORBA 
ECOC 
Java Clients 
Figure 3. IMMACCS over Warnet 
The goal of FST-2 was to show that we could provide a CTP to mobile users distributed 
over a reasonably small tactical area (10s of miles). Due to scheduling conflicts, the 
command center was moved from the ship to the shore. 
Performance 
The performance of the COTS CORBA architecture used by Shared Net during the 
exercise was mixed. ECOC users, connected via a traditional Ethernet, were generally 
able to share information effectively. However, fielded users connected via Warnet 
rarely saw a CTP. In fact, two fielded users connected to the same communication node 
(and often standing right next to each other) didn t see the same picture. In some cases, 
one fielded user would see 10 tracks, and his buddy would see more than 200. In some 
instances, a fielded client would take as long as 45 minutes to fully populate tracks. 
Again, the operational goal of the system was not met. 
As before, we tried to understand the interaction between the middleware and the 
network. This was greatly complicated by the fact that both were experimental and 
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significant changes had recently been made. A few clues helped our investigation: 
•	 Starting up clients one at a time (rather than all at once) seemed to help. This pointed 
us towards a resource (network or server) utilization issue. 
•	 Clients were still able to use news clients to connect to the ECOC, but had difficulty 
in using newer applications such as web browsers. 
•	 Network tools indicated that IP receive window was often frozen — generally 
indicating that the receiver is has still not received a missing packet even after it has 
requested its retransmission several times. This could have been caused by either the 
network dropping a lot of packets, or the application layer trying to send too many. 
As before, the problem was not in solely in either the network, or the software, but in the 
complex interaction between the two. While INITS was reasonably similar to a wired 
Ethernet, Warnet displayed most of the characteristics we would expect to see in a true 
tactical network. Packet loss was high (~ 30%), and latencies were long (~3 seconds). 
Further the extremely damp weather, constantly mobile nodes, and not infrequent 
lightning strikes resulted in very short duration communication windows (routers do not 
respond well to being hit by lightning.) While improvements could certainly be made to 
Warnet (and were), it was a reasonable representation of a tactical network. 
Unfortunately, the COTS middleware software had been developed to support enterprise 
computing over traditional networks. As such it made heavy use of the TCP/IP protocol. 
This was the crux of the problem. The long latencies and relatively large packet loss rates 
exhibited by Warnet were well outside the performance parameters of TCP/IP which 
exhibits incredibly poor performance if the latency exceeds 300 msec or the packet loss 
rates exceed 8%. In both cases we were well in excess of those values. The result is that 
TCP/IP traffic simply did not get through the Warnet network. The more traffic we tried 
to send (say retransmits of missed messages, or new clients starting up and trying to 
retrieve objects) the worse the communications became. 
Perversely enough, the network statistics showed that the network was performing well. 
Unfortunately, the network statistic was based on bandwidth — how many bits cross the 
network regardless of what they represent. From a software perspective we are interested 
in throughput — a measure of whether the packets we send from one application 
successfully reach the other application. Thus while the bandwidth was high, the 
throughput was very low. 
Lesson Learned:
 
While COTS middleware can help in rapidly building distributed systems, COTS approaches work
 
well only if the environment they are intended to support (e.g., communications, host processors, etc.)
 
is VERY similar to the deployment environment. 
4.2.3 Adapted CORBA Client-Server Architecture 
Based on the lessons learned from FST-2, both Warnet and the middleware component of 
Shared Net evolved. Warnet continued to reduce packet loss and latency, and added new 
algorithms to better handle flow control and efficiently support broadcast protocols (such 
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as multicast). The Shared Net s middleware components also exhibited significant 
change: 
•	 Approximately 95% of the routines that used TCP/IP were rewritten to use 
Multicast. Only direct CORBA set and get methods were left using TCP/IP. 
•	 The Multicast layer was tailored to meet the parameters of the Warnet. This 
included automatically broadcasting each packet again after a fixed amount of 
time. 
•	 Middleware services were modified to implement a timed store-and-forward 
service where information destined for unreachable nodes is queued (for a 
bounded time), and delivered when communications was available. 
•	 The middleware client-stubs were substantially rewritten to mimic a write-
through cache. In general, all client read operations are served by a local object 
cache, an update service is then used to ensure that the distributed cache is 
synchronized between all clients and servers. 
The resulting architecture is virtually identical to that shown in Figure 3. In fact, one of 
the advantages of the middleware approach is that the implementation of the middleware 
components can be substantially changed (say by replacing TCP/IP with Multicast in 3 
months) without requiring changes to be made to servers or clients using the Shared Net 
middleware. 
The resulting modified architecture was fielded during FST-3 that took place at Camp 
Pendleton (near Oceanside, CA) during March 2001. 
Performance 
The performance of the modified COTS CORBA architecture used by Shared Net over 
Warnet was significantly better and generally usable. ECOC users, connected via a 
traditional Ethernet, retained their virtually identical CTP. However for the first time, 
fielded users, connected via Warnet, also saw a relatively common CTP. 
However, the CTP for fielded users wasn t perfect and tended to become less common as 
network communications became less reliable. COTS CORBA requests issued by the 
clients (sets and gets) were not able to get through during marginal communications. 
Similarly, when communications were re-established, each client requested 
retransmission of the multicast traffic it had missed and tried to resubmit CORBA calls 
that had failed. While the multicast rebroadcast approach helped to satisfy multiple 
client s needs with a single broadcast, the overall traffic on the Warnet was unacceptably 
high and reportedly could cause the network to go into flow control mode. 
This pointed out three significant issues for a tactical architecture: 
•	 Since each client acts independently, there is generally no mechanism to limit the 
impact that a rogue (or even greedy or starved) client can have on the network. 
•	 In mobile topologies, at some time or another the server is at the far end of the 
network, and the clients needing the information most are at the other. This 
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happened more often that we would have expected and has a significant impact on 
the network. 
•	 Having only a single server connected via a network that provides only occasional 
connectivity can significantly frustrate users who are used to working on a highly 
connected network. While this rightly falls in the no-duh category of obvious 
problems, it still hit us. We finally had to take away options that allowed users to 
refresh their screen by re-retrieving all of the information. 
Lesson Learned:
 
While COTS middleware can help in rapidly building distributed systems, COTS approaches work
 
well only if the network connectivity the COTS product is intended to support is similar to the one in
 
your deployment environment.
 
While this seems relatively obvious, its important to realize that most commercial 
software is not intended to support long (say > 30 second) communications outages. In 
most cases, the connections are dropped and the user is expected to reconnect at a later 
time. Blame is generally focused on the network service provider, since we are 
prepossessed to expect a perfect network. 
4.2.4 Distributed Middleware Servers 
The final version of the Shared Net middleware is currently being field tested running 
over both INITS and Warnet in preparation for ELB s Major Systems Demonstration #2, 
and the Marine Corps Capable Warrior exercises both occurring in the South West states 
during June 2001. 
The most significant change to the architecture has been in installing lite (NT laptop) 
versions of the Shared Net middleware servers in the majority of Warnet s 
communications nodes. In effect, there are now Shared Net nodes in HWMMVs, fixed 
wing aircraft, helicopters, and potentially LCACs. A total of 11 Shared Net servers will 
be used to support the upcoming exercises. 
Each Shared Net node is able to support a number of clients in the same way that the 
single server did. However, in this architecture, Shared Net nodes are also clients to 
other Shared Net nodes. In effect the distributed Shared Net servers implement a loose 
but ordered, quorum. The information available on a server is at least as good as the 
client could have received by itself, and in most cases is significantly better. 
This approach has a number of advantages, particularly in a tactical arena where 
communications outages will likely be common, and an accurate and timely local tactical 
picture is more important that a less timely (or accurate) regional picture: 
•	 The clients are more likely to be able to communicate with the local 
communication node s server than with a remote server. 
•	 The local server effectively maintains the local Common Tactical Picture to its 
local clients. It selectively shares this picture with other servers, and in turn 
receives updates from them, as communications bandwidth is available. 
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•	 Each server acts as a reliable store-and-forward service, once it receives a change 
from a client, it is the local Shared Net server s job to ensure its delivery it to all 
other interested2 servers. 
•	 The vast majority of traffic across the Warnet (or any haul network links) is now 
comprised of server-to-server updates rather than client-server communications. 
Performance 
In mobile field tests held during the past month, the distributed architecture appears to be 
meshing well with the tactical network. The test involved a command center aboard the 
USS Coronado docked in San Diego, multiple maneuvering Marine units (in both STOM 
and RSTA configurations) at Camp Pendleton, and RSTA units in El Centro, CA and 
Yuma, AZ. Each location was connected via Warnet; in some cases this required using 
multiple airborne relay hops. 
The clients associated with each local server shared an identical local (or relevant) 
Common Tactical Picture. They also received updates from other servers when 
communications were available (in some situations, connectivity was only provided for 
minutes each hour). 
Lesson Learned:
 
When its properly modified and selected, COTS middleware can support the information sharing
 
needed to maintain a Common Relevant Tactical Picture across tactical networks.
 
5 Learning From the Past 
While we learned a number of valuable lessons during this process, we have always been 
aware of the fact that news was almost always able to run across the tactical networks 
when our more advanced and capable systems could not. During some of the exercises 
news was virtually the only reliable way of moving information between commands, and 
the users moved significant amounts of information (in the form of spreadsheets, images, 
and documents) between each other by attaching them to news postings. Why then could 
this rather old product operate when we could not? 
News ability to function in this environment is largely due to the environment in which 
the Network News Transport Protocol (NNTP), used to exchange news postings across 
networks, was developed. NNTP was initially developed at a time when machines were 
very loosely connected by modems and dial-up connections. NNTP servers would 
occasionally dial-up another NNTP and share postings in selected news groups with 
each other. Connections were generally bad, and it was not unusual for the connection to 
break before the exchange was complete. As such NNTP provides the ability for servers 
to reconnect and resume the state of their last connection. 
In many ways, the characteristics of the network connections NNTP was developed to 
support are very similar to those we experience in tactical networks today. From a 
2 In our architecture, we assume that not all servers will share all information. For example, servers could 
be configured to share particular types of information within either geographic or echelon boundaries. 
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modern architecture point — NNTP may be rather sophisticated. In modern terms, NNTP 
implements a store-and-forward distributed server architecture that uses local caching and 
opportunistic subscription-based exchange. Interestingly enough, a significant subset of 
the same approaches that Shared Net eventually evolved to use. 
So why aren t our COTS components as resilient as our older approaches? There are two 
possible scenarios: 
1.	 There is little market force for this type of reliability. This seems rather unlikely 
since commercial organizations are spending a significant amount of money to 
make their systems fault tolerant. 
2.	 Our COTS components (and our own developers in general) assume a fairly high 
level of service from the underlying networks and protocols. As time pressure to 
develop software has increased, we ve moved our resources to implementing 
applications layered upon these services and give little though to how they will 
react under different network situations. 
The latter is not only likely, but it may be completely appropriate for COTS. It is 
important to realize that COTS is a market driven commodity. As such it is highly 
unlikely that a COTS manufacturer would invest the effort necessary to make their 
software tolerant of faults (or behaviors) that occur only on networks that are NOT used 
by any significant percentage of their market share. In any event, a customer suitably 
motivated to use a particular COTS middleware program will likely be willing to pay for 
customization, either by their own staff or the vendor. 
6 Communications Services for Tactical Networks 
Undoubtedly, COTS middleware can provide us with significantly enhanced capabilities 
to build information sharing systems. However, as we ve seen in the previous examples, 
out-of-the-box COTS, may be insufficient to meet our needs — particularly if we extend 
our information sharing systems across tactical networks. 
It is essential that we don t merely tune our systems to a target network. Like our 
software systems, networks are evolving at a rapid pace. Its unlikely that the network we 
use today will be the same as the ones the system will run on 5 years from now. Rather, 
we need to provide a generic set of communications services (either under or within our 
middleware layers) that will allow an integrator to configure the system to support the 
particular needs of their users and capabilities of their network(s). 
Our experience with Shared Net has shown us that we can use 85% or more of the out-of­
the-box COTS software services (for example, we can use persistence, but need to 
modify CORBA event services). The portion that needs to be modified is generally 
focused on lower level communications routines used by many of the higher level 
services. In order to maximize our portability (and ability to use any future COTS or 
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GOTS implementation that evolve to meet our tactical communications needs) we need 
to implement our changes within the structure of middleware standards. For example, if 
the specification of the CORBA event service meets our architectural needs, but the 
implementation will not run on a tactical network, then we need to re-implement the 
event service to give it greater capabilities, not write an entirely different service which 
would be unique to our system. 
Based on our lessons learned, these communication services need to have the following 
properties: 
Efficient & Transparent Encoding of Information. 
In many tactical networks, packet size must be small. It is important that we 
maximize the use of the network resource. However, at the application layer, the 
ability to share information between systems is largely based on more greedy forms. 
For example, XML provides a widely accepted interchange format that is easily read 
by other programs. Unfortunately, it is based on tagged ASCII text, which is hardly 
an efficient representation of numeric data. The communications layer should allow 
the applications to use these verbose forms, but should convert the information into a 
network-suitable form (encoding and packet size) before it transits the network, and 
transparently convert it back when it reaches the appropriate level on the other side. 
Error Correction and Recovery 
The reliability of our commercial networks, and the low cost of simply detecting (say 
thru checksums) and retransmitting corrupted packets have made the use of error 
correcting approaches less appealing. However, in instances were the networks are 
less reliable or retransmission imposes a significant time lag and/or excessive use of 
resources, error corrections and recover approaches can provide a significant 
enhancement network throughput. While these approaches increase the amount of 
information that needs to pass over the network, in many cases they will allow a 
damaged packet to be recovered thus avoiding the cost of retransmitting the packet 
again and allowing the information to be used more quickly. 
Quality of Service Indicators 
Not all information has the same delivery requirements. In some cases, critical 
information MUST be delivered as quickly as possible. In others, information might 
be delivered using a best-effort approach where the information is dropped if it can 
be delivered after a number of tries or may be queued for delivery until higher 
priority traffic has been delivered. Likewise, many type of information have a 
lifespan after which it is useless and can be discarded. Finally, certain types of 
information may be replaced — i.e., updates that supercede earlier updates should 
replace them rather than using the resources to transmit the original followed by the 
change. This service is not without dangers. Many systems using this service may 
be built upon belief of how network protocols such as TCP provide data (say totally 
ordered and complete). As such, the application layer should indicate the quality of 
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service it needs, and the communications layer should attempt to provide it or signal 
the reason why it cannot. 
Efficient Transport/Confirmation 
Standard IP protocols provide for either an acknowledgement for every message 
received (TCP) or no acknowledgements at all (UDP). The former uses a significant 
amount of bandwidth, and the later leaves responsibility for reliable and ordered 
deliver to the application layer. Neither are acceptable solutions for our tactical 
network. Commercial IP stack vendors are beginning to experiment with more 
optimistic acknowledgement approaches (such as negative acknowledgements, 
summary acknowledgements, and piggy-backing acknowledgements on regular 
outbound traffic.) The communications layer should utilize or offer these services to 
optimize reliable transport across the network. Additionally, it may be beneficial to 
adaptively and pre-emptively retransmit packets that our monitoring systems or 
recent history lead us to believe will not be received. 
Independence of the Distribution and Communications Models. 
In many commercial applications, the distribution model (one-to-one, one-to-many, 
or many-to-many) tends to dictate the communication model (unicast, multicast, etc.) 
As our experience has shown, some networks may not be amenable to certain 
communication models (as Warnet was not amenable to TCP). Unfortunately, in 
Shared Net the communication and distribution models were tightly coupled. By 
giving up TCP, we needlessly gave up the ability to give tailored information feeds 
to individual clients. This caused a significant loss of capabilities and was an 
extremely inefficient use of bandwidth. The communications layer should be wholly 
independent of the distribution model. 
Support for Partial Ordering of Events. 
Communication protocols, like UDP, do not guarantee that packets will be delivered 
to the application in the same order they were delivered. Further, using the Quality 
of Service Indicator means that under certain conditions, packets should not be 
delivered at all. In total ordering systems, packets are only delivered to the 
application if all previous packets have already been sent up. This can result in sever 
time delays especially if the retransmission delay is long. Often, this is mitigated by 
waiting a maximum amount of time before giving up on the packet and processing 
the rest that are behind it. The total ordering requirement is often unnecessarily 
strict. In most of our systems, a more relaxed, or partial ordering, of events would be 
entirely sufficient. For example, its important that a create event on object A is 
processed before an modify event on the same object. However, the order in which I 
process create events on objects B and C is unimportant. If the create event on 
object A is not delivered, then we must suspend processing of the modify on object 
A. However, we are completely free to process the create events on objects B & C. 
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7 Living The Dream 
The promise of building distributed information sharing systems using COTS middleware 
components is alive and bright. Our experience over the past four years has shown that 
many of these components and approaches can be directly used in the tactical 
environment. 
However, tactical networks provide a level of service that currently is significantly 
different from that offered by commercial wired networks familiar to most developers. 
As a result, portions of these middleware products do not perform well on tactical 
networks, and must be adapted before they can be used. 
The significant evolution that has taken place in the Shared Net application over the past 
three years could not have been accomplished with our small team without middleware. 
The fact that these significant changes were made within minor or no impact on the 
clients is a strong endorsement middleware ability to provide a service-based 
architecture. 
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Abstract 
Information Age technology offers empowering opportunities to the organizations that 
can best take advantage of them. The Navy introduced network centric warfare as their 
Information Age concept. Unfortunately, the current acquisition system strangles initiative and 
precludes motivated Naval personnel from initiating network centric operations in the fleet. 
Further, this acquisition system will not permit the procurement of the more technically 
challenging network centric components needed for a true long term network centric force. 
Analyzing the five tenets of the network centric warfare concept reveals tangible end 
items needed to grow a network centric force. The results of those analyses suggest these 
requirements separate into two groups: essential hardware and software acquirable in the near 
term by adjusting the current acquisition system; and advanced networks and platforms available 
only after fundamental change to the acquisition process. This paper indicates these short term 
adjustments will launch rudimentary network centric operations in the Navy while the necessary 
long term reforms will make possible the envisioned future network centric force. 
Keywords 
network centric warfare; DoD acquisition process; joint requirements; military innovation; 
program management. 
Introduction 
The Information Age is rapidly permeating the existing Industrial Age business and 
social infrastructure. Shifts in the evolution of work offer considerable opportunity to those who 
change effectively. The Navy recognizes this opportunity and has responded with a broadly 
defined concept known as network centric warfare, designed to capitalize on those novel 
technologies. Proponents predict network centric warfare will qualitatively improve the Navy, 
allowing it to meet its commitments without significant funding increases. However, change 
involves risk. Most observers agree that adopting network centric warfare concepts will cause 
significant and long lasting change to the Navy. Critics deride the notion of "Lifting the Fog of 
War", (Owens, 2000) as Admiral Bill Owens puts it. Marine Colonel T. X. Hammes argues that 
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network centric warfare will not survive the first salvo (Hammes 1998). The happy news is that 
this tension is healthy and will ensure that network centric warfare will meet the nation’s needs. 
Unfortunately, the current acquisition system stifles innovation and prevents fiscal 
flexibility. Moreover, the longer term outlook for acquiring the true revolutionary network 
centric warfare tools is worse. The platform centric acquisition process will not support the 
needed procurement for a network centric Naval force. Parochialism, both platform and service 
oriented, is a sturdy roadblock to necessary enlightened thinking. Congress oversees DoD 
spending "in an episodic, erratic manner. (Hamilton 1999)" 
Perspective 
The Navy already owns the resources who can start network centric warfare in the Fleet; 
its people. Daily, hundreds of sailors, Marines, and Navy civilians use networks attempt to 
institute innovative new ways to execute operations more efficiently and effectively, but are most 
often thwarted. Numerous examples illustrate this daily frustration. 
Shipboard configuration control requires testing nominated software, but the 
configuration control authority has insufficient funds to test all potential software introductions. 
Yet the software provider is not allowed to pay for the testing either, so a Fleet need goes 
unfilled (Patterson 2001). 
Another example is the Navy’s inability to translate an unexpected winning idea into an 
organized and supported program. A program known as Collaboration at Sea (CaS) first 
deployed in the USS John C. Stennis battle group in January 2000. Increased battle group 
situational awareness, reduced routine message traffic, and improved battle group collaboration 
resulted. Consequently CaS was installed on all subsequent deploying battle groups. 
Nevertheless, CaS could provide considerably more network-based capability for the warfighters 
if not for the lack of an official program sponsor or integrated support infrastructure. 
There is precedence for progress. After World War I the Navy developed a new way of 
naval warfare based on carrier aviation, despite limited funding. The keys were open debate, 
rapid establishment of a supporting bureaucracy, and experimentation and concept development. 
Most importantly, the dialogue between Naval War College, the Washington Navy bureaus, and 
the fleet was nearly continuous. 
How can the Navy grow a network centric force with this intractable acquisition 
process? This paper bridges the gap between the high brow concepts of network centric warfare 
and the hardscrabble realities of the current acquisition process by using a three step process: 
1) understand the network centric warfare concepts and equate those concepts to operationally 
relevant examples; 2) analyze those examples and find tangible requirements and their associated 
characteristics needed to achieve a network centric force; and 3) determine potential strategies 
for achieving the necessary adjustments and reforms necessary to move towards a Navy network 
centric force. The process result is a potential way ahead to both kick start network centric 
operations today and achieve the advanced network centric warfare force of the future. 
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 Understanding Network Centric Warfare 
The Naval Warfare Development Command is responsible for concept development in 
the Navy. They define network centric warfare with five tenets (see figure 1) (Martoglio 2000). 
In the complete paper an operational example is designed to examine Naval force 
employment across a broad spectrum of warfare challenges, from peace operations to 
conventional warfare. This translation into an operational example brings clarity to 
what many argue is just wishful thinking. For the sake of brevity, analyzing the operational 
example generates the following requirements, as noted in figure 2.
NWDC Network Centric Warfare Concepts
 1. Know the adversary
 2. Establish situational awareness
 3. Iteratively create commanders intent
 4. Decentralized execution
 5. Self synchronization 
Figure 1: NWDC Network Centric Warfare Tenets

 NETWORK CENTRIC WARFARE EQUIPMENT 
REQUIREMENTS 
NEAR TERM 
(modify current acquisition process) 
LONG TERM 
(reform acquisition process) 
Internet Protocol Based Force 
Coordination and Planning Network 
Knowledge Sharing Infrastructure 
Visualization and Awareness Tools 
Widespread Force Control Network 
Deployable Micro Sensor Grids 
Unmanned Combat Vehicles 
Engagement Grids
 Figure 2: Representative Network Centric Warfare Equipment Requirements
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When these requirements are analyzed, they split into two broad categories: capabilities 
acquirable by using the existing acquisition system; and the technically and doctrinally 
challenging items, that can only be acquired after reforms of the current acquisition system. 
Adjusting the Current Acquisition System 
Obstructions experienced daily that are attributable to the current acquisition system 
include the inflexibility of the system to move money, the disastrous side effects of well 
intentioned rules, and the lack of structure and support for innovative ideas. These obstructions 
slow acquisition of the identified near term requirements and stifle innovation. Several 
modifications to the acquisition process can assist making the Navy network centric today. 
First, realizing the existing and future benefits that the current acquisition process 
provides is important. These benefits are found in the realm of program management. From the 
integrated product teams, which first put together a program, to the lifecycle functions that 
nourish programs, the program manager and his or her team provide a plethora of services that 
sustain specific programs. Program managers support programs by identifying and supplying 
required maintenance, manpower, supply support, training and associated training devices, and 
support equipment. Program managers actively seek improvements to their programs during its 
lifecycle, and when a program reaches the end of service, ensure that disposal requirements 
mandated by law are satisfied. Program managers and their staffs are acquisition professionals; 
most are highly trained and experienced in their fields of expertise. 
Just as in industry, the fleet operators, day in and day out, observe ways to improve 
operational processes. Capitalizing on the immense pool of intellect in the fleet can rapidly 
improve the use of the new technologically advanced tools and move the Navy forward towards 
networked operations. 
For such an idea to succeed, it needs four components: 1) an operational advocate who 
can push the opportunity; 2) an organization that ensures associated education and training are 
given to all fleet users; 3) a systems command to provide program office support for 
installations, logistics support, and manuals; and 4) a program sponsor to provide necessary 
funding. The Rapid Prototyping Cell at Naval Air and Strike Warfare Center meet these 
requirements, and has succeeded or is in the middle of migrating ten fleet generated ideas to the 
entire fleet( Wilke 2001). This idea should be tried at other primary warfare centers. 
This approach can be more successful if program sponsors were given more leeway in 
how they apportioned their money. Extending a model started in the Army several years ago, 
known as the Warfighting Rapid Acquisition Program (WRAP), offers one way of greatly 
increasing the flexibility and spending discretion of the CNO’s program sponsors. For fiscal year 
1998, the Department of the Army set aside $100 million for accelerating the "procurement of 
systems identified through warfighting experiments as compelling successes that satisfy urgent 
needs (Department of the Army, 1999)." The Chief of Staff of the Army himself approved 
disbursement of the monies. The purpose of the fund was to support rapid prototyping of 
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promising technologies emerging from any of the nine Army battle laboratories. Response time 
for funding requests was 30 days maximum. 
If program sponsors on the CNO’s staff had access to money of this magnitude, it would 
greatly increase their flexibility. For example, CaS rapidly gained high level support, but 
remains burdened with unsupplied promise. If a program sponsor could have responded within 
30 days with the approximately $3 million needed to properly execute the CaS program, the 
Navy would already be reaping the additional potential benefits CaS offers. 
The unintended negative consequences of bureaucratic rules continue to plague 
innovation. Reinstitute the 1994 DoD rule which states: 
Waiver-of-regulations requests must be acted upon within 30 days. After 30 days, 
if no answer is forthcoming, the party asking for the waiver can assume approval and 
implement the waiver. Those officials with the authority to change regulations can 
approve waiver requests, but only the head of the agency can deny a request (Collins 
1999). 
These adjustments can make a credible difference in starting network centric operations 
in the Navy. Give sailors a chance to be innovative, and there is no end to what may be 
accomplished, even before the high technology tools promised in the future become available. 
Reforming the Acquisition Process to Complete the Network Centric Warfare 
Dream 
Gaining the new tools of network centric warfare requires structural change in the current 
acquisition system. The acquisition system must change the mindset of the participants from an 
Industrial Age focus on platforms to an Information Age focus on networks. The networks will 
be the drivers of network centric success; platforms, sensors, weapons, and personnel must plug 
in and use the network to best tactical and operational advantage. 
Admiral Owens suggest a small cadre that produces joint requirements and budgets the 
Department of Defense (DoD) resource allocation according to those requirements (Owens 
2000). The Special Operations Command already conducts joint requirements generation and 
budgeting for all the services’ special forces. The Swedish Armed Forces use a cadre of less than 
100 people to do the same for their armed forces (Gustafsson 2001). Owens’ idea requires 
Congressional action to change the meaning and definition of Title X in the United States Code. 
Moreover, Congress must pass legislation regulating its own role in DoD oversight. 
They must focus their oversight on ensuring the DoD is moving towards an Information Age 
force, an added responsibility. However, they must also agree to eliminate the duplicative and 
conflicting oversight by which they now subject the DoD. This can be accomplished by: 1) 
establishing one DoD organization which serves as Congress’ single point of contact with DoD; 
2) institute an electronic tracking system for Congressional information requests; 3) agree upon 
recurring reports and procedures which minimize unscheduled requests (Scott 1995); and 
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4) require Congress to establish a cost benefit measure for oversight and report that measure 
publicly twice a year. 
Final Thoughts 
Network centric warfare is not just about buying new technology, but smartly and 
effectively employing that technology in new and innovative ways. Adjusting the current 
acquisition process will enable the Navy to start network centric operations today, setting the 
foundation for the new and revolutionary tools to follow. The transition from the present 
platform centric force to the fully netted force of the future also requires a carefully considered 
migration plan. This means change management. Finally, modifications and reforms to the 
acquisition process will help the Navy achieve network centric warfare, but not all by itself. 
Changes to our education and training process, forward thinking leadership, and the rapid 
development of tactics, techniques, procedures, and doctrine will share the forefront. 
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Abstract 
A changing geo-political environment, growing reliance on economies beyond our borders, and 
requirements for U.S. presence in remote locations; place increased demands on logistics 
systems and networks to provide the right material, to the right location at the right time while 
supporting an ever changing mission. The U.S. Government s lengthy and complex resourcing 
process, combined with the numerous stovepipe organizational relationships, makes it difficult to 
obtain the material, and personnel required to meet the challenges of this highly dynamic 
environment. The current desire for varied and more detailed information will require a 
responsive partnership of organizations and the effective integration of data, information, and 
decision makers. Failure to utilize modern information management techniques and capabilities 
will yield sub-optimized decisions, wasted resources, and unsatisfactory results. 
Keywords 
Sub-optimized, decision support, logistics network, transportation, inventory management, just-
in-time, financial management 
Disclaimer 
The views expressed in this discussion do not necessarily represent the official position of the 
U.S. Navy, or the Commander in Chief, U.S. Pacific Fleet. 
Introduction 
Modern military actions require the effective management of assigned assets, and the ability to 
obtain adequate resources to operate and maintain them. The Federal Government s Planning, 
Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS) process, requires the Department of Defense (DOD) to 
submit annual budget requests to the President approximately eighteen months prior to the start 
of the fiscal year the funds are needed. Budget requests cover a five year period, the Five Year 
Defense Program (FYDP), placing demands on agencies to predict future year funding years up 
to thirty months in advance of actual resource spending. Challenges exist when service agencies 
must predict: global threats, platforms or force structure (ship, aircraft) to counter these threats, 
personnel (grade level, skill set, replacement) to support execution plans, research & 
development initiatives to meet out year threats, and annual facility and unit operations and 
maintenance resources. Within the Department of the Navy (DON) this effort requires a 
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complex balance of future capability with the need to go Forward From the Sea anytime, 
anywhere. Historically, prior execution has been the basis for projecting future requirements 
however, significant benefit would be derived if better predictive models were available, and 
assisted support systems were developed to bring together the numerous disparate legacy 
information management systems in order to provide accountable personnel with the knowledge 
needed to make better decisions. 
The Challenge of Change 
The security environment in which we live is dynamic and uncertain, replete with a host of 
threats and challenges that have the potential to grow more deadly. 
President Clinton, National Security Strategy, 1999 
The demise of the Cold War has resulted in the development of strategic plans which are based 
on the assumption that there will be no Naval peer competitor for the next two decades. There is 
a recognition that in order to ensure regional stability the Navy will need to maintain a forward 
presence in the Middle East, Asia, Europe, and the Americas. The threat will include the transfer 
of technologically advanced weapons and sensor systems as well as nuclear, biological, and 
chemical weapons to aggressor states. 
In order to prepare for the future, the impacts of fiscal restraint of our adversaries, our allied or 
coalition forces, and ourselves can not be downplayed. As an example the costs associated with 
building, operating, and maintaining modern nuclear submarines while maintaining a stealth-like 
operational signature results in foreign powers constructing conventional submarines in order to 
provide this important capability. This threat has been a major concern to maritime nations since 
World War II. During RIMPAC 2000, a major fleet exercise that takes place every other year 
with nations around the Pacific rim, the Royal Australian Navy s (RAN) Collins Class 
submarine demonstrated such a capability, highlighting the importance of working with our 
allies and friends in order to ensure global challenges are met with a balanced and coordinated 
concept of operations, and training regime. 
The U.S. Navy must continue to dominate the maritime environment to dissuade regional powers 
from aggressive actions, and be prepared to engage in a full spectrum of Military Operations 
Other than War (MOOTW). Recent global events highlight the Navy s role in humanitarian 
disaster relief, non-combatant evacuation operations (NEO), peace support missions, 
enforcement of embargoes and no-fly zones, drug interdiction, illegal immigration, international 
criminal activity, and rapid response to terrorism. 
In order to meet the challenge of change we must be able to sustain a long-term, forward 
deployed presence. Within the Pacific Fleet this can mean supporting our deployed forces 
through the discipline of sea-based logistics with a full spectrum of battle force replenishment, 
operational logistics, weapons handling, force support, maintenance, and infrastructure from 
logistics bases over 14,000 NM away. These disciplines include the challenges of: conducting re­
supply in sea state 3 conditions, Total Asset Visibility, providing logistics information to 
operators, safe knowledgeable weapons handling, anti-fouling coatings and deck coverings, 
transportation, re-supply and predictive maintenance actions. (Natter, 2000) 
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With this background of dynamic and asymmetric missions or tasks, and the Tyranny of Distance 
it is important that we recognize the need to ensure that we can join forces with our allies in 
order to meet today s threats as we attempt to prepare for an uncertain future. Figure 1 depicts, 
the importance of recognizing that our supply needs may change as our situation changes. 
Where is our resupply of Bullets ?
 
Hey! They re lighting their arrows !! 

Can they DO that ?
 
I think we need a couple of fire extinguishers !!
 
What are the chances that our prime vendor s just in time 
supply will get the fire extinguishers to us in time ? 
Fig. 1: The changing environment 
Balance — Requirements verses Resources 
In order to ensure the maximum availability of material, personnel and equipment required to 
meet the current and future threats to global security, the Department of Defense must evaluate 
all potential threats and analyze the resources required to neutralize, minimize, or eliminate those 
threats. We must also recognize that previous defense strategies may not work in the future. As 
an example we can no longer count on our strategic forces to deter a foreign power from a first 
strike attack. Likewise, increased use of chemical and biological weapons by military, para­
military, and others is an indication of vulnerability which places new demands on governments 
to provide protection for the general population. Finally, the increasing complexities of an urban 
battleground add to the need for a greater balance of requirements to resources and the essential 
availability of real time knowledge to optimize the warfighter s decisions. 
Force structure 
In order to ensure that the warfighter has the maximum number of options the DOD must have a 
well defined, trained and ready force, whose capabilities are understood and can be relied upon 
to be available when required. Unfortunately, as resources become more scarce the Force 
Structure must become more flexible in order to respond to increased missions. In the U.S. Navy 
this has resulted in fewer platforms being built and available, while adding weapons or mission 
response capabilities of those platforms. Add to this the challenges of being prepared to meet 
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any mission on a moments notice, ensuring increased system reliability, maintenance and support 
for current equipment, systems and personnel; there is an increasing need to ensure that we 
optimize the resources and remain focused on the mission. While platforms and weapons 
systems are needed to meet current and future challenges, we must ensure that these systems are 
fully operational when required. This effective balance of current and future force requirements 
is challenging when the resource acquisition process is as lengthy and complex as the federal 
government s Planning, Programming, Budgeting System (PPBS). 
Resources 
The PPBS process normally focuses on a five year requirements plan. It starts at the activity 
level and must go through numerous management layers before the President submits the budget 
to congress for review, authorization to spend and appropriation. This lengthy process requires 
the DOD to either do without certain capabilities for several years, realign funds from adequately 
funded programs, or a combination of the two. 
The impacts can be significant when plans are delayed, requirements are changed, or projected 
costs are not accurate. In addition, many organizations within the DOD, have their own focus 
and do not always share information or collaborate on key initiatives. A major ship repair 
function (overhaul) that is deferred from one year to the next, can have an impact to fleet 
readiness and capability in a numbers of areas. Such a decision by one accountable organization 
can pass additional resource implications to another. When a scheduled overhaul replaces a 
major weapons system (e.g. new radar), the system must be tested in an operational environment 
and the operators trained on it s effective use. This requires school house training, range 
facilities, real world training scenarios, and adequate time to hone the necessary skills to 
optimize system performance. It is also unreasonable to assume that every system will perform 
exactly as envisioned or that the design was fully functional at time of installation; which would 
necessitate a reallocation of resources and potentially impact to deployment patterns. In each 
case resources will need to be redirected from other program areas in order to ensure proper 
performance. 
Recent General Accounting Office (GAO) audits of spare parts cost analysis have indicated that 
our projections have not been accurate and that our information systems do not provide an 
adequate audit trail to validate spending. Over the period 1994 to 1999 Navy-managed aviation 
parts increased at an average annual rate of 12%. Over the same period, when prices of high 
volume demand items were reviewed, it was noted that the average annual rates increased by 
27% (Zuckerstein et al. 2000). In recent years congress has provided supplemental funding to 
meet many of the shortfalls resulting from inaccurate projections. In order to ensure that the 
funds were being spent for their intended purposes GAO was asked to review DON accounting 
records. The review indicated that there was inadequate information to verify how the increase 
in funding had been spent (Overton et al. 2001). 
Although funding is required to meet the DOD s goods and services requirements Dollars 
don t fix broken systems material and people do. It is important that we turn our attention to 
material requirements and the resources necessary to have the right material, in the right place, at 
the right time. 
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Logistics 
I don t know what this logistics thing is that Marshall keeps talking about, but I want some of 
it!  Admiral Ernie King — 1942 
The area of logistics brings together the disciplines of staffing, training, warehousing, inventory 
management, transportation, procurement, repair, and maintenance. While most requirements 
can be satisfied by financial resources, there may be some instances where all the resources in 
the world will not allow actions to be taken within the desired timeframe. Therefore it is 
essential that an effective information/knowledge management system be available to meet the 
demands of complex logistics requirements. 
Inventory Management & Storage 
In order to ensure that material is available to the customer, whether in maintenance (a repair 
part) or as a consumable (food, fuel, paper towels), warehouse and inventory management 
personnel must have a good understanding of future demand. If a ship consumed $546,000 in 
fuel during underway operations last month but is going to be inport for the next six months 
there is little need to warehouse a large quantity of fuel. Inventory managers and procurement 
agents need to know ships operating schedules in order to ensure proper material is available 
either from on-board inventory or government/commercial sources. Likewise if the Ships 
Engineer is planning to clean the fuel storage tanks, the inventory manager needs to ensure that 
he can remove or not replenish fuel out of or into that storage location. The significant challenge 
to material availability is a through knowledge of the anticipated demand for that material and 
the logistics network s ability to provide that material. 
New or repair existing 
One of the essential elements in effective inventory management is the ability to evaluate and 
predict future requirements. Although prior demand history may provide a good starting point 
for the 75% solution, greater predictability is required in order to ensure proper decisions are 
made. It is equally important that we have accurate and unbiased information. As previously 
stated there are two major categories of material, repair and consumable. There is little 
flexibility in obtaining new consumable items, one must go to the manufacturer; but there are 
several options available to our modern military forces with respect to repairable items. 
Historically the navy has recognized three levels of repair and maintenance; Organizational (O), 
Intermediate (I), and Depot (D). When we consider which level of repair/maintenance is 
appropriate, we evaluate the performing activities capability to complete the task. The typical 
limiting factors are; lack of skill, lack of material, lack of facility, lack of equipment, or lack of 
knowledge. In order to repair system components or maintain systems we must understand the 
meantime between failure, the length of service of the affected component or system, and the 
anticipated replacement/service life. As we will see naval aviation readiness data indicates that 
we have not solved the problem. 
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Figure 2 highlights the number of different Naval Aviation supply parts that are managed by 
government parts item managers. As the left pie indicates 76% of the material is managed by the 
Defense Logistics Agency (DLA), however it is important to note that the high cost items 
required to support naval aviation are Navy managed. The center pie depicts the 164,000 parts 
managed by Navy, 75% of those items had zero demand from all Naval sources (Navy, Marine 
Corps, and Naval Reserve) while 8,330 items had only one demand. The balance of the Navy-
managed items 31,400 had greater than one demand, unfortunately 29% of those items were in 
backorder status at the end of the year. 
14 
Naval Aviation Material 
number of different line items 
680 thousand 164 thousand 
DLA & DON DON DON > 1 
31.4 thousand 
Fig. 2: Number of Aviation Line Items managed by DLA (76%) & DON (24%); FY-00 DON 
Aviation Material with Zero demand (75%), 1 demand (8%), & >1 demand (17%); and 
requisitions filled in FY-00 
(71%), & on backorder at year end (29%). 
Delivery and Transportation 
A recent study by navy inventory managers found that it takes an average of 39.4 days for a 
repairable item to be received at the designated repair site. The proposed solution, developed by 
a logistics stovepipe organization, without the participation of the fleet customer, will utilize 
express air freight services from the commercial contract transportation network. This solution 
fails to acknowledge that the customer is extremely mobile, and may have already contracted for 
government transportation to move passengers, equipment, or other supplies. We must also 
recognize that capabilities which exist today in the private sector may not be available in the 
future. The first American victory in the revolutionary war was against an outsourced army, 
when George Washington defeated the Hessians at Trenton. Modern Just in Time inventory 
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management practices in private sector work best in fairly stable production processes, but tend 
to break down when used in a more dynamic environment (Noreen and Garrison 1997). 
From 1992 — 1999 we saw flight operations reduced by 30% (Hall et al. 2001) this was in part 
because of the lack of funding but more importantly the lack of material. As previously stated 
the most important element of the logistics equation is the ability to have the material available 
when and where required. This challenge must be met with the effective integration of the entire 
logistics process both maintenance and supply. The maintenance organization must be able to 
identify when and where maintenance must be performed and the supply process must ensure 
that the production/repair, warehouse, and transportation capabilities are available to meet the 
demand. In order to be successful we must break down stovepipe processes and ensure that 
information and knowledge is available to all appropriate stakeholders. 
Disparate information sources 
In this environment of increasing threats and limited resources it is essential to bring together 
information from the numerous stakeholders and the legacy systems that had evolved out of 
developing processes and management information systems, without the benefit of a strategic 
focus to bring them all to a common solution. The Defense Reform Initiative Directive #47 
(DRID 47) identified the need for the DOD to operate in a shared electronic data environment. 
The final report identified the need to effectively integrate knowledge based solutions and the 
need for the seamless exchange of information (Hambre - 2000). 
This resulted in the Department s focus on the need to move toward an Enterprise Resource 
Planning (ERP) solution used by many of the leading global corporations to standardize business 
processes, application software, and facilitate a change management process. The cornerstone of 
the ERP process was the migration of numerous legacy information systems to standard 
applications using common data elements across all business applications. Current estimates are 
that the ERP process will take 8-10 years to complete and will cost the Navy in excess of 
$1.8Billion. 
As figure 3 indicates there are many elements of the supply portion of the logistics process each 
with their own link to meaningful information. Should the links break information will be lost 
and sub-optimized solutions developed. Figure 4 shows that there are many stovepipe 
organizations that do not adequately share information with one another creating many instances 
where stakeholders are not coordinating their actions with one another. This ultimately has a 
negative impact on the fleet which is responsible for providing trained and ready forces to meet 
any possible mission task. 
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Right Information  to the Right People  at the Right time. 
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Solution 
The significant problems we face cannot be solved with the same level of thinking that created 
them.  Albert Einstein 
In his paper Information-Centric Decision-Support Systems: A Blueprint for Interoperability , 
Dr Jens Pohl highlights the importance of creating a decision support environment where 
computers can focus on the functions that they perform best, and humans can collaborate in the 
decision process with the requisite knowledge to optimize the solutions. Truly optimized 
decisions can be made once the human computer partnership has been established and 
organizations have progressed to an environment of Business Intelligence which brings together 
effective, computer-assisted (agent), information management and knowledge building (Pohl ­
2001). Figure 5 depicts the need to migrate from data to understanding in order to ensure better 
decisions are made. 
Trail to Better Decisions
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Fig. 5: Trail to Better Decisions 
Dr. Philip Abraham the Logistics Program Manager for the Office of Naval Research, has 
recognized the need to bring various logistics projects and initiatives together for a common 
readiness focus. He has asked fleet representatives to participate in design specifications, 
program reviews, requirements definition, and integration efforts. There are two decision 
support projects that utilize agent based capabilities to provide a collaborative interactive tool to 
support fleet operations. The Shipboard Integrated Logistics Support (SILS) brings together 
numerous shipboard logistics R&D efforts in order to provide Commanding Officers with a 
balanced table top of information for optimized decisions. This project focuses on many of the 
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elements of Admiral Natter s Strategic Planning Guidance. Both of these projects have included 
key operational personnel in the development of a proof of concept and this participation should 
help to facilitate the transition of the projects through the PPBS process to ensure fleet support, 
as they migrate to operational status. 
Future 
Changing requirements challenge the logistics community to ensure that adequate inventories 
available when needed. This will necessitate a need to anticipate future requirements, tasking, 
capabilities, and sources of supply. Agents provide an excellent opportunity to bring balance to 
our information needs and ensure that all stakeholders are working from a common 
data/information source. Within the Pacific Fleet there is a need to also be able to collaborate 
with our allies and sister services in order to meet anticipated regional threats. 
A recent CINCPACFLT Logistics partnership was created to prototype a maintenance, supply, 
transportation, and repair process that would allow repairable items to be screened, repaired, and 
certified at a local level without the need for costly transportation, long lead time, and expensive 
depot overhead and repair. This initiative is expected to not only save repair funds but reduce 
the need for high inventory outlay; while increasing material readiness and providing more 
meaningful shore duty assignments for qualified military personnel One of the critical success 
factors is the effective integration of information and the availability of that information to the 
appropriate decision makers. 
Figure 6 displays an information network that ties together the key logistics elements of fleet 
operations with the capability to focus on the critical information in the decision making process. 
Fig.6: Achieving a Balance
 
208 
s 
 
  
 
Once this network is in place, collaboration can occur and communities of practice can come 
together to support decisions based on related functional information. Figure 7 highlights a 
streamlined organization and information network that allows for true collaboration to occur with 
the numerous and varied stakeholders. 
CPF Vision MIS Sharing
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Fig.7: Enhancing Communities of Practice 
Summary 
Changing requirements, an uncertain future and limited resources challenge us to do more with 
less. It is more important than ever that we anticipate our future material requirements in order 
to ensure that equipment and personnel perform as required. As the U.S. continues to be a global 
partner in the world we must maintain strong ties with our allies to maintain free and open access 
to global commerce. Likewise our humanitarian interest place additional demands on Naval 
Forces. The critical catalyst is meaningful, accurate, and timely information. As we become 
exposed to more and more information, intelligent agents can help the decision maker focus on 
the information required for a particular decision and prioritize the balance. Failure to manage 
information will result in sub-optimized solutions that could also result in loss of valuable 
material and personnel assets. Failure is not an option. Figure 8 depicts an optimized decision 
support process that brings together the various information sources that are essential to an 
optimized decision. 
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Fig.8: Proper Assessment results in better decisions and Actions 
On November 30, 1942 the U. S. Navy s Task Force 67 made up of four heavy cruisers 
(Minneapolis, New Orleans, Pensacola, and Northampton), one light cruiser (Honolulu), and six 
destroyers (Fletcher, Perkins, Maury, Drayton, Lamson, and Lardner) steamed through the 
Soloman Islands to attack a Japanese resupply force heading for Guadalcanal. The U.S. Forces 
were well prepared, a plan had been developed based on lessons learned from previous naval 
engagements, and the men embarked were at battle stations. 
At 2310 the lead ship (Fletcher) identified a Japanese target using it s new high tech radar and 
six minutes later requested permission to fire torpedoes. At 2320 Commander, Task Force 67 
granted permission to fire, unfortunately the Japanese force had closed to 7,300 yards, a distance 
that would enable their weapons to reach TF-67. Within a minute the U.S. Commander ordered 
the heavy guns on his cruisers to open fire, before the torpedoes had a chance to reach their 
targets. By daylight TF67 had sunk 4 Japanese DD s, and damaged 2 more, the U.S. had lost 
Northampton, and Pensacola, New Orleans, & Minneapolis were heavily damaged. New 
Orleans was struck by a Japanese torpedo hitting the forward ammunition compartment and 
ripping the bow off at the number two 8 gun mount. The three cruisers were repaired and 
returned to action in other naval battles, however the 413 men that lost their lives that night 
would not return to fight again. 
The advantages of hindsight provide an opportunity to evaluate if better U.S. decisions could 
have been made. Although the decision to delay firing on the Japanese force may have had 
impact, there were many other factors outside the control of the on scene personnel that played 
an even greater role in the outcome. Radar was a new technology that had been deployed to our 
fleet and there had not been adequate familiarization with it s capability or reliability. (USS New 
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Orleans had Radar installed after the attack at Pearl Harbor) The use of smokeless gun powder 
may have provided some advantages but the bright flash that emitted from the gun barrels at 
midnight proved to provide an excellent visual bearing for reactive enemy actions. The Japanese 
forces did not have the advantage of Radar and relied on visual references and high resolution 
optics for their fire control solutions. 
However the most critical problem may have been associated with U.S. torpedo development. 
Prior to the war the Navy s ordnance bureau had developed a faster, longer range torpedo. 
Unfortunately, the entire end-to-end capability of the weapon system was not fully tested prior to 
deployment, and critical design flaws in the exploder mechanism resulted in weapon failures. At 
the beginning of the war a naval officer from the Bureau of Ordnance visited Professor Albert 
Einstein to demonstrate the new technology. Professor Einstein informed him after a brief 
review, that the exploder mechanism had a design flaw that would preclude the firing pin from 
performing properly. The next day Einstein provided a sketch of a modification that would 
allow the firing pin to perform as it should. It is also important to note that the U.S. Submarine 
force had been experiencing similar problems with torpedoes malfunctioning. Rear Admiral 
Charles Lockwood (COMSUBPAC) in 1943 provided detailed experiments on torpedo 
performance to prove the design flaw, unfortunately it was not until 1944, long after the major 
and significant naval battles of the Pacific were over, that the problem was corrected. (Crenshaw 
—1995) 
As future Naval Commanders seek to ensure program balance it is imperative that objectives, 
visions, missions, roles, and responsibilities are kept in perspective, we must focus on our 
collective missions and never lose sight of the importance we play in support of our National 
Security Strategy (Figure 9 pertains). 
Fig.9: Keeping things in perspective
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Author s Note: This paper is dedicated to Captain John L. Neff USN (Ret) who served from 
December 1941 to June 1972 and received his final honors in May 2001 during the preparation 
of this manuscript. For over 26 years he has asked how s the fleet ? . It is this background of 
love, devotion, honor, and respect that I acknowledge a man who inspired, directed, and 
encouraged me to focus on the fleet. To you Sir, I thank you for your constant presence in my 
life and appreciate the sacrifice you made during your naval career. I trust that the lessons 
learned from the evening of November 30, 1942 will be used to ensure that the fleet is prepared 
to go forward from the sea any time any place. 
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